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Abstract
Combining data encryption, fragmentation, and dispersal is a proven but not
widely used way of reinforcing data confidentiality, availability, and integrity
in distributed storage environments. Nowadays, it is being reconsidered with
the emergence of the cloud storage and the growing interest in internet-of-
things. Multiple questions arise within these two new contexts: How to
guarantee data protection even in a situation when the attacker acquired the
encryption key? How to protect outsourced data against a curious storage
provider and malicious attackers? How to provide data confidentiality in a
sensor network where real-time data collection is not possible?
This thesis dissertation revisits state-of-the-art fragmentation techniques
making them faster and cost-efficient. The main focus is put on increasing
data confidentiality without deteriorating the processing performance. The
ultimate goal is to provide a user with a set of fast fragmentation meth-
ods that could be directly applied inside an industrial context to reinforce
the confidentiality of the stored data and/or accelerate the fragmentation
processing.
First, a rich survey on fragmentation as a way of preserving data con-
fidentiality is presented. It introduces two new definitions dividing frag-
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mentation into bitwise and structurewise. Relevant techniques are described
in details and compared in terms of data protection level, storage overhead,
and complexity. Performance benchmarks confirm the theoretical complexity
evaluation. Not only techniques, but also relevant academic and commercial
systems are presented. Their main characteristics are described. The aca-
demic and commercial approaches are compared. Several recommendations
are given on the design of an efficient fragmentation system.
Second, the family all-or-nothing transforms is extended with three new
proposals. They all aim at protecting encrypted and fragmented data against
the exposure of the encryption key but are designed to be employed in three
different contexts: for data fragmentation in a multi-cloud environment, a
distributed storage system, and an environment composed of one storage
provider and one private device. Complexity evaluation and performance
benchmark show that they are the fastest of all of the relevant techniques.
Third, a way of accelerating fragmentation is presented that achieves bet-
ter performance than data encryption using the most common symmetric-key
encryption algorithm. This gain in performance is achieved by limiting the
encryption processing, applying an all-or-nothing transform over partially en-
crypted data, and relying on the protection provided by data dispersal. This
contribution addresses the need of users disposing of access to independent
storage sites and prioritizing the speed of processing.
Fourth, a lightweight fragmentation scheme based on data encoding, per-
muting, and dispersing is introduced. It totally gets rid of data encryption
allowing the fragmentation to be performed even faster; up to twice as fast as
data encryption. The proposal revisits the use of the perfect secret sharing,
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trading its security for scalability. In contrast to other contributions, this
proposal comes with an alternative to symmetric encryption. It was moti-
vated by the fact that in some cases a lightweight data protection combined
with dispersal may be sufficient.
Finally, fragmentation inside sensor networks is revisited, particularly in
the Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks. The main focus in this case is
put not solely on the fragmentation performance, but also on the reduction
of storage and transmission costs by using the data aggregation. This is
motivated by the fact that contrary to fragmentation in the cloud, fragmen-
tation inside a sensor networks has to take into account the limited energy
capacities of the sensors’ batteries. When compared with relevant state-of-
the art techniques, the proposed scheme reduces by at least half the number
of stored and transmitted bits.
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Résumé
Dans cette thèse de doctorat, les méthodes classiques de protection de don-
nées sont revisitées au vu de l’émergence du cloud public d’une part et de
l’intérêt croissant pour l’Internet des Objets (IoT) d’autre part. Plusieurs
questions se posent dans ces deux nouveaux contextes. Comment garan-
tir la protection des données même dans le cas où l’attaquant a acquis la
clé de chiffrement? Comment protéger ses données externalisées contre non
seulement des attaquants malveillants, mais aussi contre un fournisseur de
stockage curieux qui voudrait utiliser les données pour ses propres intérêts
ou applications? Comment assurer la confidentialité des données dans un
réseau constitué de capteurs pour lequel la collecte de données en temps réel
n’est pas possible?
La combinaison du chiffrement, de la fragmentation et de la dispersion
des données constitue un moyen éprouvé mais peu répandu de renforcer la
confidentialité, l’intégrité et la disponibilité des données dans des environ-
nements de stockage distribués. Pendant longtemps, la non-popularité de
cette solution a essentiellement été liée à deux causes. Premièrement, avant
l’introduction du cloud public, l’utilisation de la fragmentation était limité
aux centres de données privés. Hors, la fragmentation n’est efficace en terme
7
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de protection que par l’usage de plusieurs nœuds de stockage indépendants.
Aujourd’hui, l’architecture distribué du cloud et de l’Internet des Objets ou-
vrent de nouvelles possibilités de dispersion: un simple utilisateur peut se
permettre de disperser ses données sur plusieurs serveurs localisés dans le
monde entier. Deuxièmement, les techniques de fragmentation classiques
détériorent notablement les performances du système et souvent augmentent
le volume de la donnée stockée de façon importante.
La thèse a commencé dans le cadre du projet européen ITEA2 CAP. Elle
se concentre sur l’étude des techniques de fragmentation et de dispersion en
se proposant de les rendre plus rapides et/ou moins gourmandes en mémoire.
Le but ultime est de fournir à un utilisateur un ensemble de méthodes de
fragmentation rapide pouvant être directement appliqué dans un contexte in-
dustriel afin de renforcer la confidentialité des données stockées ou d’accélérer
le processus de protection.
Sur la fragmentation comme moyen de protec-
tion de données
Une étude approfondie sur la fragmentation en tant que moyen de préserver
la confidentialité des données a été effectuée et a donné comme résultat une
vaste analyse et organisation de l’état de l’art. Cet état d’art commence par
la description du processus de fragmentation. Par fragmentation de données
on comprend le processus de transformation quelconque d’une donnée en un
ensemble de fragments comprenant un seuil c’est à dire un nombre mini-
mal de fragments nécessaires pour la reconstruction de la donnée initiale.
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Ainsi définie, la fragmentation inclut les méthodes ayant pour but d’assurer
la résilience de la donnée (utilisant la réplication ou les codes correcteurs
d’erreurs). Ensuite, les descriptions des travaux pertinents sont organisés
en discernant les méthodes de fragmentation qui utilisent ou non des in-
formations sur la structure de donnée. Dans le premier cas, les données
sont divisées en sous-ensembles de bits de différents niveaux de confidential-
ité qui seront protégés de différentes manières, c’est-à-dire dispersés sur des
serveurs physiques caractérisés par différents niveaux de fiabilité. Ce type de
fragmentation sera surtout appliqué pour fragmenter des bases de données.
Dans le second cas, les données sont simplement traitées comme un ensemble
de bits consécutifs, chacun ayant un niveau de confidentialité égal. Ce type
de fragmentation peut être appliqué sur tous types de données.
Les techniques de fragmentation sans considération de la structure de
données pertinentes sont décrites en détail et comparées en termes de niveau
de protection des données, de surcharge de stockage et de complexité. Des
évaluations expérimentales ont confirmé les estimations théoriques. Parmi
les techniques présentées on retrouve le partage de secret (notamment le
schéma de partage de secret proposé par Shamir), les algorithmes de dis-
persion d’information (notamment celui de Rabin), ainsi que les schémas de
fragmentation basé sur le chiffrement symétrique (entre autres la modifica-
tion du partage de secret de Krawczyk, les méthodes de type "tout-ou-rien" et
la technique AONT-RS). On peut observer que même si le partage de secret
garantit un haut degré de confidentialité de données, il reste peu pratique
pour la fragmentation de grandes volumes de données puisqu’il mène à une
augmentation considérable de la taille de la donnée fragmentée. Les méth-
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odes basées sur le chiffrement permettent de limiter la surcharge de mémoire
en garantissant un niveau de confidentialité suffisant contre un attaquant lim-
ité en terme de puissance de calcul. De plus, contrairement aux algorithmes
de dispersions, ils passe à l’échelle en terme de nombre de fragments.
Non seulement les techniques, mais aussi six systèmes académiques ap-
pliquant la fragmentation sans regard de la structure des données (Delta-
4 (1991), PASIS (2000), GridSharing (2005), POTSHARDS (2009), Dep-
Sky (2013) et CDStore (2016)) et trois systèmes commerciaux (Unisys’s Se-
cureParser (2005), IBM Cloud Storage (précédemment Cleversafe, 2011) et
Symform (2011)) ont été analysés et comparés. L’accent est mis sur la façon
de renforcer la confidentialité des données utilisée par ces systèmes. Cepen-
dant, d’autres caractéristiques propre à un système basé sur la fragmentation
de donnée sont également décrites, comme la résilience des données, la ges-
tion de placement des clés et des fragments, l’intégrité et l’authentification
des données, la fiabilité des nœuds de stockage, la taille des fragments, ainsi
que la déduplication des fragments. On peut observer que l’utilisation de la
fragmentation a changé au cours des années et diffère selon l’origine du pro-
jet. Il y a encore dix ans, les solutions reposaient presque exclusivement sur
le partage de secrets pour la confidentialité et la réplication pour la résilience
des données, tandis que les systèmes récents remplacent le partage de secret
par le chiffrement et la réplication par les codes correcteurs d’erreurs. A la
différence des produits commerciaux, les propositions académiques ont ten-
dance à être plus originales, même au prix d’une augmentation excessive du
volume des données stockées et d’une diminution drastique des performances.
Les techniques de fragmentation exploitant la structure de données sont
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divisés en deux groupes. La première groupe réunit les travaux autour de la
fragmentation orientée objets: une approche de conception de logiciel décom-
posant l’architecture d’une application en plusieurs fragments de différents
niveaux de confidentialité et favorisant le placement des objets confidentiels
sur des machines de confiance. Le deuxième groupe applique la fragmentation
au base de données relationnelles. Cet approche est majoritairement réalisée
dans un environnement de type multi-cloud. Les n-uplets de la base de
données sont segmentés en plusieurs fragments pour séparer les valeurs non-
confidentielles qui, une fois associées, pourraient dévoiler de l’information
confidentielle, notamment qui dé-anonymiseraient l’information stockée dans
la base. Les valeurs contenant de l’information confidentielle sont ensuite
chiffrées.
Pour conclure, quelques recommandations sont données sur la conception
d’un système de fragmentation efficace. On recommande notamment la façon
de disperser la données selon son niveau de confidentialité et selon son volume
(voir Figure 1).
Protection des données chiffrées contre
l’exposition de la clé de chiffrement
L’externalisation du stockage de données dans le cloud constitue sans doute
un défi en terme de sécurité. D’une part, les fournisseurs doivent faire face
quotidiennement à un grand nombre d’attaques externes. Chaque fuite de
données majeure risque d’être signalée dans les médias en nuisant à leur répu-
tation. D’autre part, du point de vu d’un utilisateur du service, la menace
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Figure 1: Dispersion des données selon leurs niveaux de confidentialité.
peut venir non seulement d’un attaquant externe, mais aussi du fournisseur
lui même. En effet, un fournisseur malhonnête pourrait être tenté d’exploiter
les données stockées, par exemple pour des raisons économiques ou politiques
ou même par pure malveillance. Ainsi, la solution recommandée (entre autres
par le Règlement européen Général sur la Protection des Données (RGPD))
est de chiffrer les données avant de les confier à un service de stockage.
D’un autre point de vu, grâce à sa nature hautement distribuée, le cloud
ouvre de nouvelles possibilités pour renforcer la protection des données qui,
en plus d’être protégées par le chiffrement, peuvent être maintenant facile-
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ment et efficacement dispersées sur un grand nombre de serveurs situés sur
des sites de stockage différents. Un tel traitement non seulement ralentit
un attaquant externe (qui doit accéder à plusieurs sites de stockage protégés
par des mécanismes de sécurité différents), mais protège également contre une
utilisation abusive des données stockées par un seul fournisseur (qui ne pos-
sédera pas la données complète sans une coalition avec tous les fournisseurs).
Le renforcement de la protection des données en utilisant une combinaison
de chiffrement, de fragmentation et de dispersion a déjà été proposé par
plusieurs solutions de stockage durant les dernières années. Cependant, la
majorité d’entre eux ne prêtent pas beaucoup d’attention à la manière dont
les fragments sont construits à partir de la donnée chiffrée. La fragmentation
est généralement effectuée de manière simple, les fragments étant formés à
partir de gros morceaux consécutifs de donnée. Un tel traitement ne protège
pas contre des adversaires qui, en plus d’avoir accès à un sous-ensemble des
domaines de stockage, ont réussi d’obtenir la clé de chiffrement. Ce type
d’adversaire sera en effet capables de déchiffrer une partie des informations
dispersées.
De nos jours, l’accès par l’attaquant à la clé de chiffrement (on parlera
d’exposition à la clé de chiffrement) est une menace réelle surtout pour des
données de long cycle de vie ou des données partagées par de nombreux
utilisateurs. D’une part, cette exposition peut être le résultat d’une mauvaise
génération de clé résultant en une clé facilement concevable ou reproductible.
D’autre part, elle peut être due à l’utilisation par les attaquants de portes
dérobées dans les logiciels de génération de clé, ou encore due à une forme de
corruption ou de coercition. De plus, lorsque nous considérons des données
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ayant de longs cycles de vie, la longueur de la clé de chiffrement utilisée peut
devenir insuffisante après plusieurs années en raison des progrès réalisés dans
le développement de nouvelles machines toujours plus puissantes ainsi que
dans le domaine de la cryptanalyse.
Afin d’empêcher un attaquant en possession de la clé de chiffrement de
déchiffrer même une petite partie de l’information, la donnée sera première-
ment transformée avec une méthode dite "tout-ou-rien" (all-or-nothing) et
ensuite fragmentée en plusieurs fragments puis dispersée. La transformation
"tout-ou-rien" produit un texte chiffré déchiffrable seulement s’il est complet.
Ainsi, la totalité des fragments est nécessaire pour la défragmentation. Une
fois que les fragments sont dispersés sur au moins deux sites de stockage in-
dépendants, la donnée est protégée contre un attaquant incapable de collecter
tous les fragments. Cela est vrai même si l’attaquant parvient à obtenir la clé
de chiffrement car un déchiffrement partiel des données (déchiffrer unique-
ment la partie des données contenues dans un seul fragment) est impossible.
Plusieurs algorithmes de type "tout-ou-rien" ont déjà été proposés dans
la littérature. Cependant, nécessitant un traitement créant des liens en-
tre les blocs du texte chiffré, ils restent moins rapides que le chiffrement
symétrique combiné avec une fragmentation simple de la donnée chiffrée.
Dans le Chapitre 3 de la thèse, la famille des algorithmes de type "tout-ou-
rien" se voit agrandie de trois propositions visant à atteindre un surcoût de
performance optimisé voire négligeable: le "Secure Fragmentation and Dis-
persal" (SFD), le "Circular all-or-nothing" (CAON), et le "Selective all-or-
nothing" (SAON). Ayant le même but, chacune des propositions est conçue
pour être utilisée dans un contexte différent.
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SFD est une méthode de fragmentation et de dispersion d’un texte obtenu
en exploitant les propriétés d’un chiffrement symétrique par blocs. Elle ne
nécessite aucune transformation de la donnée chiffrée, juste une simple seg-
mentation. En effet, les bits de la donnée sont dispersés sur plusieurs frag-
ments. Cependant, cette dispersion n’est pas faite d’une façon aléatoire mais
suit des règles précises exploitant les propriétés d’un chiffrement par bloc et
ayant pour but de renforcer la confidentialité des fragments. Premièrement,
les blocs consécutifs du texte chiffré sont séparées entre différents fragments.
Cela est motivé par le fait que le déchiffrement d’un bloc nécessite dans la
plus part des cas la présence du prédécesseur de ce bloc. Ainsi, la sépara-
tion des blocs consécutifs renforce la protection et il n’est plus possible de
déchiffrer un seul fragment, même si la clé de chiffrement est connue. Deux-
ièmement, les bits d’un seul bloc sont aussi répartis entre différents fragments
qui seront dispersés sur plusieurs serveurs. Cela est motivé par le fait que le
déchiffrement d’un bloc incomplet n’est pas possible. Les fragments finaux
sont dispersés sur plusieurs serveurs dans plusieurs clouds. Les fragments
contenant des blocs consécutifs de la donnée chiffrée sont séparés entre dif-
férent clouds préférablement indépendants. Cette forme de fragmentation et
de dispersion renforce la confidentialité de la donnée en forçant un attaquant
de connaitre la liste des serveurs et d’obtenir l’accès aux services de stock-
age utilisés. Un attaquant ayant obtenu l’accès à un seul cloud ne peut pas
déchiffrer les données qu’il a obtenu même s’il possède la clé utilisée pendant
le chiffrement (cela est vrai pour un fournisseur de stockage malhonnête qui
voudrait déchiffrer les données qui lui ont été confiées). SFD ne nécessite au-
cun traitement de données spécifique juste une simple dispersion de bits qui
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peut être implémentée d’un façon très rapide en rendant le surcout provenant
de la dispersion négligeable. Cette technique est particulièrement adaptée
aux environnements multi-clouds permettant une dispersion des fragments
sur des sites de stockage indépendants.
Contrairement au SFD, CAON peut être appliqué sur tou type de chiffre-
ment. Cet algorithme crée des dépendances entre les blocs consécutifs du
texte chiffré en les xorant entre eux. Ainsi, une chaîne de dépendances en-
tre blocs du texte chiffré est créée. Après cette transformation, la donnée
est fragmentée en plusieurs fragments qui vont être ensuite dispersés sur
plusieurs serveurs ou sites de stockage indépendants. Pour défragmenter la
donnée initiale, il est nécessaire de rassembler la totalité ces fragments. En
conséquence, un attaquant n’ayant pas obtenu tous les fragments ne peut pas
procéder aux déchiffrement de la donnée et cela même s’il possède la bonne
clé. En comparaison avec l’algorithme le plus rapide de l’état de l’art, la
transformation utilisée par CAON réduit de moitié le nombre de XOR exigé
en plus du chiffrement de la donnée. L’étude de la complexité théorique a
été confirmée par des tests de performance (voir Figure 2).
SAON vise à protéger les données chiffrées contre l’exposition de la clé
de chiffrement même si l’utilisateur a accès à un seul service de stockage.
La donnée chiffrée est transformée en deux fragments: un grand fragment
public et un petit fragment privé. Les deux fragments sont nécessaires au
déchiffrement de la donnée initiale. Un utilisateur conserve le fragment privé
et externalise le fragment public. Ainsi, l’utilisateur peut profiter des avan-
tages du cloud public sans se soucier de l’exposition de la clé de chiffrement.
En effet, sans le fragment privé, la donnée contenue dans le fragment public
17
Figure 2: Tests de performance de l’algorithme CAON.
reste inutilisable. La transformation de la donnée en fragments est composée
d’une combinaison de SFD et d’une transformation rapide de type "tout-ou-
rien" appliquée seulement à une partie de la donnée. En conséquence, SAON
est plus rapide qu’une transformation "tout-ou-rien" appliquée à la totalité
de la donnée. Les performances dépendent de la taille du fragment privé qui
est un paramètre de SAON à la main de l’utilisateur.
En conclusion, les schémas présentés dans le Chapitre 3 résolvent efficace-
ment le problème de la protection des données chiffrées contre l’exposition
de la clé de chiffrement. Chacun de ces schémas correspond à un contexte
de stockage différent. Le renforcement de la confidentialité se traduit par
un surcoût de performance presque négligeable. Les propositions présentées
18 RÉSUMÉ
restent les plus rapides de la famille des algorithmes de type "tout-ou-rien"
publiés: cela a été démontré par une analyse de complexité et confirmé par
des tests de performance (voir Figure 3).
Figure 3: Tests de performance de l’algorithme SAON.
Accélération de la fragmentation
Le renforcement de la confidentialité des données entraîne inévitablement un
surcoût en termes de performances (même s’il peut être réduit au point d’être
négligeable, comme dans le cas des algorithmes présentés dans le Chapitre 2).
Pour certains cas d’usage, même une petite surcharge s’avère inacceptable
car la rapidité de traitement est critique. Le choix de la bonne technique de
fragmentation est souvent un compromis entre les performances souhaitées,
le niveau de protection des données et la surcharge de stockage. Le Chapitre
3 introduit le schéma PE-AON permettant d’accélérer le processus de frag-
mentation en le rendant plus rapide que le chiffrement symétrique de la don-
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née combiné à une simple fragmentation. Il transforme les données en un
ensemble de fragments, qui sont tous nécessaires à la reconstruction des don-
nées. Contrairement aux algorithmes présentés précédemment, seulement
une partie (la quantité exacte dépend du niveau de protection souhaité) de
la donnée initiale est chiffrée. Les blocs de la donnée sont ensuite mélangés à
l’aide d’une transformation de type "tout-ou-rien". Les fragments finaux sont
formés à partir de ce mélange. La protection des données est assurée par la
dispersion. Une reconstruction complète de la donnée initiale n’est possible
qu’une fois tous les fragments rassemblés.
Éviter partiellement le chiffrement améliore les performances, car une
partie des opérations de chiffrement par blocs est remplacée par des XORs.
Par conséquent, PE-AON est plus rapide que le chiffrement symétrique com-
biné à une fragmentation simple (où les données sont simplement divisées
en gros morceaux de bits consécutifs). Lorsque le rapport entre le nombre
de fragments chiffrés et non chiffrés est judicieusement choisi, les données
contenues dans les fragments sont protégées contre l’exposition de la clé de
chiffrement. Intuitivement, de meilleures performances se font au détriment
d’une protection plus faible que celle fournie par le chiffrement complet com-
biné à une transformation "tout-ou-rien". Dans les schémas présentés dans le
Chapitre 2, un attaquant est censé pouvoir compromettre tous les emplace-
ments de stockage sauf un. En revanche, PE-AON n’est efficace que contre
un attaquant plus limité, notamment résidant sur un seul site de stockage.
Ainsi, PE-AON doit être traité comme une méthode de fragmentation rapide
pour une protection de données légère, permettant un gain de performance
considérable (voir les résultats de performance sur la Figure 4). Cela est
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particulièrement utile dans les cas où l’utilisateur dispose d’un obstacle de
dispersion important, par exemple, il peut séparer les données sur plusieurs
clouds notoirement indépendants.
Figure 4: Tests de performance de l’algorithme PE-AON.
Protection des données par une combinaison
de chiffrement, fragmentation et dispersion de
données
La solution habituelle pour assurer la confidentialité des données externalisées
consiste à chiffrer les données avant de les envoyer au fournisseur de stockage.
L’utilisation d’un algorithme de chiffrement symétrique assure normalement
de fortes garanties de confidentialité. Cependant, le chiffrement a toujours
un coût. Grâce aux récents progrès réalisés dans le domaine du matériel,
comme l’intégration du jeu d’instructions AES (AES-NI) dans de nombreux
processeurs Intel, la vitesse de chiffrement doit être considérée comme une
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variable qui évolue avec les progrès technologiques. Cependant, suivre cette
progression est coûteuse et l’ensemble des utilisateurs doit être considéré
comme étant hétérogène dans son comportement et, par conséquent, une
quantité non négligeable de données n’est pas chiffrée avant d’être envoyée
dans le cloud.
Le Chapitre 4 introduit le Fast and Scalable Fragmentation Algorithm
(FSFA), un algorithme de fragmentation léger basé sur l’encodage, la per-
mutation et la dispersion des données. Il élimine totalement le chiffrement des
données, ce qui permet une fragmentation encore plus rapide: jusqu’à deux
fois plus rapide que le chiffrement des données en utilisant l’algorithme de
chiffrement le plus répandu (AES-NI) (voir les résultats présenté sur la Fig-
ure 5). Contrairement à d’autres contributions présentées dans cette thèse,
cette proposition constitue une alternative au chiffrement symétrique. Elle
était motivée par le fait que, dans certains cas (ex. transmission temps réel),
le temps d’exécution du chiffrement n’est pas acceptable et qu’une fragmen-
tation de données peut-être suffisante. Elle est destinée à être utilisée dans
un environnement multi-clouds dans lequel les fournisseurs des données sont
considérés comme curieux - ils essaieront d’examiner les données qui leur
ont été confiées - mais ne feront pas l’effort de collaborer avec d’autres four-
nisseurs. Le but de l’algorithme est de fragmenter les données entre les clouds
de manière à ce que les fragments reçus par un seul fournisseurs soient pra-
tiquement inutiles.
Dans un premier temps, FSFA disperse la donnée initiale sur plusieurs
fragments. Les données sont ensuite encodées en utilisant une version mod-
ifiée de l’algorithme de partage de secret de Shamir. L’encodage crée des
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Tests de performance de l’algorithme FSFA pour deux configura-
tions: 2 clouds utilisés (gauche) et 3 clouds utilisés (droite).
dépendances entre les fragments. Au final, les données encodées sont per-
mutées en utilisant des permutations pseudo-aléatoires pour complexifier le
décodage.
FSFA pourrait être considéré comme un cas particulier d’une méthode
plus générale de protection de données. En effet, on peut imaginer différentes
variantes de chaque étape de l’algorithme. Du point de vue de la mise en
œuvre, les performances pourraient être améliorées en exploitant pleinement
diverses possibilités de parallélisation du traitement.
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Fragmentation dans les réseaux de capteurs
Dans le monde de l’Internet des Objets, les réseaux de capteurs sans fil
sont largement utilisés pour rassembler toutes sortes d’informations environ-
nementales. Dans une approche classique, ils fonctionnent en mode temps
réel où, juste après l’acquisition de la donnée, les capteurs la déplacent vers
un nœud statique du réseau appelé "sink". Cependant, dans certaines sit-
uations, la présence de ce nœud statique ne peut pas être assurée, par ex-
emple, lorsque des capteurs sont déployés dans des zones vastes ou hostiles
telles que des parcs nationaux, des zones frontalières, etc. Par conséquent, le
terme Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks a été introduit pour définir une
classe de réseaux de capteurs où les données sont stockées dans les capteurs
en attendant d’être ramassées par un sink mobile (par exemple un drone)
qui visite périodiquement les noeuds du réseau.
Figure 6: Fragmentation dans les UWSN.
Les données conservées à l’intérieur des nœuds peuvent être exposées à
divers types d’attaquants désirant lire, détruire ou corrompre les informa-
tions stockées. Plusieurs stratégies de protection de données ont déjà été
proposées. Par exemple, pour assurer la survie des données, celles-ci peuvent
24 RÉSUMÉ
être répliquées et dispersées sur différents nœuds. Une approche différente
assurant, en outre, la confidentialité des données consiste à faire en sorte
que les capteurs chiffrent, fragmentent et dispersent les données sur leurs
voisins (voir le schéma d’architecture présenté Figure 6). La reconstruction
des données est alors impossible à moins qu’un seuil donné de fragments soit
rassemblé. Ainsi, les données sont protégées contre un attaquant incapable
de compromettre le nombre requis de capteurs entre les visites consécutives
du sink mobile.
(a) SO - fragmentation techniques. (b) SO - homomorphic techniques.
Figure 7: Occupation de mémoire et cout de transmission par capteur.
Plusieurs schémas de fragmentation aux UWSN ont été introduits dans
la littérature. Ils proposent un processus basé sur le partage de secret ou
une combinaison de chiffrement et de codes correcteurs d’erreurs. Étant
donné que la consommation d’énergie est un problème important au sein
d’UWSN, certaines propositions utilisent des schémas homomorphes afin de
réduire les coûts de stockage et de transmission. Le schéma Additively Ho-
momorphic Encryption and Fragmentation (AHEF) présenté au Chapitre 6
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revient sur le schéma HEHSS. Dans les deux schémas, les données fragmen-
tées et chiffrées sont agrégées dans les nœuds des voisins. Cependant, AHEF
améliore considérablement le schéma HEHSS - au lieu d’utiliser le partage
de secrets pour la fragmentation des données, AHEF utilise un algorithme
de dispersion d’informations homomorphe. Cette modification a un impact
considérable sur les coûts indirects de stockage et les coûts de transmission
qui en résultent. En comparaison avec le schéma de fragmentation le plus
proche de l’état de l’art, ces coûts son divisés par au moins deux (voir les ré-
sultats de la comparaison présentés sur la Figure 7). En effet, les fragments
obtenus à l’aide du partage de secret ont la même taille que les données
elles-mêmes. La dispersion des informations produit des fragments de taille
réduite grâce à l’utilisation des propriété homomorphes. Ainsi, une aug-
mentation des données à protéger est évitée. En outre, AHEF permet deux
méthodes d’agrégation de fragments: l’agrégation de fragments provenant du
même capteur et l’agrégation de fragments provenant du même groupe de
capteurs.
Conclusion et travaux futurs
Après la réalisation d’un état de l’art détaillé, six schémas ont été proposés
pour améliorer les techniques de pointe en matière de protection des données
par fragmentation dans deux types d’environnements distribués. Ils ouvrent
la porte à plusieurs pistes de recherche et soulèvent quelques questions en
suspens qu’il convient de traiter dans les travaux futurs.
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Sommaire des contributions
Au Chapitre 2, une enquête approfondie sur la fragmentation en tant que
moyen de préserver la confidentialité des données a été effectué et a donné
comme résultat une vaste analyse de l’état de l’art. Cet état de l’art a été or-
ganisé en discernant les méthodes de fragmentation prenant en considération
ou non la structure de données. Les techniques pertinentes ont été décrites
en détail et comparées en termes de niveau de protection des données, de
surcharge de stockage et de complexité. Les algorithmes de fragmentation
ont été implémentés et comparés pour valider leur complexité théorique. Non
seulement les techniques, mais aussi les systèmes académiques et commerci-
aux pertinents ont été analysés et comparés. Au final, plusieurs recomman-
dations ont été données sur la conception d’un système de fragmentation
efficace.
Au Chapitre 3, la famille des algorithmes de type ‘all-or-nothing’ (tout-
ou-rien) a été agrandie avec trois nouvelles propositions. Elles visent toutes
à protéger les données chiffrées et fragmentées contre l’exposition de la clé de
chiffrement. Ils sont conçus pour être utilisés dans trois contextes différents:
pour la fragmentation des données dans un environnement multi-cloud, un
système de stockage distribué quelconque et un environnement composé d’un
seul fournisseur de stockage et un dispositif privé. L’évaluation de la com-
plexité et les critères de performance montrent que les algorithmes présentés
sont les plus rapides de toutes les techniques pertinentes connues.
Au Chapitre 4, une manière d’accélérer la fragmentation a été présentée,
qui offre de meilleures performances que le chiffrement de données en utilisant
l’algorithme de chiffrement à clé symétrique le plus courant (AES-NI). Ce
27
gain de performances est obtenu en limitant le traitement de chiffrement:
avant la fragmentation une transformation tout-ou-rien est appliquée sur les
données partiellement chiffrées qui crée des liens entre les données claires et
les données chiffrées. Les fragments sont ensuite dispersés de façon à renforcer
leur protection. Cette contribution répond au besoin des utilisateurs donnant
la priorité à la vitesse de traitement.
Au Chapitre 5, un schéma de fragmentation léger basé sur le codage, la
permutation et la dispersion des données a été introduit. Il élimine totale-
ment le chiffrement des données, ce qui permet une fragmentation encore
plus rapide: jusqu’à deux fois plus rapide que le chiffrement de données.
La proposition revisite l’utilisation du partage de secret. Contrairement à
d’autres contributions, cette proposition est une alternative au chiffrement
symétrique. Elle était motivée par le fait que, dans certains cas (ex. trans-
missions temps réel), le temps d’exécution du chiffrement peut ne pas être
acceptable et que la dispersion peut-être suffisante.
Au Chapitre 6, la fragmentation au sein des réseaux de capteurs a été
réexaminée, en particulier dans les réseaux de capteurs sans fils. Dans ce cas,
l’accent est mis non seulement sur la performance en matière de fragmenta-
tion, mais également sur la réduction des coûts de stockage et de transmission
grâce à l’agrégation de données. Ceci est motivé par le fait que, contraire-
ment à la fragmentation dans le cloud, la fragmentation au sein d’un réseau
de capteurs doit prendre en compte les capacités énergétiques limitées des
batteries des capteurs. Par rapport aux techniques pertinentes, le schéma
proposé réduit d’au moins la moitié le nombre de bits stockés et transmis.
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Travaux futurs
Plusieurs travaux futurs peuvent être envisagés, entre autres:
• L’intégration des algorithmes proposés avec les librairies standards util-
isés pour le chiffrement des données améliorerait encore plus les perfor-
mances de la fragmentation. De plus, les performances pourraient être
améliorées en exploitant pleinement diverses possibilités de parallélisa-
tion du traitement.
• Transformation du Fast and Scalable Fragmentation Algorithme (FSFA)
en une méthodologie plus générale combinant plusieurs mécanismes
légers afin de protéger les données fragmentées. En effet, diverses mod-
ifications pourraient être apportées, par exemple le schéma de partage
de secret de Shamir utilisé pendant l’encodage des données pourrait
être remplacé par un autre algorithme.
• Sécurisation de la transmission des fragments. Il a été supposé que
l’utilisateur avait accès à un nombre suffisant d’emplacements de stock-
age séparés physiquement ou indépendants, c’est-à-dire différents cen-
tres de données du même fournisseur de stockage ou de différents four-
nisseurs de stockage. Cependant, la question de savoir comment as-
surer la séparation des fragments n’est pas triviale. Par conséquent, les
travaux futurs viseront à garantir une distribution sécurisée des frag-
ments de données de la zone de confiance où la fragmentation se produit
jusqu’à leur destination de stockage.
• Traitement des fragments. La question d’un traitement sécurisé est
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inévitable dans le cas de données externalisées. Le chiffrement homo-
morphe constitue un moyen théorique de résoudre ce problème, mais
trouve que des domaines d’applications limités vu son manque de per-
formance. Le calcul multiparti et le chiffrement interrogeable semblent
une direction beaucoup plus prometteuse pour les années futures. Une
piste de recherche adapterait les techniques de calcul multiparti et de
chiffrement interrogeables existantes à la nature fragmentée des don-
nées.
• Conception d’une solution complète de stockage. À l’avenir, les algo-
rithmes de fragmentation présentés pourraient être intégrés aux sys-
tèmes existants afin de les enrichir d’un mécanisme de protection de
données supplémentaire ou d’une alternative de fragmentation rapide
et légère. Par exemple, ils pourraient être intégrés au système HAIL,
offrant une haute disponibilité et une intégrité optimale pour le stock-
age sur le cloud ou le projet multi-cloud DepSky. De plus, les schémas
tout-ou-rien présentés au Chapitre 3 pourraient être utilisés comme
moyen de créer des dépendances entre des données dans des systèmes
de gestion d’accès rapide.
• Évaluation des coûts de distribution (en terme d’énergie) des fragments
dans un environnement de type UWSN. De plus, la distribution des
fragments pourrait être développer, par exemple les fragments pour-
raient être distribués d’une façon multi-hop.
Une partie de ces travaux a déjà commencé.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This chapter introduces the motivation behind this dissertation and an-
nounces the presented contributions.
1.1 Background and Motivation
Efficient protection of data confidentiality is not a recent challenge. Ac-
tually, the first methods aiming at obfuscating or encoding sensitive infor-
mation date back to antiquity, like the scytale transposition or the Cae-
sar’s cipher [Kah67]. For centuries, humanity has been developing various
techniques of data protection until the invention of cryptography in its re-
cent form in the last few decades. Although historical and currently applied
methods obviously differ from each other, they share the same principle: they
transform some sensitive input data using a secret known as the key and/or
a secret method (in modern cryptography only the key is secret, according
to the Kerckhoff’s principle [Ker83]). In order to reconstruct the initial in-
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formation, two elements are required: the transformed data and the key that
allows the data to revert to its original state. In symmetric-key algorithms,
being currently the most common way of providing data confidentiality, the
secret required during the data reconstruction corresponds to the one used
during data transformation. As data confidentiality is only achieved when
the secret key is separated from the transformed data, it is crucial to keep
the key in a secure place that belongs to the data owner or people to the
data was entrusted to. Clearly, data becomes vulnerable once the secret key
is compromised. Thus, the main difficulty that a potential attacker has to
overcome consists in obtaining the secret, which in practice is equivalent to
accessing the storage location that keeps it, performing a brute-force search
over all possibilities of the secret (or guessing it knowing some additional
information if the secret is far from being pseudo-random).
Several questions arise: How can the security of the storage location
keeping the secret key be guaranteed? What if an attacker can guess the
secret without compromising the place that stores it? What will happen if
the secret key is lost or destroyed? Currently, key management solutions try
to address these questions by creating secure key stores accessible only to
authorized users. As an alternative, the key can be fragmented into several
fragments and spread over several separate locations or distributed among
several shareholders. Therefore, an attacker has to compromise not only one
key store but several of them. However, even the most sophisticated key
management system may not help if the key was generated in an incorrect
way, is easily guessable, or the attacker is able to bribe or coerce the holder
of the secret.
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The problem of secure data protection could be approached from a differ-
ent perspective. Instead of basing the protection solely on the secure storage
of the key, data can be in addition fragmented and dispersed, in a way that
all of its fragments are needed for the initial data reconstruction. Such pro-
cessing makes the importance of the data fragments comparable to a secret
key and obliges the attacker to compromise not a single key store, but mul-
tiple storage locations. Such data fragmentation could be divided into two
categories. In the first one, there is no other way to reconstruct the initial
data apart of gathering all of the data fragments as dependencies are created
between fragments of data. In the second one, the knowledge of the secret
key allows to reconstruct a part of the information from a single fragment;
fragmentation is performed in a simple way that does not create dependen-
cies between data fragments. In both types of data fragmentation, in order
to make data resilient to intentional or accidental fragments loss, only a
threshold of the fragments can be required for the data reconstruction.
Fragmentation as a way of providing or reinforcing data confidentiality is
not a recent idea. It can be found in Shamir’s [Sha79] and Blakley’s [Bla79]
seminal papers from late 70s , addressing the problem of secure storage and
management of an encryption key. Few years later, a more architectural
technique was proposed with a design separating sensitive data from non-
confidential fragments and dispersing them over separated devices[DBF91].
In the following decades, the idea of fragmentation was applied to self-
securing and archival storage [SGMV09, SGS+00], as well as to relational
database systems [ABG+05, CVF+10] as a way of ensuring user’s data pri-
vacy. Recently, it is revisited in the context of multi-cloud architectures
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allowing an easy and efficient data separation [BCCBF13, BGJ+13, HIK+13,
DCdVEF+14]. A more detailed insight into those techniques and systems is
given in Chapter 2 containing a detailed survey on fragmentation as a way
of data protection.
Apart of the reinforcement of data protection, several arguments come out
in favour of applying data fragmentation inside distributed storage. First,
fragmentation allows to reduce, and in some cases event remove, the costs
usually dedicated to the key management. A centralized secure key store is
not needed anymore or becomes less critical as the dispersal plays a major
role in the data protection process. Second, fragmentation is already widely
used for other purposes. Indeed, it is currently applied in systems using
the RAID storage technology or error-correction codes. Moreover, it was
demonstrated that when applied in a multi-cloud environment it improves not
only data confidentiality, but also availability and integrity [BCQ+13]. Third,
fragmentation enables a more efficient data deduplication and thus can be
successfully employed inside systems for version control or storage of backup
data [LQLL16]. Last but not least, fragmentation techniques of the all-or-
nothing type may be used in fast access management systems [BDCdVF+16].
Access revocation of outsourced data shared between multiple users is slow
as it requires to re-encrypt the data using a fresh key. Re-encrypting only a
fragment of data in order to revoke the access accelerates the process.
Although data fragmentation presents multiple benefits, it also comes
with several limitations that can discourage from its deployment. First, the
majority of secure data fragmentation techniques is slower than symmetric
encryption performed over the whole data, which is the recommended tech-
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nique for protection of the data confidentiality [SSS+07]. Some of them, like
perfect secret sharing or XOR-splitting, lead in addition to a huge increase
in the volume of the stored data and/or terribly lack of scalability. More-
over, dispersing data using not one but several communication channels may
increase the latency. Second, an efficient protection based on fragmentation
requires the access to at least several physically separated servers and thus
may lead to an increase of costs.
Nevertheless, what was seen as a major obstacle not more than ten years
ago, becomes less restrictive with the recent technology development. On
the one hand, even mere users have access to devices with spectacular capac-
ities in terms of computing power. Data processing can be accelerated using
parallelization and new hardware is adapted to improve the speed of encryp-
tion operations (see the AES intrinsic instruction set AES-NI 1). Moreover,
the transmission capacities enormously improved since the time when frag-
mentation was being introduced. On the other hand, fragmentation is not
anymore solely related to private data centers composed of multiple servers
as other architectures also enable data dispersal. First, even mere users have
access to a multitude of storage devices distributed across the word as stor-
age providers offer solutions that are cost-efficient and easy to use. Second,
in a world of internet-of-things, we are surrounded by networks composed of
thousands of sensor nodes used for measuring and storing all kind of envi-
ronmental variables.
The complexity of the fragmentation processing or the accessibility of
1https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/architecture-and-technology/advanced-
encryption-standard–aes-/data-protection-aes-general-technology.html
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a distributed architecture are old issues that nowadays become less signif-
icant. However, at the same time new challenges are raised. Especially,
preserving data confidentiality and privacy in the presence of sophisticated
attackers is becoming a serious and relevant problem [KSLC17]. Users wit-
ness data breaches leading to exposure of sensitive data and consequently
start to doubt into the capacity of their providers to protect the stored data
(see cases like the data theft of 3 billions of Yahoo users 2, the infamous
Equifax data breach that exposed the sensitive information of 143 millions
of Americans 3, or the late SingHealth theft of personal information of 1.5
millions patients 4). Moreover, cases of misusing of personal data were re-
cently revealed (see Facebook, Cambridge Analytica case 5). International
regulations, like the recently introduced European General Data Protection
Regulation [VVdB], recommend to at least encrypt the data before outsourc-
ing them, making the data owners (and not the storage providers) responsible
for the key management. Still, mere users are anxious that they private data
could be exposed or misused for commercial or political reasons. Moreover,
enterprises of all size fear that a data breach will inevitably make them loose
their reputation. For both categories of users, fragmentation as a way of
reinforcing the data protection seems to be a promising track.
2https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yahoo-cyber/yahoo-says-all-three-billion-
accounts-hacked-in-2013-data-theft-idUSKCN1C82O1
3https://www.ftc.gov/equifax-data-breach
4https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/personal-info-of-15m-singhealth-patients-
including-pm-lee-stolen-in-singapores-most
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook-Cambridge_Analytica_data_scandal
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1.2 Contributions and Dissertation Overview
This dissertation revisits known fragmentation techniques, particularly the
Rivest’s all-or-nothing transform [Riv97] or Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79],
making them usable for users looking for secure but at the same time cost-
efficient and fast storage solutions. The main focus is put on increasing data
confidentiality without deteriorating fragmentation performance. This is es-
pecially motivated by the fact that a detailed survey on data fragmentation
(presented in Section 2) demonstrated that although multiple fragmentation
techniques were proposed since the late 70s, they are not widely used for
storage of large data as they are slow, difficult to integrate, or lead to an
increase in overall data volume.
The ultimate goal of this thesis is to provide a set of methods that could be
directly applied inside an industrial context to reinforce the confidentiality
of the stored data. As current standards imply the use of symmetric en-
cryption for protection of data confidentiality, the majority of the proposed
methods leave symmetric encryption as its core component and reinforces
the protection by using additional mechanisms. Thus, the contributions are
not in contrast with the usual process but rather inherit from it. Issues of
data availability or integrity are not treated in this thesis as separate re-
search tracks provide solutions that could be integrated within the proposed
methods.
Chapter 2 contains a rich survey on data fragmentation as a way of pre-
serving data confidentiality. It introduces two new definitions dividing frag-
mentation into bitwise and structurewise. Relevant fragmentation techniques
are divided according to these definitions and described in detail. They are
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compared in terms of data protection levels, storage overhead, and complex-
ity. Performance benchmarks confirm the theoretical complexity evaluation.
In addition to techniques, academic and commercial systems applying data
fragmentation are presented. The main characteristics of the systems are
described and the academic and commercial approaches are compared. Fi-
nally, recommendations are given on the design of an efficient fragmentation
system.
In Chapter 3, the family of all-or-nothing transforms is extended with
three new proposals. They all aim at protecting encrypted data against
the exposure of the encryption key; encrypted data are transformed into
fragments so the decryption of even a single ciphertext block is impossible
unless all the fragments are gathered. The proposed schemes are the fastest
of all the state-of-the-art techniques as they require a very low number of
operations in addition to data encryption. Moreover, a fast fragmentation
solution is introduced addressing the needs of users that do not want or
cannot afford to use of a multitude of storage sites (like those using using
a basic account inside a public cloud). It allows them to protect their data
against the curiosity of the cloud or potential external attackers.
Chapter 4 modifies some of the schemes presented in Chapter 3 mak-
ing their fragmentation processing even faster than data encryption using
the most common symmetric-key encryption algorithm. This gain in per-
formance is achieved by limiting encryption processing and relying on the
protection provided by data dispersal. This contribution addresses the need
of users prioritizing the speed of processing.
Chapter 5 introduces a lightweight fragmentation scheme based on data
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encoding, permutation, and dispersal that totally gets rid of data encryp-
tion. This allows the fragmentation processing to be performed even faster
- up to twice as fast as data encryption. The proposal revisits the use of
the Shamir’s secret sharing, trading its perfect security for scalability. In
contrast to other contributions, this proposal comes with an alternative to
symmetric encryption. It was motivated by the fact that in some cases, a
lightweight data protection combined with dispersal may be sufficient as sug-
gested in [CBHK15, BLU+15]. It should be considered as a first sketch of
a fragmentation methodology that would have to be investigated in more
detail before being deployed in an industrial context.
Chapter 6 revisits data fragmentation inside sensor networks, particularly
in the Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks. The main focus in this case is
put not solely on the fragmentation performance but also on the reduction of
storage and transmission costs by using the data aggregation. This is moti-
vated by the fact that, contrary to fragmentation in the cloud, fragmentation
inside a sensor network has to account for the limited energy capacities of
the sensors’ batteries. When compared with relevant state-of-the art tech-
niques, the proposed scheme reduces by at least half the number of stored
and transmitted bits.
Chapter 7 contains a summary of the research contributions as well as a
detailed insight into future work. It opens the way to several new research
tracks.
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Chapter 2
Data protection by means of
fragmentation in distributed
storage systems
2.1 Introduction
Protecting data confidentiality using a combination of data fragmentation
and dispersal is not a recent idea. In fact, one of the first secret sharing
techniques can be found in Adi Shamir’s [Bla79] or George Blakley’s [Bla79]
seminal papers from the late 70s. In these still timely proposals, fragments
of the encryption key are distributed over several collaborators. The key
reconstruction is only possible when a given threshold of the fragments is
being gathered. Around the same time, the French LAAS-CNRS labora-
tory designed an architecture for secure data storage and processing that
distributed data fragments over multiple physical devices of different trust-
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worthiness levels [DBF91]. During the following decades, data fragmentation
and dispersal were considered in a multitude of various contexts: protection
of archival data [SGMV09], proactive data storage [SB05], preserving pri-
vacy of relational database systems [ABG+05, BCCBF13, CVF+10], secur-
ing commercial object storage solutions [RP11, SJH05, TG11a], and rein-
forcing data confidentiality, integrity, or availability in multi-cloud environ-
ments [BCQ+13, BGJ+13, DCdVEF+14, HIK+13]. Nowadays, a new gener-
ation of solutions based on data fragmentation and dispersal is emerging 1.
They address the concerns of users who fear the exposure of their outsourced
data but still want to store data in public areas for obvious reasons of cost
reduction.
This chapter presents relevant fragmentation techniques that aim to en-
sure confidentiality or privacy of stored data. It also gives an overview of
the historical as well as current distributed storage systems applying the
described techniques. In order to better organize the descriptions, two defi-
nitions of two different types of data fragmentation are introduced:
Definition 1 Bitwise fragmentation is defined as the process of data
fragmentation without regards to the data structure; data is just treated as
set of consecutive bits, each of which is of equal confidentiality level.
Definition 2 Structurewise fragmentation is defined as the process of
data fragmentation with regards to the data structure; data is divided into
subsets of bits of different confidentiality levels that will be protected in dif-
1http://wikibon.org/wiki/v/3_Tenants_of_Security_and_the_Role_of
_Information_Dispersal
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ferent ways, i.e. dispersed over physical devices characterized by different
trustworthiness levels.
Presented techniques and systems are divided into two groups according
to those two definitions. The first group addresses the user’s need for storing
data without making any assumptions about its type. Typically, it will
include all kinds of object storage methods and systems. The second group
gathers mainly applications of data fragmentation inside relational database
storage systems.
2.2 Data Concepts and Notation
Different terminology is applied in different works; for instance, fragments
are sometimes called chunks, shards, or shares. The following data concepts,
notation, and terminology are introduced in order to unify and facilitate the
description of relevant works.
Data Concepts
The presented fragmentation techniques perform two kind of operations on
their input data: they can segment the data into physically separate frag-
ments or they can transform the data (i.e. encrypt or encode). Therefore,
data concepts will be divided into two groups corresponding to those two
kind of operations.
Concepts connected with data fragmentation:
48 CHAPTER 2. RELEVANT WORK
• Data (D or d): An initial vector of data bits of size |D| bits. When
the data is represented as an integer it is denotes as d.
• Fragment (F ): The final fragment, a vector of bits of size |F | bits, a
result of the data fragmentation.
• Share (SHARE): an intermediary fragment of size |SHARE| bits
in the case when the data fragmentation process is performed in two
steps.
Concepts connected with data transformation:
• Block (B, P or C): a sequence of |B| bits corresponding to the
classical concept of a data block. When referring to a plaintext block,
the block is denoted as P and, when referring to a ciphertext, the block
is denoted as C. When it is not specified if the block is a plaintext or
a ciphertext block, it is referred to as simply B.
• Plaintext (PLAIN): when the data D is designed to be encrypted,
it is denoted as plaintext PLAIN composed of p plaintext blocks (the
plaintext is already padded if needed).
• Ciphertext (CIPH): encrypted plaintext composed of c ciphertext
blocks. The number of blocks inside the ciphertext is equal to c = p+1
as an initialization vector is added at the beginning of the ciphertext.
• Transformed ciphertext (CIPH ′): when an additional processing
is applied to the ciphertext after the data encryption, CIPH ′ denotes
the transformed ciphertext.
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• Key (K): An encryption key of size |K| bits in the case when a sym-
metric encryption algorithm is used.
Notation
• n: The total number of final data fragments obtained after the frag-
mentation process.
• k: In the case when a threshold scheme (in which not all the fragments
are required for data reconstruction) is applied, k denotes the threshold:
the minimum number of fragments out of the n final fragments that is
required for the reconstruction of the data. When a scheme has kmax
different thresholds, they are denoted as k1, . . . , kkmax.
2.3 Bitwise Fragmentation
This section presents an overview of most notable bitwise fragmentation tech-
niques and systems providing data confidentiality. First, it will describe the
fragmentation techniques. Second, it will portray important characteristics
and elements proper to bitwise fragmentation systems: data resilience, key
and fragments’ location management, integrity authentication, trustworthi-
ness of the storage nodes, fragment size and decoys, and data deduplication.
Finally, it will explain individual descriptions of nine selected bitwise frag-
mentation storage systems: six academic and three commercial solutions.
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2.3.1 Bitwise Fragmentation Techniques
During bitwise fragmentation, initial data D is transformed into n fragments
F0, . . . , Fn−1 that are later dispersed over n different physical locations over
multiple physically separated storage servers inside of a data center or several
independent storage providers. Data reconstruction is only possible when a
threshold of k of the fragments is reached. Therefore, protection provided
by the data fragmentation depends mainly on the two parameters k and n
defining the dispersion scope. On the one hand, a value of k close to n makes
the fragments gathering harder as it gives less choice to an attacker. In a
particular case, when k equals n, all fragments are needed for data recovery
and the attacker has to compromise all of the chosen storage sites. On the
other hand, a lower value of k increases data availability as it makes data
reconstruction feasible even if some of the fragments are lost or corrupted.
Therefore, a wise choice of the k and n setting has to take into consideration
the characteristics of the environment in which the fragments will be stored
(the issue of providing data resilience inside a distributed storage system is
described in more details in Section 2.3.2).
Fragmentation algorithms can be very roughly organized in three groups
with a decreasing confidentiality level. The first group includes secret shar-
ing schemes providing the highest level of secrecy - no information can be
deduced from a single data fragment. The second group contains computa-
tionally secure algorithms that are usually based on symmetric encryption.
In this case, an attacker with enough time and computational resources may
deduce some information from fewer fragments than the minimum amount re-
quired for data reconstruction. The last group gathers all kind of lightweight
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fragmentation techniques replacing encryption with data shredding and dis-
persal in order to improve the fragmentation performance.
The following subsections describe in detail the most relevant fragmen-
tation techniques used for data protection inside historical and modern dis-
tributed systems.
Secret Sharing Schemes and Information Dispersal Algorithms
The perfect (or information-theoretically secure) secret sharing schemes trans-
form data D into n fragments, each of a size equal to the size of D. Any k
of those fragments are sufficient to recover original information while k − 1
fragments do not provide any information about the initial data. This is true
even if an attacker possesses unlimited computational resources. However,
information-theoretical security comes at the price of a large storage overhead
as the size of a single data fragment is equal to the size of the data. There-
fore, secret sharing schemes are often judged too impractical for voluminous
data and are rather used for protection of small data, typically encryption
keys. Nevertheless, three of five academic systems proposals described later
in Section 2.3.3, adopt perfect secret sharing for data protection, judging
the increase of storage as an acceptable cost. POTSHARDS and GridShar-
ing chose XOR-splitting because of its fast performance. PASIS in some
situations also accepts the use of perfect security.
In contrast to perfect secret sharing schemes, information dispersal al-
gorithms are space-efficient. They fragment data D into n of size |D|
k
each.
Like in secret sharing, any k of such fragments is needed for the data re-
construction. Nevertheless, the gain in storage is at the cost of secrecy as
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initial data patterns are preserved inside the data fragments resulting in a
low confidentiality level. Thus, information dispersal algorithms are mainly
used for resilience purpose (as they can resist a loss of n− k fragments) and
more rarely are considered as a way of data protection [BLU+15].
Ramp schemes are somehow hybrid (k1, k2, n)-threshold schemes situated
between secret sharing and information dispersal. Data fragments are pro-
tected like in the case of secret sharing, but only until k1 fragments are
gathered. A complete data reconstruction is possible when k2 fragments are
gathered.
Following paragraphs describe in detail two relevant secret sharing schemes
(Shamir’s secret sharing and XOR-splitting), the Rabin’s information disper-
sal algorithm, as well as linear ramp schemes.
Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS) In his seminal work from the late 70s,
Shamir introduced a perfect secret sharing scheme [Sha79] that 40 years
later still finds multiple applications in the data protection domain. A (k,n)-
threshold SSS takes as input data d (represented as an integer) and trans-
forms it into n fragments F0, . . . , Fk−1, any k of which are needed for data
reconstruction. SSS is based on polynomial interpolation; it exploits the fact
that given k unequal points x0, . . . , xk−1 and arbitrary values y0, . . . , yk−1
there is at most one polynomial y(x) of degree less or equal to k − 1 such
that y(xi) = yi, i = 0, . . . , k−1. More precisely, Shamir’s scheme uses modu-
lar arithmetic. The set of integers modulo a prime number m forms a field in
which interpolation is possible. In order to encode data d, a prime number
m greater than d and n is picked. A polynomial y(x) of degree k − 1 is
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constructed where k − 1 coefficients coeff 0,. . . ,coeffk−2 are randomly cho-
sen from a uniform distribution over the integers in [0,m). yi values are
computed modulo m. The n computed points Fi = (xi, yi), i = 0, . . . , k − 1
are the final fragments that will be distributed over n different locations or
owners.
In SSS, fragmentation consists in evaluating n times a polynomial of
degree k − 1. The complexity of computing a value at a single point is O(k)
when the Horner’s scheme is applied. Therefore, it takes O(kn) to compute
a polynomial of degree k − 1 at n points. During data defragmentation,
the constant term of the interpolating polynomial is computed using, for
instance, the Lagrange interpolation. Unlike the fragmentation, this is an
operation quadratic in function of k.
When the data is large, Shamir’s advice is to break it into smaller chunks
and apply the fragmentation process to each of the chunks separately. Im-
plementations of the scheme usually optimize its performance by performing
the operations in the finite field GF (28) as it is adapted to the nature of byte
computations2.
SSS was primarily designed to protect secret keys - an encryption key is
fragmented and the fragments are distributed among shareholders. In this
case, quadratic complexity and n-fold increase in storage are acceptable but,
in the context of distributed storage of larger data, they may be a serious
obstacle.
Around the same time that Shamir presented his scheme, Blakley [Bla79]
published his own scheme relying on the fact that any n nonparallel (n-1)-
2http://manpages.ubuntu.com/manpages/xenial/man7/gfshare.7.html
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dimensional hyperplanes intersect at only one specific point. However, it did
not find wide application inside distributed storage systems.
XOR-splitting XOR-splitting is an information-theoretically secure scheme
relying on the one-time pad encryption technique [Sha49]. During fragmen-
tation of data D, k − 1 random fragments F0, . . . , Fk−2 of size |D| bits each
are generated. The last fragment, Fk−1, is obtained by exclusive-oring all the
fragments with the the data Fk−1 = (
⊕k−2
0 Fi)⊕D. In contrast to Shamir’s
scheme, xor-split does not provide data redundancy in addition to secrecy
and the loss of a single fragment makes the data unrecoverable. Therefore,
in order to achieve resilience of protected data, it has to be combined with
a complementary technique like data replication (the combination of tech-
niques used in the GridSharing system) or a (k, n)-threshold secret sharing
scheme (the combination of techniques chosen by the POTSHARDS system).
Like in the case of all perfect secret sharing schemes, XOR-splitting leads to
a n-fold increase in storage as the fragments are of the size of the data itself.
Its advantages are the high confidentiality level. XOR-splitting processing
is theoretically very fast as exclusive-or is one of the quickest operations to
implement. However, the increase in storage connected with the generation
of k − 1 random fragments can make it slow and not scalable in practice.
The idea behind XOR-splitting is very similar to the one behind the Karnin-
Greene-Hellman method [DKWGH83, KK03].
Information Dispersal Algorithms (IDA) Rabin introduced the con-
cept of an information dispersal algorithm (IDA) [Rab89] at the end of the
80s. An IDA divides data D of size |D| bits into n fragments. Each fragments
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contains |D|
k
bits of the data. Any k fragment of those n fragments suffices
for reconstruction. More precisely, data D is represented as a collection of
k-element vectors. Each of those vectors is transformed into an n-element
vector by being multiplied by a k×n nonsingular dispersal matrix DM . The
n-elements of each transformed vector are then dispersed over n fragments
F0, . . . , Fn−1. The n rows of the dispersal matrix DM are usually attached
within the fragments. Data reconstruction consists of multiplying any k of
the fragments by the inverse of a k × k matrix built from any k rows of the
matrix DM .
Rabin’s IDA is mainly used for fault-tolerant storage and information
transmission as its confidentiality level is too low. Indeed, fragmented data
cannot be explicitly reconstructed from fewer than the k required fragments
[Li12] though some information about the content of the initial data is leaked.
Data patterns are preserved inside fragments when the same matrix is reused
to encode different data vectors. A similar problem occurs when using the
Electronic Code Book block cipher mode for block cipher encryption [Dwo01].
Even with this weakness, IDA is still sometimes being considered as one the
techniques that could be applied in a multi-cloud environment [BLU+15].
When applied to already encrypted data, IDA adds redundancy and rein-
forces confidentiality.
Data parsing [CBHK15, SJH05] is sometimes seen as a subcategory of
information dispersal. Data (encrypted or not) are shredded and distributed
with a bit granularity over k fragments. A dispersal key is required to define
the parsing pattern. A relative drawback of this solution resides in the fact
that it operates at bit level while in many high level programming languages
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the byte is the smallest addressable unit of memory. Therefore, an efficient
implementation of this kind of solution is a challenge at the programming
level and may necessitate the use of a dedicated hardware element (like in
[SJH05]).
Ramp schemes Ramps schemes, first introduced in [BM85], are situated
between perfect secret sharing and information dispersal. They break data
into n fragments, such that any k2 of them allow data recovery and fewer than
k1 reveal no information at all. The main idea is to gain storage efficiency by
relaxing security requirements. One of the simplest ramp schemes modifies
the Shamir’s scheme by using only k1 random coefficients inside the encoding
polynomial. Data D is used to generate the remaining coefficients of the
polynomial. A different way of implementing a linear ramp scheme consists
of modifying the Rabin’s information dispersal algorithm. Each data vector
is composed of k2 elements, k1 of which are random and k2 − k1 belong to
the initial data.
In distributed storage, ramp schemes have been considered in the con-
text of distributed storage by the authors of PASIS and CDStore systems.
In [LQLL14], a modification of the linear ramp scheme designed for data
dispersal in a cloud-of-clouds was introduced: the Convergent Ramp Secret
Sharing Scheme (CRSSS). CRSSS replaces random information inside a clas-
sical ramp scheme with deterministic hashes generated from the initial data.
Such processing allows further fragment deduplication.
Fast and Scalable Fragmentation Algorithm (FSFA) The fast and
scalable fragmentation Algorithm (FSFA) is situated somewhere between se-
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Table 2.1: A comparison between relevant techniques in terms of the number
of operations required during data fragmentation and defragmentation. (add.
- additions, sub. - subtractions, mult. - multiplications, div. - divisions, xors
- exclusive-ors)
Algorithm Fragmentation Defragmentation
Shamir’s SS Dn(k − 1) add. D(k − 1) add.
Dn(k − 1) mult. D2(k − 1)2 + 2n sub.
D2(k − 1)2 + 2n− 1 mult.
Dn+ 1 div.
XOR-splitting Dn xors Dn xors
Rabin’s IDA Dn mult. Dk mult.
Dn add. Dk add.
Ramp scheme D(1 + k1
k2
)n mult. D(1 + k1
k2
)k add.
D(1 + k1
k2
)n add. D(1 + k1
k2
)k mult.
FSFA D(k − 1) add. D(k − 1) add.
D(k − 1) mult. D(k − 1) mult.
cret sharing and information dispersal. It is introduced in detail in Chapter 5.
It transforms data into k interdependent fragments that all have to be gath-
ered in order to reconstruct the initial information. Its process is a mix of
data encoding based on a modification of the Shamir’s scheme, data permu-
tation, and data dispersal. A performance comparison with related works
demonstrates it can be much faster than fragmentation techniques based on
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Table 2.2: A comparison between relevant techniques in terms of overall re-
quired storage, integrated resilience, and provided data confidentiality level.
A low confidentiality level preserves data patterns inside the fragments. A
lightweight protection does not preserve patterns.
Algorithm Storage Resilience Confidentiality
Shamir’s SS |D|n Yes Perfect
XOR-splitting |D|n No Perfect
Rabin’s IDA |D| Yes Low
Ramp scheme |D|(1 + k1
k2
) Yes Perfect up to k1,
then low
FSFA |D|+ |B|, |D|  |B| No Lightweight
symmetric encryption while producing reasonable storage overhead.
Comparison between presented techniques Table 2.1 and Table 2.2
contain a comparison of the techniques in terms of complexity, storage, re-
silience and confidentiality level. The following algorithms are compared:
Shamir’s secret sharing, XOR-splitting, Rabin’s information dispersal algo-
rithm, the linear ramp scheme based on an information dispersal algorithm,
and the fast and scalable fragmentation algorithm. Figure 2.1 shows a perfor-
mance benchmark confirming the theoretical evaluation. All techniques were
implemented in JAVA language using GF(28) which allows for multiplications
using look-up tables and replaces addition/subtraction with exclusive-ors.
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Figure 2.1: Performance comparison between Shamir’s secret sharing (SSS),
Rabin’s information dispersal algorithm (IDA), and the fast and scalable frag-
mentation scheme (FSFA, presented in two configurations, a more precise
comparison of FSFA with relevant techniques is presented in Chapter 5).
SSS and IDA are slow and not scalable while FSFA achieves a good perfor-
mance that does not decrease with the growing numbers of fragments. A linear
ramp scheme based on Shamir’s scheme will have a similar or slightly faster
performance compared to SSS depending on the chosen threshold. A linear
ramp scheme based on IDA will have a performance similar or slightly slower
than the IDA depending on the chosen threshold. XOR-splitting in practice
achieves the same performance as well implemented SSS. In presented con-
figuration k = n.
Fragmentation Techniques Using Symmetric Encryption
A different group of fragmentation techniques reunites methods based on
symmetric encryption. Such techniques first encrypt the data using a sym-
60 CHAPTER 2. RELEVANT WORK
metric encryption algorithm (like AES). Then, they fragment data into n
fragments, k of which are needed for data reconstruction. Finally, the en-
cryption key is securely fragmented and transmitted withing the fragments.
The big advantage of such techniques is that they provide data confidentiality
without leading to an increase of storage.
Secret Sharing Made Short (SSMS) Krawczyk was the first one to in-
troduce a fragmentation scheme combing data encryption and dispersal [Kra94]
at the beginning of the 90s. In his proposal named Secret Sharing Made Short
(SSMS), data D are first encrypted using a symmetric encryption algorithm
with a random encryption key K. Encrypted data are then fragmented us-
ing an information dispersal algorithm like the Rabin’s IDA into n fragments
any k of which are sufficient for data reconstruction. The random key K
used during data encryption is fragmented using a (k, n)-threshold perfect
secret sharing scheme (usually Shamir’s secret sharing) and fragments of the
encryption key are attached to the n data fragments. In contrast to the per-
fect secret sharing, the storage overhead of SSMS does not depend on data
size |D| but is only equal to the size of the key |K| per data fragment: Such
storage overhead is negligible when larger data are being fragmented.
SSMS defines a fragmentation methodology, leaving implementation de-
tails to the user. In modern implementations [BCQ+13], systematic error-
correction Reed-Solomon codes [RS60] are used during the information dis-
persal step. They fragment data in a way that k fragments are formed from
large chunks of encrypted data (data are just fragmented in a straightforward
way) and n − k fragments are added for data resilience. Systematic error-
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correction codes are faster than classic information dispersal algorithm, but
they leave large chunks of encrypted data inside the fragments. Therefore
an attacker in possession of the encryption key is able to decrypt a portion
of information from less than k fragments.
AONT-RS Like SSMS, the AONT-RS method [CLM17, RP11] combines
symmetric encryption with data dispersal. The main difference between these
two methods lies in the key management. Similarly to SSMS, in AONT-RS
data D are first encrypted using a random encryption key and a symmet-
ric encryption algorithm. In a next step, encrypted data are fragmented
into k fragments in a straightforward way (data are just divided into chunks
composed of consecutive bits) and n − k additional fragments are gener-
ated using systematic Reed-Solomon codes [RS60]. In contrast to SSMS, in
AONT-RS the encryption key is not fragmented using Shamir’s scheme but
exclusive-ored with the hash of the encrypted data (so it is unrecoverable
in the absence of the complete ciphertext). AONT-RS was clearly inspired
by the all-or-nothing transform (AONT) introduced by Rivest [Riv97] (de-
scribed in detail in Section 2.3.1). However, unlike Rivest’s proposal, it does
not protect data against the exposure of the encryption key.
CAONT-RS [LQLL16] slightly modifies AONT-RS in order to allow a
fragments’ deduplication. It replaces the random key used during data en-
cryption with a key generated from the cryptographic hash of the initial
data.
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All-Or-Nothing Family of Algorithms
An all-or-nothing process mainly aims at protecting encrypted data against
the exposure of the encryption key. It creates dependencies inside the ci-
phertext in a way that its partial decryption is infeasible. Therefore, once
the ciphertext is being fragmented and dispersed, encrypted data contained
inside the fragments is protected against the key exposure.
Historical (introduced by Rivest [Riv97]) all-or-nothing processing is com-
posed of two steps: an all-or-nothing transform (denoted as AONT) pre-
processing applied before data encryption and the data encryption. The
whole two step process is denoted in the literature as all-or-nothing (AON)
[KSLC17]. The majority of recent all-or-nothing schemes operate differently:
they are first encrypting the data and then applying a transform over it to
create dependencies. Thus, they avoid the data re-encryption. The following
paragraphs present the most relevant all-or-nothing schemes.
Rivest’s and Desai’s all-or-nothing transforms Rivest was the first
one to propose an all-or-nothing process [Riv97]. In his proposal, data are
encrypted twice: first during the pre-processing step named the all-or-nothing
transform (AONT) and second after the transformation. During this pre-
processing step, the plaintext composed of p input blocks is transformed into
a sequence of c = p+1 output blocks. First, each input block Pi is encrypted
using a random key K: Ci = Pi ⊕ E(K, i), where 0 ≤ i ≤ p − 1 (E is
a symmetric encryption function). Second, a hash of each output block is
computed: Hi = hash(Kpub, Ci ⊕ i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ c − 1 using a publicly
known key Kpub (H is a keyed hash function). Third, the last output block
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is computed as an exclusive-or of K and of all hashes: Cc−1 = K
⊕n
i=1 Hi.
Such transformed plaintext is then encrypted using a key Kenc. Rivest’s
pre-processing protects against the exposure of the key Kenc which was used
during the second step of processing. However, it does not protect against
a situation where an attacker managed to acquire the random key K used
during the pre-processing AONT in addition to the encryption key used after
the pre-processing. Rivest’s proposal requires two rounds of encryption (one
during pre-processing and one after) that could be a burden for performance.
Desai [Des00] proposed a modification to Rivest’s proposal replacing the
round computing hashes. The last output block Cc−1 is obtained as an
exclusive-or of the random key and of all previously obtained p output blocks:
Cc−1 = K
⊕c−2
i=0 Ci. Such processing improves the performance.
Bastion Among the latest developments, Bastion [KSLC17] is an AON
composed of the data encryption step and of a linear transform applied to
the encrypted data. It ensures that the initial ciphertext blocks cannot be
recovered as long as the adversary has access to all but two output blocks.
More specifically, the ciphertext CIPH is multiplied by a square matrix A of
dimensions c× c, such that: (i) all diagonal elements are set to 0 and (ii) the
remaining off-diagonal elements are set to 1 (such a matrix is invertible and
A = A−1 so the inverse transform: CIPH = A−1 · CIPH ′ = A · CIPH ′).
The multiplication CIPH ′ = A · CIPH ensures that each output block C ′i
will depend on all output blocks C ′j except from C ′i,i = j. Bastion achieves
much better performance than AONs as it does not require an additional
encryption round. Thanks to a wise implementation, the transform applied
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after the encryption uses only 2c exclusive-or operations (3c−1 exclusive-ors
are made in total, counting c− 1 exclusive-ors from the CTR mode).
Mix&Slice Mix&Slice [BDCdVF+16] is an approach to enforce access re-
vocation on data stored at external cloud providers. Dependencies are cre-
ated inside encrypted data so re-encrypting even a small portion of the out-
sourced data with a fresh key revokes the access to a user who does not
possess the new key. The algorithm used for the data transformation could
be seen as a particular case of an all-or-nothing scheme as it is characterized
by the same property: data decryption is not possible without the possession
of the whole ciphertext. In Mix&Slice, the transformation into final output
messages is performed using multiple encryption rounds - each encryption
round re-encrypts (and thus creates dependencies between) a different sub-
set of the input data.
Figure 2.2: Performance comparison between techniques based on symmetric
encryption. In light blue: techniques that do not provide protection against
key exposure. In dark blue: techniques that provide protection against key
exposure.
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Table 2.3: Comparison between relevant techniques in terms of number of op-
erations required for data fragmentation (encryption is measured in the num-
ber of block operations b.o.), number of exclusive-ors (including those used
during encryption), operations used for key management, and data defrag-
mentation. n - total number of fragments, k-number of fragments required
for data reconstruction, p- number of plaintext blocks, C- ciphertext block,
K- encryption key, rMS- (in Mix&Slice) number of encryption rounds, e- (in
PE-AON) number of fragments on which encryption will be applied
Algorithm Enc. [b.c.] xors Key m. K.E.P.
SSMS p p SSS(K) No
SSMS + IDA p np+ p+ n SSS(K) Yes
AONT-RS p p Hash(D)⊕K No
Rivest’s AON 3p+ 1 3p - Yes
Desai’s AON 2p+ 1 2p - Yes
Bastion p 3p+ 1 - Yes
Mix&Slice prMS prMS - Yes
SFD p p - Yes
CAON p 2p+ k − 1 Cp+1 ⊕K Yes
SAON p from p to 2p - Yes
PE-AON e
k
p e
k
p+ 2(p+ 1) - Yes
Secure fragmentation and dispersal Presented in detail in Chapter 3,
the Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal scheme (SFD) [KM18a] can be also
66 CHAPTER 2. RELEVANT WORK
seen as a form of an all-or-nothing fragmentation. Instead of creating de-
pendencies between the ciphertext blocks, it fragments the data along the
dependencies created during a block cipher encryption.
Circular all-or-nothing (CAON) The Circular All-Or-Nothing (CAON)
[KM18b] algorithm presented in detail in Chapter 3 improves the Bastion
proposal by reducing the complexity of the linear transform applied after the
data encryption by a factor of 2.
Selective All-Or-Nothing (SAON) The Selective All-Or-Nothing (SAON)
[KM18c] scheme, presented in detail in Chapter 3, is a fast way of protecting
data against key exposure in a single cloud environment. It achieves good
performance thanks to combining the SFD with the Bastion scheme.
Partial encryption and all-or-nothing (PE-AON) The partial en-
cryption and all-or-nothing (PE-AON) scheme, presented in detail in Chap-
ter 4, improves the fragmentation performance of encryption based fragmen-
tation schemes: it applies encryption only to a subset of the data and then
exclusive-ors encrypted and non-encrypted data fragments.
Comparison between presented techniques A comparison between
techniques presented in the section is presented in Table 2.3. A performance
benchmark is shown in Figure 2.2. All relevant schemes were implemented in
similar ways. AES was used as the symmetric encryption algorithm. SHA256
was used as the hash function inside the AONT-RS. More detailed bench-
marks comparing algorithms presented in this thesis (SFD, CAON, SAON,
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and PE-AON) with the state-of-the-art techniques are shown in Chapter 3
and Chapter 4.
2.3.2 Characteristics of bitwise fragmentation systems
The previous section gave an overview of existing techniques providing data
protection by means of fragmentation. This section focuses on other aspects
intrinsically connected with fragmentation that will be later analyzed in Sec-
tion 2.3.3 during the description of the storage systems.
Data Resilience
Any kind of distributed storage system should ensure data resilience as it
has to be prepared for the loss or alteration of a part of its data in case of an
attack or an incident. In a system applying fragmentation, the ratio between
the total number of fragments (n) and the number of fragments required
for the data reconstruction (k) should depend mainly on two factors: the
trustworthiness of the storage devices and the estimated longevity of the
system. Indeed, data dispersed over unreliable machines (i.e. inside a peer-
to-peer storage system) are more likely to be lost or altered. At the same
time, it is easier to ensure data survival if the longevity of the system is
measured in years rather than decades.
Several techniques may be applied to ensure data resilience, like data
replication, threshold secret sharing, information dispersal, and systematic
error-correction codes. The choice of a suitable technique is not straightfor-
ward as multiple factors like the performance of the technique or its impact
on the confidentiality and storage requirements have to be taken into account.
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Replication is the easiest and fastest solution but also quite inefficient in
terms of memory occupation. Its main advantage is that it ensures high data
availability as the replicas of fragments are immediately ready to be used and
no special processing is required in case of data recovery. Among systems
presented in Section 2.3.3, it can be found in GridSharing, DepSky (only as
an option), and IBM Object Cloud Storage (only for small data, for which
the gain in performance prevails over storage blow-up).
Threshold schemes, like the previously presented Shamir’s scheme, pro-
vide not only data protection but also resilience. However, in this case re-
silience comes at an extremely high cost as not only does the performance of
such schemes drastically decrease with the increasing number of fragments,
but their storage overhead is comparable to data replication. Therefore, they
are almost exclusively used for the protection of small data, especially en-
cryption keys. One of the rare uses of secret sharing for ensuring the resilience
of larger data can be found in the POTSHARDS system, designed to protect
archival data for decades.
Information dispersal algorithm adds resilience without leading to an ex-
cessive storage overhead. They perform better than threshold schemes but
similarly lack of scalability (performance decreases with the increasing num-
ber of fragments). Therefore, recent systems use rather systematic error-
correction codes (especially Reed-Solomon codes [RS60]). The principle of
systematic error-correction codes is similar to the one of an information dis-
persal algorithm (both can be seen as matrix multiplication). However, they
allow users to save computations by only generating resilient n−k fragments
while keeping k fragments as direct chunks of the data.
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Key and Fragments’ Location Management
The use of a classical key management store may not be necessary inside a
bitwise fragmentation system. Indeed, data fragmentation method do not
require any encryption key (i.e. when secret sharing is used to create the
fragments) or disperses the key within the data fragments (i.e when SSMS
or AONT-RS techniques are applied). Thus, of all the systems described
later in Section 2.3.3, only Delta-4 and Symform store encryption keys in a
separate trusted area.
In systems based on fragmentation, the encryption key is somehow re-
placed by a map - a piece of information mapping information about the
stored data with the corresponding fragments’ locations and ordering. Even
if the map is less critical than a key, its possession clearly facilitates the work
of an attacker. Thus, it should be stored in a trusted location, fragmented
over independent nodes, or given to the user. The last solution is risky as
the probability that the user will loss the map increases with the supposed
data longevity [SGMV09]. In order to increase the protection level, the map
may be also encrypted or fragmented [PBL91].
The loss of the map is a critical situation. A straightforward solution
to this problem would be to broadcast a request to all of the storage nodes
in order to discover fragments location. However, this will work only if
fragments have a piece of information attached to them describing their origin
and order.
An interesting design was proposed by POTSHARDS system, where a
user possesses a primary map of their data fragments and a secondary dis-
tributed map, named approximate pointers, is attached to the fragments.
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Therefore, this make the data reconstruction possible even if the user lost
their map. However, the secondary map includes a sort of honeypot mak-
ing the emergency recovery much more time consuming than the standard
procedure.
Data Integrity and Authentication
Dispersed fragments may be altered, especially when they are stored on a
multitude of untrusted devices. The most common solution addressing the
data integrity issue is to compute a digest of the data that will be transmitted
to the client within the fragments. The client can then verify the integrity
of the defragmented data by computing its hash and comparing it with the
one that was received within the fragments. When authentication of the
fragments is also required, a keyed-hash message authentication code can be
used or the data can be signed using public-key cryptography.
An alternative way of ensuring data integrity was implemented in Grid-
Sharing using a voting system. It makes the system resilient to a Byzantine
fault; even if a certain amount of storage nodes are corrupted, the system still
behaves correctly. GridSharing replicates fragments and distributes them of
multiple storage nodes. During data retrieval, several replicas of the same
fragments are sent to the client and the most frequent among the set of
replicas is considered to be the right one. On one hand, such a technique
is very inefficient in terms of storage capacity and transmission costs. On
the other hand, over-requesting of the fragments may slightly improve the
defragmentation performance. Even if the GridSharing approach does not
directly require the computation of cryptographic hashes, it still demands a
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comparison between data fragments.
PASIS presented an interesting approach against unauthorized data changes.
It audits the storage nodes in order to detect data modifications and restore
the data from backup when necessary. Storage nodes are recording any kind
of data modifications. In the case of a data loss or undesired data modifica-
tion, the state of the node will be reverted.
Trustworthiness of the Storage Nodes
Roughly, three principal levels of device trustworthiness can be distinguished:
trusted, curious-but-honest, and untrusted. Trusted devices are used for the
processing (fragmentation, defragmentation, mapping) of data. They also
store maps and encryption keys if necessary. In any kind of system there must
be at least one such trusted device (often it is the user’s device). Intuitively,
communication to and from this component must be appropriately secured
as a man-in-the-middle attack would expose fragments to an attacker making
the dispersal obstacle useless (it is recommended to use separate channels for
the distributions of distinct fragments). Commercial solutions apply TLS to
secure communication between the trusted zone and the storage nodes. In
the historical Delta-4 project, a less typical approach was proposed where
fragments belonging to different data are mixed together during the trans-
mission and thus obfuscate the communication.
Curious-but-honest (or semi-honest) devices try to learn as much as pos-
sible about the stored data. However, they behave correctly, do not modify
the data, and execute protocols as specified. A storage provider like a cloud
is often assumed to be curious-but-honest. The category of untrusted devices
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gathers all kind of storage nodes that will not only look at the stored data,
but can also deviate from the defined protocols.
Fragment Size and Decoys
Knowledge of the fragments’ size opens the door to a potential side-channel
attack. Not only does it give an attacker information about the estimated size
of the data, but it can also help identify fragments belonging to the same
data as most likely they will be equal in size. A possible countermeasure
could be having a fixed fragment size inside the whole storage system. This
implies pre-processing data - segmenting larger data into smaller chunks while
padding smaller data. Such a solution has already been applied, for instance,
in the Symform peer-to-peer storage system. Data could also be divided into
chunks of various sizes that would obfuscate the size of the data.
Decoys can be defined as fragments aiming to mislead an intruder. They
may be implemented in two ways. The first way, consists in generating
random fragments that do not belong to any initial data and mixing them
with valid fragments. The randomly-generated portion of data obfuscates the
exact amount of stored data but inevitably increases storage requirements. A
more efficient way of proceeding would be to inject invalid entries to the map
with fake locations of the data fragments. These pre-existing fragments (but
matching different data files) are now decoys. This technique was adopted
by POTSHARDS where, in its secondary map, only one entry out of four
lead to a valid fragment.
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Data Deduplication
Data deduplication exploits content similarity in order to reduce the over-
all storage volume [LQLL14, QD02a]. It is especially efficient in the case
of archival systems storing large amounts of similar data like backup or log
files. Applied inside a bitwise fragmentation system, deduplication prohibits
the use of randomness during data fragmentation. Therefore, usual bitwise
fragmentation techniques have to be modified in order to produce the same
output fragments for same input data. To make a technique deduplica-
ble, the random element used during fragmentation (typically the encryp-
tion key) is replaced by deterministic data constructed from the hash of the
data [LQLL14].
A naive implementation of data deduplication opens the door to side-
channel attacks. Indeed, an attacker eavesdropping the communication be-
tween a user and the system nodes may deduce if the user’s data exists
already inside the system. A two stage deduplication, like the one proposed
by CDStore, provides a solution to this problem.
2.3.3 Systems applying bitwise fragmentation
Nine bitwise fragmentation systems were selected among relevant works: six
academic solutions and three commercial products. Their main focus is to
protect data confidentiality using fragmentation. Systems applying fragmen-
tation solely for a data resilience purpose were put aside. The particularities
of each of the systems are described and a comparison between the academic
and commercial approaches can be found at the end of this section.
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Academic Systems
Six academical systems were described in chronological order: Delta-4, Grid-
Sharing, POTSHARDS, PASIS, Depsky, and CDStore.
Delta-4 (LAAS-CNRS, INRIA, and Univerisity of Newcastle upon
Tyne) [PBL91] Delta-4 was a European project - one of the first to ad-
dress the need for a dependable distributed storage system that could resist
not only accidental faults but also intentional intrusions. In this proposal,
the storage environment is composed of three different sites: a user site per-
forming data fragmentation, an archive site storing the fragmented data, as
well as a security site handling authentication, authorization, and key man-
agement. The user and security site have to be trusted. Individual nodes
of the archive site are not trusted and can be a subject to accidental faults
and malicious intrusions. However, the archive site overall is supposed to be
trusted.
Delta-4 transforms data using the fragmentation-redundancy-scattering
(FRS) technique [DBF91, FDP86]. In a pre-processing step data are cut
into chunks of equal size and chunks are encrypted with a block cipher.
Encrypted data are then distributed over k fragments using decimation at
the byte level; consecutive bytes of data are distributed over separate frag-
ments. Final fragments are then replicated and the replicas are sent to the
archive site that distributes them over its storage nodes using a randomized
algorithm obfuscating the fragments’ locations. Data replication was chosen
because of performance reasons as, thirty years ago, CPU cycles were too
scarce to efficiently execute error-correction or information dispersal. During
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the transmission to the archive site, fragments belonging to different data
are mixed, forming a single data flow (if necessary such data flow may be
artificially created by injecting decoys).
After two decades, the FRS technique was implemented inside two dis-
tributed systems: one peer-to-peer [BSL+06] and one using a central server
[CP11].
PASIS (Carnegie Mellon University [WBS+00, GKB+01, SGS+00])
PASIS shares the same objective as Delta-4: designing a storage system
capable of handling node failures and activities of malicious users. In or-
der to achieve its goal, it combines data fragmentation with dynamic self-
maintenance. Its architecture is composed of storage nodes (vulnerable to
attacks and intrusions) equipped with repair agents and agents integrated
within client devices (supposed to be inside trusted areas). Agents fragment
and disperse data over the storage nodes. A fragment is identified by the
name of its storage node and its local name on that node. A dedicated di-
rectory service maps the name of data stored over storage nodes to their
fragments. Therefore, a careful naming of stored files can obfuscate relations
between fragments.
In PASIS, the data fragmentation method is not predefined, but adapted
to the type of stored data (details of the right fragmentation choice are
presented in [WBP+01]). A wide range of techniques and their combinations
is taken into account: secret sharing, encryption, ramp schemes etc. The
choice of the right fragmentation technique is a compromise between the
desired performance, data availability, and data confidentiality.
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Self-securing storage nodes are the PASIS particularity. Each node im-
plements a repair agent that internally keeps track of all changes at the node
during a given interval of time. Keeping historical information allows the
detection of intrusions and prevents intruders from destroying or tampering
with stored data. Systems administrators have a window of time to recognize
malicious activity and rebuild the system using the history pool.
PASIS comes up with two interesting suggestions aimed at improving the
speed of data retrieval. The first suggestion consists of over-requesting data
fragments: asking storage nodes for more than the k fragments during the
data retrieval. This way, only the k first fragments that arrived first are
defragmented. However, at the same time, the bandwidth usage is increased.
The second suggestion is to prioritize nodes that have responded first during
recent retrievals.
GridSharing (Georgia Institute of Technology [SB05]) GridSharing
proposes a distributed system architecture that organizes storage nodes in
the form of a logical grid of k × n dimensions. It can handle up to cr of
node crashes and will behave correctly even if le of the nodes are honest-
but-curious and by are Byzantine faulty. The exact values of cr, le, and by
depend on the grid dimensions and the data distribution technique.
GridSharing combines XOR-splitting with replication. First, data are
fragmented into k fragments, all of which are required for data reconstruction.
Each row of the k rows receives a single fragment and replicates it n times
over its columns. During defragmentation, a client broadcasts their request
to the grid. As an answer, they will receive multiple replicas of the same
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fragments from which they will choose the most frequent answers. Such
processing leads to a very high overhead of storage and transmission costs
(in the example presented in the paper, data are replicated more than 60
times).
An original concept of renewal of data fragments is described. Indeed,
the random fragments generated using XOR-splitting could be replaced with
a new set after some time. Therefore, an attacker would dispose of less time
to gather the required fragments.
POTSHARDS (University of California [SGMV09]) POTSHARDS
is a proposal for an archival storage architecture able to last years or even
decades. Its basic concept is to distribute fragmented data over several co-
operating providers (named organizations).
POTSHARDS fragments data in a two steps process. First, data are frag-
mented using XOR-splitting into a set of shards. All shards are then required
for data reconstruction. To add resilience, each shard is fragmented using
Shamir’s secret sharing (this results in a considerable increase of storage over-
head as secret sharing is applied twice). The final fragments are distributed
across independent storage providers. POTSHARDS assures data integrity
by the use of algebraic signatures.
Authors motivate the choice of secret sharing with two reasons. First, key
management can be expensive over the years as it requires key replacements.
Moreover, an encryption key may be lost making the data unrecoverable.
Second, even the strongest encryption is only computationally secure and
may become become insufficient over a finite period of time taking into ac-
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count the fast development of new technologies.
After data fragmentation and dispersal, a user receives a primary map
containing the locations of the data fragments. Because it is possible that
this primary map will be lost after decades, a secondary map is attached to
the fragments in the form of approximate pointers. Each fragment contains
four pointers to other fragments, but not all of them point at the fragments
of the same data. This allows data reconstruction even if the primary map
is not anymore available. However, data reconstruction using approximate
pointers is time consuming and requires access to multiple different storage
providers and nodes.
In the event of a partial data loss, a special protocol allows the providers
to reconstruct the lost data without revealing too much of their content
where data used during the reconstruction are encrypted and only the fail-
over archive receives the corresponding encryption keys.
DepSky (University of Lisbon [BCQ+13]) DepSky is an academic sys-
tem built on commercial clouds. It fragments and disperses data over several
providers in a way that only a subset of the fragments is required in or-
der to reconstruct the initial data. This cloud-of-clouds aims at improving
data availability, confidentiality, and integrity, as well as protecting against
a vendor lock-in problem. Its architecture is composed of clients (a software
installed at the user site) reading and writing data stored over four com-
mercial clouds (Amazon S3, Windows Azure, Nirvanix, and Rackspace). To
deal with the heterogeneity of cloud interfaces, data are encapsulated inside
special data units, the exact implementation of which depends on the archi-
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tecture of the storage provider. Each data unit contains information about
its content including the data version or signature.
Two protocols for the distribution of data units are proposed: DepSky-A
and DepSky-CA. DepSky-A does not provide any data confidentiality but just
disperses replicas of data over the clouds in order to increase the data avail-
ability. As data are replicated, the overall storage blowup is equal to number
of the replicas. DepSky-CA is a secure and space efficient improvement of
the DepSky-A. Data processing follows the Krawczyk’s Secret Sharing Made
Short method. First, data are encrypted using symmetric encryption (AES).
They are then encoded into n fragments by the use of an optimal erasure
code (Reed-Solomon). The encryption key is partitioned into n fragments
using secret sharing (via the Shoenmakers’ Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing
scheme [Sch99]) and these key fragments are attached to data. Data integrity
is ensured by the use of n digests (one digest for each cloud) stored inside of
the metadata (SHA-1 was used for cryptographic hashes and RSA for signa-
tures). The system allows for the replacement of secret sharing by a more
traditional key distribution infrastructure.
Depsky’s authors demonstrated an improvement of the perceived avail-
ability and (in most cases) of the access latency when compared to cloud
providers individually. The monetary cost of the data dispersal was esti-
mated at twice the cost of using a single data storage provider.
CDStore (The Chinese University of Hong Kong [LQLL16]) CD-
Store deduplicates backup-data stored in a multi-cloud environment. The
system architecture is composed of CDStore clients integrated with users’ ser-
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vices and CDStore servers belonging to the cloud storage providers. Data are
first divided into shares of variable size that are then transformed into frag-
ments. CDStore keeps only the fragments that are different from those that
have already been archived. In order to enable such deduplication process-
ing, fragmentation of two identical input data has to result in two identical
sets of fragments [QD02b] (as already described in Section 2.3.2). Therefore,
authors of CDStore introduces two fragmentation techniques allowing data
deduplication: CAONT-RS and CRSSS [LQLL14]. Both modify existing
fragmentation techniques (AONT-RS and RSSS) by replacing their random
elements with deterministic data generated from the data hash. Moreover,
for performance reasons, CAONT-RS uses an all-or-nothing transformation
based on optimal asymmetric encryption padding (OAEP) [BR95, Boy99]
instead of the one initially proposed in [RP11].
CDStore comes with a two stage deduplication method to resist side-
channel attacks. When deduplication is implemented in a naive way, an
attacker can deduce information about the stored data by observing frag-
ments being updated to the cloud. With CDStore, produced fragments are
deduplicated at the client side between themselves as a first step. Then,
the remaining fragments are transferred to the CDStore servers that perform
the second deduplication step: they will keep only the fragments that are
different from those already inside the clouds.
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Commercial Systems
Three commercial systems were chosen for the survey: the IBM Cloud Object
Storage (existing3), the Symform peer-to-peer system (discontinued4), and
Unisys’s Secure Parser R© (existing5). All of them reinforce the protection
provided by symmetric encryption using data fragmentation.
IBM Cloud Object Storage [RP11] IBM Cloud Object Storage6 was
one of the first commercial products to use fragmentation and dispersal for re-
inforcing data confidentiality. Created by the Cleversafe startup as a private
cloud storage solution aimed at achieving petabyte scalability and reliability,
it was acquired by IBM and adapted to be integrated within a hybrid cloud
storage 7.
Data inside IBM Cloud Storage are fragmented into around 20-30 frag-
ments using the AONT-RS technique combining symmetric encryption with
Reed-Solomon codes (presented in detail in Section 2.3.1). Such fragments
are dispersed over random storage nodes. AES-256 is used as the algorithm
for symmetric encryption and SHA-256 is used to compute the hash of the
data that will be exclusive-ored with the encryption key. Data resilience is
achieved as, thanks to the Reed-Solomon error correction codes, not all of
the data fragments are required for the data reconstruction. A canary is
dispersed within the fragments in order to ensure data integrity. For per-
3https://www.ibm.com/cloud/object-storage
4https://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/06/17/quantum_file_sync_and_share_sinks/
5https://www.unisys.com/offerings/security-solutions/news%20release/latest-release-
unisys-stealth-security-extends-protection-to-include-medical-iot-devices
6https://www.ibm.com/cloud-computing/products/storage/object-storage/
7http://www.pcworld.com/article/3130792/ibms-cleversafe-storage-platform-is-becoming-a-cloud-service.html
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formance reasons, in the case of smaller data, the fragmentation process is
replaced with data encryption and replication.
AONT-RS does not require the use of a key store as the encryption key
is exclusive-ored with the data hash and dispersed within the fragments.
Therefore, the storage costs can be reduced by the costs of the key manage-
ment. However, the key is somehow replaced by a map that allows users
(and attackers who find it) to obtain the location of the fragments.
Symform peer-to-peer storage Symform8 was a peer-to-peer solution
offering distributed storage space. It used the distributed nature of its ar-
chitecture to enhance the confidentiality of the stored data. Symform’s frag-
mentation method was based on the RAID-96TM patented [TG11a, TG11b,
TG14] technology. RAID-96TM first divides data into 64MB shares com-
posed of consecutive data bits. It then encrypts the shares using the AES
algorithm with a 256-bits key. The encryption key is generated from the hash
of the data inside the share, allowing deduplication. In the next step, each
of the encrypted shares is shredded into 64 fragments of size 1MB each and
32 additional fragments are generated using Reed-Solomon codes. Finally,
the 96 fragments are dispersed across 96 randomly chosen devices. Data
reconstruction is possible if any 64 out of 96 fragments are gathered.
Symform was one of the rare fragmentation systems to use a centralized
key store situated in a trusted element. The store kept not only encryption
keys but also the information about the locations of the data fragments.
8http://www.symform.com
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Unisys’s SecureParserR© Unisys’s SecureParser R© [Joh07, SJH05] aims
at improving classical data protection techniques using a combination of
encryption, data shredding, and error-correction codes. It is composed of
software and hardware components.
First, data are encrypted using the AES algorithm with a random key.
Second, encrypted data are fragmented at bit level using a random splitting
key (the splitting key parses data and disperses its bits over fragments).
Therefore, final fragments are composed of random bits of encrypted data.
Both keys, encryption and splitting, are transformed using an all-or-nothing
transform and distributed within the fragments. Resilience is added to the
data using error-correction codes. An authentication value is also added to
the data fragments.
SecureParser R© introduces the interesting concept of the mandatory frag-
ment: a fragment that is necessary for a correct reconstruction of the data
regardless of the k and n specification. It can be useful in a situation when
the user would like to quickly refresh the fragmented data as they will only
have to replace the mandatory fragment. Such processing proposal od data
refreshment was already proposed by GridSharing (for a description of Grid-
Sharing, see Section 2.3.3). Nevertheless, a mandatory fragment should be
seen as especially sensitive data. Indeed, in a situation when an attacker
will want to make the data unavailable, they will most probably target the
mandatory fragment.
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Academic Approach vs. Commercial Products
It can be observed that the approach to data fragmentation changed over
the years. First, solutions based their protection almost solely on secret
sharing for confidentiality and replication for data resilience while recent
systems apply data encryption for confidentiality and error-correction for
data resilience.
In contrast to commercial products, academic proposals tend to be more
original even at the cost of an excessive (like in GridShard or POTSHARDS)
increase of storage volume or a drastic decrease of fragmentation perfor-
mance. They introduce novel solutions, such as repair agents in PASIS, or
approximate pointers in POTSHARDS, which deserve more experimenting
and probing. They look to the future by trying to be prepared for the pos-
sibility that the currently recommended size of the encryption key will no
longer be enough.
Commercial products hold to recommended NIST encryption standards
(AES with a key size of 128 or 256 bits) that they combine with some ad-
ditional fragmentation and dispersal processing. They tend to avoid data
replication, caring about the storage costs.
2.4 Exploiting data structures, multi-level con-
fidentiality, and machine trustworthiness
In a case where the data structure is known, the fragmentation process can
proceed by taking into account the varying need for secrecy along different
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subsets of the input data. Confidential data can be separated from the non-
sensitive part of the information and consequently different type of process-
ing can be applied to these two data subsets; for instance only confidential
data could be encrypted saving computations. Moreover, such fragmentation
could allow a reduction in storage costs as there is no need to provide a spe-
cific secure architecture (often expensive) in order to store a piece of data that
does not reveal anything confidential to an attacker. The idea of structure-
wise fragmentation was first proposed at the end of the last century by the au-
thors of the object-oriented fragmentation-redundancy-scattering [FDRR92]
technique. It was later modified to suit database storage [ABG+05, CVF+10]
and cloud computing technology [BCCBF13, DCdVEF+14, HIK+13].
Separating data along its confidentiality levels is simple to imagine but
not easy to implement. The decomposition process often requires user inter-
action and cannot be automatized. It is the users’ responsibility to provide
the rules of confidentiality for each set of data types. It is still possible, how-
ever, that even after a careful data fragmentation, a combination of two or
more non-confidential data fragments will reveal some confidential informa-
tion [CVF+10]. Moreover, information from outside could be used to exploit
the non-confidential data (for instance, de-anonymizing it). Therefore, a re-
cent research track aims at automatizing the data separation; new ways of
separating data in two fragments, confidential and non-confidential, without
user interaction were recently developed and presented in [QM15, Han18].
These were inspired by selective encryption and use the discrete cosine and
discrete wavelet transforms.
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2.4.1 Object-oriented Data Fragmentation
In the 90s, authors of the fragmentation-redundancy-scattering (FRS) tech-
nique (described in Section 2.3.3) introduced an object-oriented version that
could be used to fragment applications composed of objects [FDRR92, FP95].
Confidential objects are fragmented using a recursive algorithm until they are
broken into fragments that do not reveal any confidential information about
the functions of the application. Resilience is then added through the use
of error processing techniques (like error correcting codes). According to the
authors, adding resilience to objects could also be done by anticipating the
application design at the early stage of design. At the end, the fragmented
data is scattered over various workstations. Leftover fragments, still holding
confidential information (even after being fragmented inside the first step),
are encrypted or stored on trusted devices. All remaining pieces are dis-
tributed over untrusted sites. Obviously, data processing or defragmentation
are performed only on trusted sites.
The object-oriented FRS is hard to implement and thus was not later
developed. Indeed, decomposing an application into confidential and non-
confidential objects raises a challenge for the developers. Its distribution over
multiple nodes may very probably slow down the execution performance.
2.4.2 Database Fragmentation
A database as a service 9 delivers similar functionality to a classic, rela-
tional, or NoSQL database management systems while providing flexibility
9https://www.technologyreview.com/s/414090/designing-for-the-cloud/
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and scalability of a hosted in a cloud on-demand platform. The DBaaS user
does not have to be concerned with database provisioning issues; it is the
cloud provider’s responsibility to maintain, backup, upgrade and handle the
physical failures of the database system. Therefore, it is easy to see that sim-
plicity and cost effectiveness are the biggest advantages of such a solution.
At the same time, owners lose control over their outsourced data. Such
situations create new security and privacy risks, especially when the stored
data contains sensitive information like health or financial records. Conse-
quently, securing database services has become a need of paramount impor-
tance. A straightforward solution to the problem lies in the encryption of
the whole database, successfully implemented in [PRZB12]. However, per-
formance overhead and query processing limitations may be the drawbacks
of such a blunt approach. Moreover, the ability of encrypted databases to
provide provable security guarantees is sometimes questioned [GRS17].
A way of protecting the privacy of a database without using encryption is
seen in anonymization techniques aimed at guaranteeing the k-anonymization
[Swe02], t-closeness [LLV07] and l-diversity [MKGV07] of records inside a
database. They allow the release of a non-encrypted database containing
personal information while ensuring some degree of individual privacy. Some
progress on this subject, mainly for health data, has recently been performed
among others in [BCBC+14].
Database fragmentation promises an interesting alternative to full database
encryption or full anonymization. One of the first works on the subject
[ABG+05], introduces a distributed architecture for preserving data privacy.
End users communicate through a trusted client (as all of the presented sys-
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tems must include at least one trusted element in their architecture - the
one in which the fragmentation and defragmentation processes will occur)
with two non-trusted servers belonging to two different storage providers
(as presented in Figure 2.3). The use of different storage providers ensures
the physical separation of the information being protected. By construction,
storage providers do have access to the information that users entrust them
with. Even if they are well aware that they should not incorrectly interact
with the user’s data and its integrity without endangering their own busi-
ness, it is a common assumption to suppose them to be honest-but-curious;
they have the ability to observe, move, and replicate stored data, especially
behind the virtualization mechanism. In [ABG+05], the outsourced data is
partitioned among the two untrusted servers in a way that content at any one
server does not breach data privacy. In order to obtain valuable information,
an adversary must gain access to both databases. By analogy, the system is
also protected from insider attacks and the curiosity of the providers as long
as they do not ally together. On top of that, queries involving only one of
the fragments are executed much more efficiently than on encrypted data.
Another work [CVF+10, DCdVEF+14] protects sensitive information by
mixing encryption and fragmentation. It defines confidentiality constraints
as a subset containing one or more relation attributes. A constraint involving
only one attribute implies that the value of the attribute is sensitive and the
only way of protecting it is the use of encryption. On the other hand, multi-
attribute constraints specify that only associations between attributes of a
given constraint are sensitive. In that case, there is no need to encrypt all the
attributes values because confidentiality can be ensured by fragmentation.
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Figure 2.3: Fragmentation of the database is performed inside a trusted
area [ABG+05] and database fragments are then dispersed over two inde-
pendent storage providers.
In [CVF+10, DCdVEF+14], three scenarios of fragmenting a relation are
presented. In the first one, a relation is divided into two fragments which
does not contain sensitive combination of unencrypted attributes. In the sec-
ond scenario, the relation is split into multiple fragments in a way that any
query can always be evaluated on one of the fragments; each fragment con-
tains unencrypted attributes that do not violate confidentiality constraints,
as well as the encrypted representation of all other attributes. The last frag-
mentation scenario avoids the use of encryption by introducing a trusted area
(belonging to the data owner) for the storage of sensitive portion of data.
For each scenario, the authors present fragmentation metrics supporting
the definition of an appropriate fragmentation algorithm. Fragmentation
metrics can aim at minimizing the number of fragments, maximizing affinity
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between attributes stored in one fragment or minimizing querying costs.
Recently, Bkakria [BCCBF13] generalized this approach to a database
containing multiple relations. It introduced a new confidentiality constraint
for the protection of relationships between two tables. Sensitive associa-
tions between relations are secured by the protection of primary key/foreign
key relationships and the separation of the involved relations. Relations are
transformed into secure fragments in which subsets of attributes respecting
confidentiality constraints are stored in plaintext while all others are en-
crypted. Bkakria introduced a parameter for evaluating the query execution
cost and proposed a query transformation and optimization model for ex-
ecuting queries on distributed fragments. He also focuses on the issue of
preserving data unlinkability while executing queries on multiple fragments.
Indeed, providers have to build a coalition and then deduct information by
observing query execution. To avoid such situations, he proposes the use of
an improved Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [OG10] technique which al-
lows querying a database without revealing query results to service providers.
Results of implementation of the proposed approach are presented. Although
the modified PIR solution is much faster than its predecessor, the process-
ing time of record retrieval from multiple fragments is considerably slower in
comparison with querying a single fragment.
The idea of splitting a database into fragments stored at different cloud
providers was also proposed by Hudic [HIK+13]. In his approach, a database
is first normalized and then several security levels (high, medium, low) are
attributed to relations. Based on these three levels and specific user re-
quirements, data is encrypted, stored at local domain or distributed between
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providers.
Database fragmentation methods presented in this thesis remain limited
by the fact that the number of fragments does not exceed a few dozen. More-
over, in each case, the proposed fragmentation algorithms require user inter-
action in order to define the data confidentiality level.
2.5 Issues and Recommendations
Several issues have to be taken into account while designing a storage sys-
tem basing its data protection on fragmentation and dispersal. First, a right
separation of the fragments has to be ensured. A situation where data is
fragmented but there is no control over the fragments locations is a weak so-
lution as it does not guarantee that the dispersal will constitute a sufficient
obstacle for an attacker. Indeed, the majority of cloud providers use virtual-
ization which prevents the end user from such control. Dispersing data over
independent providers is a rapid solution but it can entail an increase in la-
tency costs [BCQ+13, HIK+13]. A single provider possessing several storage
sites, like the Amazon S3, may also be used. Such coarse-grained solutions
are suitable for users looking for simplicity. A more sophisticated means
of data dispersion would use bare-metal clouds like Rackspace OnMetal 10,
that abandoned virtualization and thus allows full control over the physical
location of the stored data.
A suggested dispersal strategy is presented in Figure 2.4. A small amount
of confidential information is stored inside trusted devices. Fragments of data
10https://www.rackspace.com/cloud/servers/onmetal
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that are not confidential but could reveal some information are gathered
and dispersed over several physically separated servers or independent cloud
providers. A large amount of non-confidential data then goes to a public
cloud as it this the most cost efficient solution.
Fragmentation may increase latency inside the storage system as it usu-
ally requires additional data processing, multiple transmission channels, and
in some cases it increases the amount of data to be stored and transmit-
ted. However, parallelization of the processing may be applied in order to
compensate for the performance overhead coming from the fragmentation.
Fragments over-requesting as well as keeping track of the most responsive
nodes also help to accelerate the data reconstruction process. When per-
formance becomes a critical issue, lightweight fragmentation techniques like
the FSFA (proposed in the Chapter 5) could be applied. A pre-processing
step consisting in structurewise fragmentation may also help to speed up
the overall processing as it allows the extraction and protection solely of the
confidential portion of the stored information.
Last but not least, structurewise fragmentation strongly depends on user
guidance for the definition of the confidentiality levels and consequently
on the data nature. Designing an algorithm for automatically or semi-
automatically separating confidential data from non-sensitive pieces would
make the structurewise fragmentation process much faster and easier to use.
This last idea has been successfully developed by Qiu [QM15] for the selec-
tive encryption of images using a general purpose GPU.
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Figure 2.4: Dispersing data according to the trustworthiness of the storage
devices. First, a small portion of sensitive data is kept inside a private area.
Second, fragments of data are dispersed over a multi-cloud environment or
physically separated servers. Such fragments do not leak confidential infor-
mation unless the are gathered. Third, a large amount of non-confidential
data is stored inside a public untrusted area..
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, related works from the domain of data protection by means
of fragmentation were presented. Fragmentation is divided into two cate-
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gories: bitwise and structurewise. Bitwise fragmentation regroups all kind
of data fragmentation techniques operating on data without regards for the
data structure. Structurewise fragmentation gathers methods that fragments
data into fragments of different confidentiality levels by analyzing their struc-
ture. Relevant works are organized into two groups according to those two
definitions.
The first section of the survey focuses on bitwise fragmentation. Relevant
techniques are presented including secret sharing, information dispersal, as
well as multiple schemes based on symmetric encryption used in recent dis-
tributed systems. They are compared in terms of storage requirements, per-
formance, and provided level of data confidentiality. Performance benchmark
help the positioning of the techniques. Several elements proper to bitwise
fragmentation systems are portrayed like data resilience, key and fragments’
location management, integrity, data defragmentation, trustworthiness of the
machines, the concept of decoys, fragment size, and data deduplication. Fi-
nally, descriptions of eight selected storage systems applying bitwise frag-
mentation techniques are presented.
The second section gathers works applying structurewise fragmentation:
the historical object-oriented fragmentation-redundancy-scattering and vari-
ous proposals connected with fragmentation of relational databases, including
database anonymization and private information retrieval.
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Chapter 3
Fragmentation as a way of
protecting encrypted data
against key exposure
3.1 Introduction and Motivation
The rapid growth of the cloud data storage market raises both security chal-
lenges and opportunities. On the one hand, cloud providers deal with a large
number of external attacks on a daily basis. Each major data leak is loudly
reported in the media, damaging their reputation. On top of that, the threat
from a user point of view may not only come from the outside but also from
a curious, malicious, or careless insider. On the other hand, never before
could users access so many storage devices at such a low cost. This highly
distributed nature of cloud storage opens up new possibilities for strength-
ening data protection: data can be fragmented and dispersed over a large
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number of servers on independent sites [BCQ+13, BLU+15]. Such processing
not only slows down an external attacker but also enhances users’ privacy
against the misuse of their personal data (as with the infamous Facebook
and Cambridge Analytica case 1) as it limits the possibility of data exploita-
tion by a malicious insider or of compromising data confidentiality by an
honest-but-curious storage provider.
As presented in Chapter 2, several recent storage solutions already frag-
ment and disperse encrypted data to reinforce the protection level [KM15].
However, the majority of them do not pay much attention to the way the
fragments are constructed from encrypted data. Fragmentation is usually
performed in a straightforward manner where fragments are formed from
large consecutive chunks of encrypted data. Such processing does not pro-
tect against powerful adversaries in possession of encryption keys with access
to a subset of the storage domains (and thus able to decrypt a part of the
dispersed information).
Nowadays, key exposure becomes a real threat [KSLC17]. It may be the
result of an easily guessable or reproducible key generation but even relying
on secure mechanisms may be insufficient as a secure key may be acquired in
various ways, e.g., using backdoors, bribes, or coercion. Moreover, when we
consider data with long life cycles (like archive data that are supposed to be
kept for decades or even more), the length of the encryption key which may
be recommended when data are first stored may not be sufficient anymore a
decade later due to progress in hardware development and cryptanalysis.
In order to prevent an attacker in possession of the encryption key from
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Facebook-Cambridge_Analytica_data_scandal
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decrypting even part of a ciphertext, data can be fragmented into a set of k
fragments (needed for data reconstruction). Once the fragments are dispersed
over two or more independent storage sites, the data is protected against an
attacker unable to gain access to the totality of the storage sites. This is true
even if the attacker managed to obtain the encryption key as a partial data
decryption ( decrypting just the portion of data contained inside a single
fragment) is impossible.
To make the decryption of less than the totality of data fragments im-
possible, an all-or-nothing transform can be applied as a pre-processing step
[Riv97] before data encryption. Alternatively, an information dispersal algo-
rithm can be used to form the final fragments from encrypted data [Rab89]
or a linear transform may be applied over the encrypted data to create de-
pendencies between the ciphertext blocks [KSLC17]. These three methods
reinforcing data protection come with a performance cost. The all-or-nothing
transform in particular leads to a considerable decrease in performance (as it
requires at least two rounds of block cipher encryption). A linear transform
achieves better performance but still requires some operations in addition to
data encryption. Finally, information dispersal lacks terribly in scalability.
Motivated by recent attacks on user’s privacy, this chapter treats the
problem of protecting outsourced data against cryptographic material ex-
posure. It introduces three fast schemes reinforcing confidentiality of frag-
mented data: the Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD), the Circular
All-or-Nothing (CAON), and the Selective All-or-Nothing (SAON) scheme.
The Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal scheme is a method applied af-
ter data encryption in order to create fragments resistant to the exposure of
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the encryption key. It operates on a ciphertext obtained with block cipher
encryption with a mode of operation creating dependencies between consec-
utive ciphertext’s blocks. In contrast to SFD, the Circular All-or-Nothing
(CAON) can be applied over any kind of ciphertext. Both SFD and CAON
significantly increase the computational effort that an attacker would have to
apply in order to recover even a single block from an incomplete set of data
fragments. In contrast to similar techniques, they do not compromise per-
formance or scalability in processing. Finally, the Selective All-or-Nothing
(SAON) scheme adresses the needs of users that cannot or do not want to use
multiple storage providers. It has similar properties with SFD and CAON
but in a single cloud scenario.
3.2 Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal
The main idea behind Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD, published
in [KM18a]) is to derive from known properties of block ciphers (and more
particularly from their chaining modes of operation), a new method for the
fragmentation and dispersal of encrypted data that could produce fragments
resistant to the exposure of the cryptographic material. In SFD, encrypted
data are organized into a set of fragments in two steps. Each step increases
the difficulty of a brute-force search that an attacker in the possession of the
encryption key and some of the fragments would have to perform in order to
decrypt even part of the initial data. SFD is an easy and efficient alternative
to the family of information dispersal algorithms and to the all-or-nothing
transform pre-processing. It can be seen as a generalized methodology of
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data parsing [SJH05]. When integrated within existing techniques, it enriches
them with an additional layer of data protection by securing encrypted data
in a situation of key exposure.
3.2.1 Data Concepts, Notation, and Prerequisites
The proposed approach identifies the following basic data structures that
mostly correspond to classical concepts concerning a symmetric block ci-
pher [Dwo01]:
• Block (P or C): a sequence of bits of size |B| corresponding to the
classical concept of block. A plaintext block is denoted as P while a
ciphertext block is denoted as C.
• Sub-block (SB): a sequence of bits of size |SB| contained in a block.
• Plaintext (PLAIN): initial data composed of p plaintext blocks (al-
ready padded if needed).
• Ciphertext (CIPH): encrypted plaintext composed of c ciphertext
blocks. c = p + 1 as an initialization vector is added at the beginning
of the ciphertext.
• Share (SHARE): result of the first fragmentation step in the SFD
method. An intermediary fragment; it is composed of c
k1
blocks.
• Fragment (F ): result of the final fragmentation step. Each fragment
is composed of c
k1
sub-blocks.
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Notations
Plaintext PLAIN is composed of p input blocks P1, ..., Pp. It is encrypted
into ciphertext CIPH composed of c = p + 1 blocks C0, C1, ..., Cc−1, where
C0 corresponds to the initialization vector. A ciphertext block Ci comes
from the encryption of the plaintext block Pi (except for the pseudo-random
initialization vector that is just appended as the first block C0). In the
first fragmentation step, blocks of the ciphertext CIPH are dispersed over
k1 shares SHARE0, ..., SHAREk1−1. In the second fragmentation step, a
share SHAREj is fragmented into k2 fragments F j0 , ..., F jk2−1. Each block is
composed of k2 sub-blocks. A sub-block l inside a block Ci is denoted as
Ci (l) , l = 0, . . . , k2 − 1.
Prerequisites
The ciphertext CIPH is to be obtained using a block cipher with a mode of
operation creating dependencies between consecutive blocks (like the widely
used Cipher Block Chaining). The motivation behind this requirement will
be detailed in Section 3.2.2.
Simply put, it is supposed that k1 is a divisor of the number of blocks
inside the ciphertext c and that the size of the sub-block |SB| is a divisor of
the size of the block |B|. This way, all the fragments will be of equal size.
If this requirement is not fulfilled, two possibilities could be applied. One
would consist in having fragments of different sizes. Another would require
the use of padding. This would guarantee that the fragments are of equal
size.
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Figure 3.1: Data fragmentation, example for k1 = 2 and k2 = 4. Plain-
text blocks are encrypted into corresponding ciphertext blocks using the CBC
mode. Consecutive ciphertext blocks are dispersed over k1 different shares.
Each of the k2 sub-blocks of a block is dispersed to a different final fragment.
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3.2.2 Description of the Scheme
A pseudo-code of the SFD scheme is presented in Figure 3.2. The goal of
this process is to shred data into fragments making data recovery from an
incomplete set of fragments as hard as possible without leading to decreased
performance. The difficulty of the recovery is measured in the feasibility of
a brute-force search attack with less than the required number of fragments.
Splitting Ciphertext into Shares
A symmetric block cipher transforms (encrypt or decrypt) a fixed-length
group of bits called block. To operate on data larger than a single block, an
operation that repeatedly applies the single-block procedure - named mode of
operation - has to be defined. The simplest mode of operation, the Electronic
Code Book, encrypts each of the ciphertext blocks separately. Such process-
ing was proven to be insecure as it transforms identical plaintext blocks into
identical ciphertext blocks. One way of dealing with this lack of diffusion is
re-using the output of the encryption of a block for the encryption of the next
block (for the first block that does not have a predecessor, an initialization
vector is generated that plays the role of the previous block). In such mode
of operation, e.g., in Cipher Block Chaining, it is infeasible for an adversary
in possession of the encryption key to decrypt Ci without possessing Ci−1.
Indeed, Ci−1 can take on any possible values in {0, 1}|b| as it is an output of a
secure block cipher (or a pseudo-random initialization vector); consequently,
Pi could take any of the 2|b| possibilities depending on Ci−1. Therefore, it
is infeasible for the adversary to recover a set of non-consecutive ciphertext
blocks without possessing their predecessors. This leads to the definition of
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the following dispersal property:
Property 1 (Dispersal of blocks) If a ciphertext was obtained using a
mode of operation implying chaining between blocks, then dispersing its con-
secutive blocks over separate shares makes the data recovery infeasible for an
adversary that does not have access to consecutive shares.
The first step of the SFD scheme disperses the ciphertext blocks over
shares to comply with the Dispersal Property 1. More precisely, c blocks
of the ciphertext c are distributed over k1 shares share0, . . . , sharek1−1 in
a way that Ci is assigned to the share sharej ⇐⇒ i mod k1 = j. A share
SHAREj contains all the predecessor blocks of those contained in share
SHARE(j+1) mod k1 and it is therefore necessary for recovering blocks inside
SHARE(j+1) mod k1 . This proves that the fragmentation function presented
in Figure 3.2 verifies our Dispersal Property 1.
1: function Fragmentation(CIPH, k1, k2)
2: for each block Ci inside the ciphertext CIPH do
3: Compute share index j = i mod k1
4: Disperse Ci to SHAREj
5: for l = 0, . . . , k2 − 1 do
6: Disperse Ci (l) to fragment F jl
Figure 3.2: Pseudo-code of the fragmentation function transforming a cipher-
text CIPH into k = k1k2 fragments in a single pass. For each block a share
index is computed indicating to which of k1 shares the block belongs. Then,
sub-blocks of the block are dispersed over k2 fragments.
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Splitting Shares into Fragments
A symmetric cryptographic function operating on blocks guarantees that a
ciphertext block depends on every bit of the corresponding plaintext block.
Moreover, modern symmetric encryption functions, like AES, guarantee that
the absence of i bits from the plaintext block and of o bits from the ciphertext
block does not permit to easily recover the plaintext (or the ciphertext)
block. A brute-force search generating and verifying all the 2min(i,o) possible
configurations for the missing bits would have to be performed [ABM14,
BDCdVF+16]. Therefore, the following property can be formulated:
Property 2 (Dispersal of sub-blocks) Dispersing sub-blocks of ciphertext
blocks contained inside a share over separate fragments increases the difficulty
of the ciphertext decryption for an adversary possessing an incomplete set of
fragments belonging to consecutive shares.
This property is behind the motivation of the second step of the SFD
scheme. A block Ci belonging to the share SHAREj and composed of k2
sub-blocks is dispersed over the k2 fragments F j0 , . . . , F jk2−1 in a way that a
sub-block Ci (l) is assigned to the fragment F jl . Thus, each single ciphertext
block inside a share is uniformly spread over k2 fragments. After the splitting
of the shares, k = k1k2 fragments are obtained that will be dispersed over k
different physical locations.
The size of a sub-block does not necessarily have to be a divisor of the size
of the block. A solution could be imagined, similar to the data parsing found
in [SJH05], where a block is composed of several sub-blocks of different sizes
or where bits are spread unevenly over fragments without taking into account
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the block structure of the ciphertext. However, this would lead to fragments
of different sizes (as well as of different importance since larger fragments
would contain more information). Moreover, such processing would require
a sort of dispersal key similar to the splitting key used by the Unisys’s Secure
Parser R© (described in Section 2.3.3).
The SFD scheme is particularly adapted for dispersal of data obtained
using block cipher encryption with a mode of operation like the Cipher
Block Chaining (CBC), the Output Feedback (OFB) or the Cipher Feedback
(CFB). Such modes of operation creates dependencies between consecutive
data blocks that are exploited by SFD. Indeed, when SFD is applied within
the Counter (CTR) mode (that is closer to a stream cipher than to a block
cipher), the two dispersal properties are not fully satisfied. Nevertheless, the
dispersal of the ciphertext sub-blocks will still slow an attacker from the re-
covery of consecutive sub-blocks of plaintext. Moreover, a special dispersal
procedure could be imagined for the CTR. In the CTR mode, it is not pos-
sible to decrypt the ciphertext without possessing the right pseudo-random
initialization vector that is used as the counter during the encryption process
and is usually appended at the beginning of the ciphertext. Thus, dispersing
the initialization vector over the fragments, using, for instance, the Shamir’s
secret sharing, would slow down an attacker that managed to obtain the
encryption key but not the right initialization vector.
Fragment Dispersal
After fragmentation, the ciphertext is transformed into k = k1k2 final frag-
ments. The data protection provided by fragmentation is fully enabled only
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when the fragments are stored in k different physical locations: without the
data dispersal, an attacker needs only resolve the fragment order, which is
not a significant obstacle.
The simplest fragment distribution is to disperse each fragment to a ran-
dom location. It is also the only possible way when a user dispose of k
physical storage devices that are equally hard to access (like k servers inside
the same cluster). Nowadays, a user has the opportunity to disperse data
over multiple servers on several independent sites. They can maximize the
degree of data protection by following two recommendations:
Recommendation 1 (Dispersing fragments of consecutive shares)
Every two sets of fragments allowing the recovery of consecutive shares (con-
taining consecutive ciphertext blocks) should be dispersed over independent
storage sites - e.g., over different cloud providers.
Recommendation 2 (Dispersing fragments of the same share)
A set of fragments allowing the reconstruction of a share should be dispersed
over separate storage locations - e.g., multiple physical servers.
Figure 3.3 presents an example secure fragment dispersal that follows the
two recommendations. In a trivial case when k1 = 1, the scheme becomes
identical to a data parsing solution. A choice of k2 = 1 is suitable when a
user would like to limit the number of fragments (for instance because they
dispose of a limited number of storage locations or they fear latency costs).
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Figure 3.3: Dispersal of fragments presented in the example from Figure 3.1.
Fragments are dispersed over k1 = 2 independent storage sites. Each storage
site spreads its fragments over k2 = 4 physically separated servers.
3.2.3 Comparison with Relevant Works
The SFD scheme was implemented and compared with relevant works: Secret
Sharing Made Short (implemented in two versions: with and without Rabin’s
Information Dispersal Algorithm), AONT-RS, and Rivest’s All-or-nothing
scheme.
Implementation Details
All schemes were implemented in JAVA using the following resources: JDK
1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-
4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB RAM, under Windows 7. The standard
javax.crypto library was used. Data samples of 200MB were used for each
measurement. AES-NI was enabled.
During benchmark tests, relevant algorithms were compared in a k = n
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configuration (all fragments are necessary for data recovery) as the genera-
tion of redundant fragments would have the same impact on each method’s
performance. In each method, Reed-Solomon systematic error correction
codes could be applied to obtain additional n − k fragments. Details of the
implementation of each algorithm are as follows:
SSMS: Data are encrypted using AES-CBC with a 128 bits key and frag-
mented in a straightforward way into k consecutive data chunks. The en-
cryption key is fragmented into k fragments using Shamir’s secret sharing
and attached to the fragments. For larger data, the time taken on key frag-
mentation has a negligible impact on the overall performance. Thus, the
performance of SSMS is practically equivalent to symmetric data encryp-
tion.
SSMS with Rabin’s IDA: Data are encrypted using AES-CBC with a
128 bits key and divided into vectors of k bytes. Each data vector is then
multiplied by a k × k dispersal matrix. Fragments are formed from the
results of vector multiplication by the dispersal matrix. The encryption key
is fragmented using Shamir’s scheme and attached to the fragments.
Rivest’s AON: Data are first encrypted using an inner cipher: AES-CBC
with a 128 bits. A SHA-256 hash of the encrypted data is calculated and
exclusive-ored with the encryption key. Data fragments are then re-encrypted
using an outer cipher: AES-ECB with a 128 bits key (such insecure mode of
operation can be used as the data was already encrypted).
AONT (AONT-RS without the use of RS): Data are encrypted using
AES-CBC with a 128 bits key. A SHA-256 hash of the encrypted data
is calculated, exclusive-ored with the encryption key, and attached to the
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data. Encrypted data are then fragmented in a straightforward way into k
consecutive chunks. The processing is similar to the Rivest’s AON but skips
the second encryption round.
Bastion scheme: Data is encrypted using AES-CBC with a 128 bits key.
Bastion’s linear transform is then applied over the data, exclusive-oring each
ciphertext blocks with all other blocks. Encrypted and transformed cipher-
text is then fragmented in a straightforward way into k fragments composed
of large chunks of consecutive data bits.
Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal: The SFD scheme was integrated
within SSMS and AONT. It replaced the straightforward fragmentation of
these two methods. This integration was done in a coarse-grained manner
where data encryption and data fragmentation are performed in two differ-
ent steps. A fine-grained integration would directly interface fragmentation
steps after each block encryption. Moreover, it is clear from the algorithm’s
description that the fragmentation can be parallelized. Fragmentation perfor-
mance was measured in various configuration of k1 and k2. The configuration
choice had no visible impact on the scheme’s performance.
Comparison with Relevant Works
The performance benchmark presented in Figure 3.4 shows that replacing
straightforward fragmentation with the proposed SFD scheme leads to a rea-
sonable constant performance overhead (around 6% percent for the AONT-
RS scheme and 11% for SSMS) given the chosen coarse-grained integration.
The SFD scheme’s was compared to Rivest’s all-or-nothing and a SSMS ver-
sion using Rabin’s information dispersal algorithm for data fragmentation.
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Figure 3.4: Performance benchmark: throughput of different fragmentation
methods in function of the number of fragments k. SSMS and AONT are
treated as baseline; they do not provide protection against key exposure.
Adding the SFD to the AONT method decreases the performance of the orig-
inal technique by 5.5%. Adding the SFD to SSMS decreases the performance
of the original technique by ∼11%. SFD method is ∼27% faster than the
Rivest’s all-or-nothing transform and ∼10% faster than the Bastion scheme.
In contrast to Rabin’s information dispersal, its performance does not de-
crease with the growing number of fragments.
SFD is much faster than Rivest’s all-or-nothing proposal. Unlike an infor-
mation dispersal algorithm, SFD is scalable with the number of fragments.
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Figure 3.5: Performance comparison of relevant fragmentation algorithms in
an end-to-end scenario (data fragmentation and dispersal over 4 indepen-
dent Amazon S3 storage sites, k1 = 2 and k2 = 4 for all the algorithms).
Tests performed using 200 MB data samples. For the end user, replacing
straightforward fragmentation in SSMS or AONT-RS with SFD has an neg-
ligible impact on the performance. Strengthening data protection using SFD
is faster than using an IDA or the Rivest’s all-or-nothing method.
Impact on the Performance on the Client Side
The performance of relevant techniques was measured in an end-to-end sce-
nario where data was not only fragmented but also dispersed over several
independent storage locations. More precisely, algorithms presented in Fig-
ure 3.4 were integrated within the DepSky multi-cloud environment [BCQ+13].
Data were fragmented and dispersed over 4 independent Amazon S3 storage
sites 2. Figure 3.5 shows the performance result of the experiment. The
2https://aws.amazon.com/s3
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performance cost of replacing straightforward fragmentation with SFD is
negligible in an end-to-end scenario and therefore unnoticeable for the end
user. Indeed, no performance overhead was observed when applying secure
dispersal in addition to the AONT-RS technique. Applying secure dispersal
in addition to SSMS resulted in a negligible decrease of performance of ∼1%.
In contrast to SFD, applying an IDA in combination to SSMS decreases the
performance twice as much (∼ 95% performance overhead in a k = 8 con-
figuration) while the Rivest’s pre-processing transform is 12% slower than
AONT-RS.
3.3 Circular All-Or-Nothing
The Circular All-or-Nothing (CAON, published in [KM18b]) algorithm ad-
dresses the same problem of data protection against key exposure as the
Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD) scheme but in a different way. In
contrast to SFD, it is compatible with all kinds of symmetric encryption algo-
rithms. Similar to the Bastion scheme presented in [KSLC17], it transforms
the encrypted data by creating dependencies between ciphertext blocks. It
improves the Bastion’s scheme by reducing the number of exclusive-or oper-
ations required in addition to the data encryption to half.
3.3.1 Data Concepts and Notation
The CAON algorithm identifies the following basic data structures that
mostly correspond to the classical concepts concerning a symmetric block
cipher [Dwo01]:
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• Block (P or C): a sequence of bits of size |B| corresponding to the
classical concept of block. A plaintext block is denoted as P and a
ciphertext block is denoted as C.
• Transformed ciphertext block (C ′): a transformed ciphertext block
after CAON was applied to the ciphertext.
• Plaintext (PLAIN): initial data composed of p plaintext blocks (al-
ready padded if needed).
• Ciphertext (CIPH): encrypted plaintext composed of c ciphertext
blocks. c = p + 1 as an initialization vector is added at the beginning
of the ciphertext.
• Ciphertext (CIPH ′): the ciphertext CIPH after being transformed
using CAON.
• Fragment (F ): a fragment, the result of the final fragmentation step.
Each fragment is composed of c
k
blocks.
Notations
Plaintext PLAIN is composed of p input blocks P1, . . . , Pp. It is encrypted
into ciphertext CIPH composed of c = p+ 1 blocks C0, C1, . . . , Cc−1, where
C0 corresponds to the initialization vector. A ciphertext block Ci comes from
the encryption of the plaintext block Pi (except for the initialization vector
that is appended as the first block C0). The CAON transform transforms
the ciphertext CIPH into CIPH ′ composed of c blocks C ′0, C ′1, . . . , C ′c−1.
CIPH ′ is then fragmented into k fragments F0, . . . , Fk−1.
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3.3.2 Description of the Algorithm
CAON operates on a ciphertext CIPH = C0, . . . , Cc−1 coming from the en-
cryption of a plaintext PLAIN = P1, . . . , Pp using an encryption keyK. The
ciphertext CIPH is transformed into CIPH ′ = C ′0, . . . , C ′c−1 inside the func-
tion TransformCAON and then fragmented into k fragments F0, . . . , Fk−1
in a way that the decryption of a single fragment is not possible unless all the
fragments are gathered. An example illustrating the whole process is shown
in Figure 3.9.
Linear transform
The pseudo-code of the linear transform applied to the ciphertext CIPH is
presented in Figure 3.6. The processing is done block by block and starts
from the last ciphertext block Cc−1. Each ciphertext block Ci is transformed
into C ′i by being exclusive-ored with its predecessor Ci−1. The first block
C0 does not possess a predecessor. Instead, it is exclusive-ored with k − 1
already processed blocks. Such circular chaining makes the reconstruction of
any block Ci, i = 1, . . . , c− 1 from C ′i impossible without the reconstruction
of Ci−1.
C0 is a special block as it is found at the beginning of the chain of blocks.
Once reconstructed, it allows the user to "break" the chain and starting from
C1, begin the reconstruction of other blocks. Therefore, C0 is exclusive-ored
with k − 1 pre-transformed special blocks. The indices of the special blocks
i1, . . . , ik−1 are chosen (i) with gaps at least 1 between them, (ii) and such
that, in the next step, the k blocks C ′0, C ′i1 , . . . , C
′
ik−1
all end up in k pairwise
different fragments.
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Pseudo-code of the inverse transform ReconstructCAON is presented
in Figure 3.7. It starts after the ciphertext CIPH ′ was reassembled from
the k fragments. First, C0 is obtained by exclusive-oring C ′0 with the k − 1
special blocks. Remaining blocks are then reconstructed by exclusive-oring
each block with its already recovered predecessor Ci = C ′i ⊕ Ci−1 starting
from C1.
1: function TransformCAON(CIPH, k)
2: for each i = c− 1, . . . , 1 do
3: Compute C ′i = Ci ⊕ Ci−1
4: First block: C ′0 = C0
⊕k−1
j=1 C
′
ij
Figure 3.6: Pseudo-code of the linear transform creating dependencies be-
tween consecutive blocks of the ciphertext and between the first block C0 and
k − 1 pre-transformed blocks that will be later dispersed over different frag-
ments (here we choose the k−1 special blocks with indices ij, chosen (i) with
gaps at least 1 between them, (ii) and such that, during dispersal, C ′0 and the
C ′ij all end up in k pairwise different fragments.
1: function ReconstructCAON(CIPH ′, k)
2: First block: C0 = C ′0
⊕k−1
j=1 C
′
ij
3: for each block Ci, i = 1, . . . , n do
4: Compute Ci = C ′i ⊕ Ci−1
Figure 3.7: Pseudo-code of the function reconstructing the initial ciphertext.
No block can be reconstructed without first reconstructing C0.
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1: function DisperseBlocks(CIPH ′, k)
2: Disperse shares of the block C0 over k different fragments
3: for i = 1, . . . , c− 1 do
4: Disperse C ′i to fragment Fj, j = i (mod k)
Figure 3.8: Pseudo-code of the function dispersing the transformed ciphertext
CIPH ′ over k fragments FRAG = F0, . . . , Fk−1.
Managing the Key
A variation of the CAON transform hides the encryption key K inside an
additional ciphertext block (like in Desai’s AONT presented in Section 2.3.1).
An additional ciphertext block is computed as C ′c = Cc−1 ⊕K. Once a user
possesses the whole transformed ciphertext, they can not only reconstruct
the blocks but also the encryption key. This variation could be applied
to facilitate key management in distributed storage systems, as it does not
require the use of a separate key store (similar solutions are already used in
the AONT-RS technology [RP11] of the IBM Cloud Object Storage and in
multiple systems using secret sharing for managing keys).
Fragmentation and Dispersal of the Transformed Ciphertext
In order to fully enable the protection against key exposure, transformed
ciphertext CIPH ′ has to be fragmented into at least two fragments that will
be stored over independent storage locations. Fragmentation of CIPH ′ has
to follow one rule: k cipher blocks required for the reconstruction of C0 have
to be dispersed over separate fragments. A straightforward fragmentation
can be applied where the ciphertext is cut into k chunks of equal sizes,
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Figure 3.9: Example for k = 2. A ciphertext composed of c = 6 blocks
is transformed using CAON transform and then dispersed over two storage
sites. The block C ′3 was chosen as the special block. Therefore, C ′0 and C ′3 are
separated over different fragments. The fragmentation process presented in
the Figure, reinforces data protection by dispersing consecutive blocks (con-
secutive blocks are stored on different sites).
each containing one of the critical blocks. It can be shown that when the
fragments are wisely created, CAON behaves like an all-or-nothing; it forces
an adversary to gather all the fragments in order to decrypt even a single
ciphertext block.
3.3.3 Comparison with Relevant Works
CAON was compared with relevant works in terms of the amount of computa-
tions and ability to protect against key exposure. Results of the comparison
are shown in the Table 3.1. As a baseline, the CTR block cipher encryp-
130 CHAPTER 3. PROTECTING DATA AGAINST KEY EXPOSURE
Table 3.1: Comparison with relevant works in terms of the number of block
cipher operations (block op.), number of exclusive-ors, and the ability to pro-
vide a key exposure protection (K.E.P). For Bastion and CAON, the number
of exclusive-ors coming only from the linear transforms applied after encryp-
tion is pointed out. p - number of blocks in the plaintext. c - number of blocks
in the ciphertext.
Algorithm Block op. Exclusive-ors K.E.P.
CTR Enc. c-1 b.c. c-1 No
Rivest AONT 2(c-1) b.c. 3(c-1) No
Desai AONT c-1 b.c. 2(c-1) No
Rivest AON 3c-2 b.c. 3(c-1) Yes
Desai AON 2c-1 b.c. 2(c-1) Yes
Bastion c-1 b.c. 3c-1 [Transform: 2c] Yes
CAON c-1 b.c. 2c+k-3 [Transform: c+k-2] Yes
tion requires c− 1 block cipher operations and c− 1 exclusive-or operations.
Rivest and Desai apply encryption during their AONT pre-processing step
that comes before the proper encryption. Thus, the complete AON pro-
cessing composed of AONT and actual encryption doubles (Desai) or triples
(Rivest, as the hash of data is computed) the number of block ciphers op-
erations in comparison to normal data encryption. By contrast, the Bastion
scheme only applies a linear transform over the encrypted data without in-
creasing the number of block cipher operations. Bastion’s transform uses 2c
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exclusive-or operations. Counting with the encryption step, Bastion scheme
requires 3c− 1 exclusive-ors. Similarly to Bastion, CAON applies only a lin-
ear transform on the ciphertext. However, its transform uses only c+ k − 2
exclusive-ors (almost 50% less, as k is usually a small number). This results
in a total of 2c+ k − 3 exclusive-ors.
Rivest and Desai AONTs do not protect against key exposure; an attacker
possessing the key is able to decrypt the transformed data. AONs encrypt
data already preprocessed with AONT making them resistant to key expo-
sure unless the random key used during the pre-processing is also exposed.
Bastion protects transformed ciphertext against key exposure unless all but
two blocks are exposed. CAON protects data against key exposure unless all
the k fragments are being exposed.
Performance Results
Implementation details: Relevant algorithms were implemented using the
same programing style in JAVA with JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-
based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8
GB RAM, under Windows 7. A standard javax.crypto library was used.
A random data sample was used for each measurement and each presented
result is an average of 30 measurements. AES-CTR-128 was used as the algo-
rithm for symmetric encryption. AES-NI was enabled. Results are somewhat
consistent with those presented in [KSLC17] when taking into account the
difference between AES and AES-NI (factor of 3 in performance) as well as
differences between hardware platforms.
The comparison is presented in Figure 3.10. CAON is the fastest of the
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Figure 3.10: Performance comparison. CAON achieves the best performance
among techniques protecting fragmented data against key exposure. AES-
CTR-128 was used for encryption. Rivest’s and Desai’s are presented in
AON configurations.
four schemes, protecting encrypted data against key exposure. Protection
against key leakage is achieved with an overhead of only 7% against a simple
data encryption. The second fastest scheme, Bastion, results in an overhead
of around 19% in comparison to data encryption. It could be assumed that
a fine-grained implementation of CAON could make its overhead negligible.
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3.4 Selective All-Or-Nothing
The Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD) scheme and the Circular
All-or-Nothing (CAON) algorithm are only efficient when data are equally
distributed over at least two independent storage sites. Such solutions may
not be acceptable for casual users as dispersing data over independent storage
providers may increase storage costs: A study on the cost of using multiple
storage providers show that dispersing data over multiple providers is twice
the cost of using a single cloud [BCQ+13]. The Selective All-or-Nothing
(SAON, published in [KM18c]) scheme addresses the needs of users that
would like to benefit from a single cost-efficient storage solution but fear the
exposure of their data.
To be specific, SAON transforms a ciphertext into two fragments: a small
confidential private fragment that will be kept on the user’s private device
and a large public fragment that will be uploaded to an inexpensive storage
site. This separation into two fragments is remotely inspired by selective en-
cryption. Decryption of the public fragment is infeasible without the private
fragment. Consequently, outsourced data are protected against key exposure.
3.4.1 Data Concepts, Notations, and Prerequisite
The following key data components are introduced:
• (Input or Output) Block (P or C): a sequence of bits of size |B|
corresponding to the classical concept of a block. When referring to
a plaintext block, the block is denoted as P , and when referring to a
ciphertext the block is denoted as C.
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• Plaintext (PLAIN): initial data composed of p plaintext blocks.
• Ciphertext (CIPH): encrypted plaintext composed of c ciphertext
blocks. c = p + 1 as an initialization vector is added at the beginning
of the ciphertext.
• Share (SHARE): intermediary result of the fragmentation of the
ciphertext (it corresponds to the concept of share in the Secure Frag-
mentation and Dispersal scheme).
• Private Fragment (Fpriv): a small data fragment that will be stored
at user chosen device.
• Public Fragment (Fpub): a large data fragment that will be uploaded
to a public cloud.
Notations
Plaintext PLAIN is composed of p input blocks P1, ..., Pp. It is encrypted
into ciphertext CIPH composed of c blocks C0, C1, ..., Cc−1 (c = p + 1),
where C0 corresponds to the initialization vector of the cipher. A ciphertext
block Ci comes from the encryption of the plaintext block Pi (except for
the initialization vector C0). In a first step, blocks of the ciphertext CIPH
are separated into two shares SHAREpub0 and SHARE1 of size c2 each. A
ciphertext block Ci that was attributed to the share SHAREj is also de-
noted as Cji . In a second step, SHARE1 is fragmented into SHARE
priv
10 and
SHARE11. SHARE11 is then transformed using an all-or-nothing trans-
form and fragmented into SHAREpriv110 and SHAREpub111 . The upper index
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of a share denotes if a share will be stored at a private or public storage
location. Final data stored at a private location are denoted as Fpriv and
data stored at a public storage site are denoted as Fpub.
Prerequisite
SAON uses the first fragmentation step of the Secure Fragmentation and
Dispersal (SFD) scheme. Therefore, as in SFD, the ciphertext CIPH should
be obtained as a result of symmetric encryption using a block cipher with
a mode of operation creating dependencies between consecutive ciphertext
blocks, (for instance the Cipher Block Chaining mode).
3.4.2 Description of the Scheme
The SAON scheme is composed of three steps. The first step includes the
encryption of the plaintext and its transformation into two interdependent
shares. The second step operates only on one of the obtained shares. In the
final phase, private and public fragments are formed.
Step 1: Encryption and Blocks Separation
Step 1 of the scheme directly applies the first fragmentation step of the SFD
scheme for k = 2. Plaintext PLAIN is encrypted into ciphertext CIPH
using a symmetric block cipher with a mode of operation that reuses the
output of the encryption of a previous block during the encryption of the
current block, for instance the Cipher Block Chaining or the Cipher Feedback
mode. Consecutive blocks of the ciphertext are then separated over two
shares, SHAREpub0 and SHARE1. Both shares are necessary in order to
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1: function Fragmentation(PLAIN)
2: Step 1: Encryption and blocks dispersal
3: Encrypt plaintext PLAIN into ciphertext CIPH
4: for each pair (Ci−1, Ci) such that i is odd do
5: Ci−1 goes to SHAREpub0 and Ci goes to SHARE1
6: Step 2: All-or-nothing transform on a subset of SHARE1
7: Fragment SHARE1 into SHAREpriv10 and SHARE11
8: Apply a linear all-or-nothing transform over AON(SHARE11)
9: Fragment SHARE11 into SHAREpriv110 and SHAREpub111
10: Step 3: Forming the final public and private fragments
11: Form the private fragment Fpriv = SHAREpriv10 + SHAREpriv110
12: Form the public fragment Fpub = SHAREpub0 + SHAREpub111
Figure 3.11: Pseudo-code of the fragmentation algorithm transforming a
plaintext into a public and a private fragment.
decrypt the ciphertext CIPH. Therefore, an attacker in possession of the
encryption key and only one of these two shares will not be able to decrypt
even one ciphertext block.
Remark 1 After Step 1, a user could already save SHARE1 as the private
fragment and upload SHAREpub0 to the cloud as the public fragment. How-
ever, it would oblige them to keep 50% of the total ciphertext on their private
storage device. The second step goes further by transforming SHARE1 into
a private and a public fragment and by consequence, increasing the size of
the data that can be safely stored in the cloud.
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Figure 3.12: Transformation of SHARE1 into public and private fragments.
SHARE1 is first fragmented into SHAREpriv10 and SHARE11. An all-or-
nothing transform is applied to SHARE11 before fragmenting it into a private
SHAREpriv110 and a public SHARE
pub
111 . By choosing a larger SHARE
priv
10 a
user improves the performance of the algorithm at the cost of an increase of
storage on the private device.
Step 2: All-or-Nothing Transform of a Subset of Data Contained
inside SHARE1
Step 2 operates only on data of SHARE1 (SHARE0 equally could be chosen
for further processing instead of SHARE1). It transforms SHARE1 into two
small private shares (SHAREpriv10 and SHAREpriv110 ) and one public share
SHAREpub111 . The transformation process is illustrated in Figure 3.12.
Fragmenting SHARE1 into SHAREpriv10 and SHARE11 SHARE1 is
fragmented into SHAREpriv10 and SHARE11. SHAREpriv10 will not be pro-
cessed but directly stored at a private storage device. SHARE11 will be
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transformed using an all-or-nothing transform and then fragmented into a
private and a public part. The choice of the size of both shares is left to the
user. The only requirement is an even number of blocks inside SHARE11
(this is necessary for the correctness of the all-or-nothing linear transform
that will be later applied). On the one hand, a larger SHAREpriv10 will lead to
an increased occupation of the private device’s memory. On the other hand,
a larger SHARE11 will increase the computation overhead as the complexity
of the all-or-nothing transform depends on the size of the data on which it
is applied.
1: function AON(SHARE11)
2: SUM = 0
3: for each block Ci inside the share SHARE11 do
4: SUM = SUM ⊕ Ci
5: for each block Ci inside the share SHARE11 do
6: C ′i = SUM ⊕ Ci
Figure 3.13: Pseudo-code of the linear all-or-nothing transform applied to the
share SHARE11. Each block Ci of the ciphertext is transformed into C ′i =⊕m−1
0 Cl, l 6= i, where m is the number of blocks contained in the SHARE11.
In order to achieve linear complexity, the processing is performed in two
passes. In the first pass, all ciphertext blocks are exclusive-ored together in
order to obtain the value SUM . In the second pass, each block is exclusive-
ored with the value SUM .
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Transforming SHARE11 using an all-or-nothing transform An all-
or-nothing linear transform (the Bastion’s all-or-nothing transform was cho-
sen) is applied over SHARE11. The goal of this process is to create depen-
dencies between every sub-block of data contained in that share in a way
that a correct reconstruction of the share is impossible even if all but two
sub-blocks are missing. The pseudo-code of the processing is presented in
Figure 3.13.
Fragmenting SHARE11 into SHAREpriv110 and SHARE
pub
111 After the
all-or-nothing transformation, the absence of any two sub-blocks inside SHA-
RE11 makes the correct reconstruction of this share impossible. In the next
step, SHARE11 is fragmented into a private share SHAREpriv110 and a public
share SHAREpub111 . SHAREpriv110 will be stored in the user’s private device as
a part of the private fragment and SHAREpub111 will be uploaded to a public
storage service. Without SHAREpriv110 , data contained inside SHAREpub111 are
useless to an attacker. Indeed, without SHAREpriv110 , the SHARE1 cannot
be reconstructed. Consequently, as even a block of ciphertext data cannot be
decrypted without the SHARE1, it is impossible to decrypt the ciphertext
without SHAREpriv110 . Obviously, one could imagine a brute-force search over
the possible values of SHAREpriv110 . Therefore following recommendation is
being formulated:
Recommendation 3 (Recommendation for the size of SHAREpriv110 )
SAON applies the Bastion’s all-or-nothing transform on data inside the SHA-
RE11 at the level of sub-blocks. Therefore, it efficiently protects SHARE11
against a situation of key exposure unless an attacker acquires all but two
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blocks of AON(share11). Therefore, the size of SHAREpriv110 should be twice
as large as a sub-block. However, the size of SHAREpriv110 should also be
large enough to prevent a brute-force search of all possible values. Therefore,
SHAREpriv110 should contain at least 32 bytes of transformed data: Such a
choice leaves all but two data blocks in the public share. The space of the
brute-force search is then the same as for a 256-bits encryption key (2256
possible values).
Figure 3.14: Dispersing private and public fragments (here, on a smartphone
with limited capacity and a public cloud) coming from the SFD fragmentation
(white and grey shares) and the all-or-nothing transform (red shares).
Step 3: Forming the Private and the Public Fragment
In a final step, private and public fragments are formed. As shown in Fig-
ure 3.14, public fragment is composed of SHAREpub0 (coming from the sep-
aration of consecutive blocks) and of SHAREpub111 (coming from the all-or-
nothing transformation). The private fragment is composed of SHAREpriv10
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(coming from the fragmentation of SHARE1) and of SHAREpriv110 (coming
from the all-or-nothing transformation). The public fragment is resistant
to a key exposure attack. Indeed, a block inside SHAREpub0 cannot be de-
crypted without a predecessor that is either stored as a part of SHAREpriv10
or transformed inside SHAREpub111 which in turn is unrecoverable without
SHAREpriv110 .
3.4.3 Comparison with Relevant Works
Theoretical Comparison
One can combine block-wise fragmentation of the ciphertext with the ap-
plication of an all-or-nothing transform on just a part of the ciphertext in
order to minimize the amount of computations. In a case where the all-or-
nothing transform is applied on the totality of the ciphertext at the level of
blocks, 2× |CIP H||B| exclusive-or operations have to be performed. In the case
of the proposed algorithm, the all-or-nothing transform is applied only over
SHARE11, a subset of SHARE1. Thus, it requires 2× |SHARE11||B| exclusive-
or operations. As the size of SHARE11 is smaller or equal than the size of
SHARE1 (which is half of the total size of the ciphertext), it saves at least
half of the operations by applying the block-wise fragmentation.
Performance Benchmark
Implementation details Relevant algorithms were implemented in JAVA
using the following resources: JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-based
PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB RAM,
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Figure 3.15: Performance results for various sizes of the data sample and for
two sizes of the private fragment. AES-CBC with 128 bit key was used for
data encryption. SAON was compared with simple encryption and with the
Bastion scheme (where the all-or-nothing transform is applied over the whole
ciphertext). For the smallest amount of data stored as a private fragment
(16 bytes), the performance overhead of SAON is two times better than Bas-
tion’s. The gain becomes greater with the increase of the private fragment (the
larger the private fragment, the smaller the data on which the all-or-nothing
transform is applied).
under Windows 7. The standard javax.crypto library was used. AES-NI was
enabled. A random data sample was used for each measurement.
Results of the performance comparison are presented in Figure 3.15. The
processing time for two configurations of SAON is shown:
1. where the size of the private fragment is minimized and only 16 bytes
are stored at the user’s device.
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2. where the private fragment is 25% the size of the ciphertext and where
75% of the data is outsourced to the cloud.
The performance overhead of the SAON is 13% for configuration 1 and of
6% for configuration 2 in comparison to a simple encryption of a plaintext.
By contrast, Bastion’s scheme (where the whole ciphertext is transformed
using an all-or-nothing transform) leads to an overhead of approximately
20%. Increasing the size of the private fragment improves the performance
of SAON as it decreases the size of data on which the AONT is applied.
However, the performance gain becomes less interesting when the private
fragment is larger than 25% of the ciphertext. Indeed, a private fragment
containing 25% of the ciphertext already results in a negligible performance
overhead of 6%.
The presented performance results were obtained using AES in the Ci-
pher Block Chaining (AES-CBC) mode of operation. We also compared the
performance of Bastion’s scheme using AES in Counter Mode (AES-CTR)
with SAON using AES-CBC. Results were similar to the comparison with
Bastion’s scheme using AES-CBC.
3.5 Summary
This chapter presented three fast novel ways of protecting encrypted data
against key exposure: the Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal Scheme, the
Circular All-or-nothing algorithm, and the Selective All-Or-Nothing scheme.
All of them fragment a ciphertext in two or more fragments, all of which are
needed to be gathered in order to start the decryption process. The difference
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between them lies in the context of their application.
Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD) operates on data encrypted
using block ciphers with a mode of operation creating dependencies between
consecutive ciphertext blocks. It breaks data into a set of fragments, all of
which are needed for data reconstruction: Consecutive blocks are dispersed
over different shares who are then shredded over different final fragments.
The exact protection level will depend on the number of storage locations
that an attacker is able to compromise. SFD was integrated within two
known fragmentation methods: Secret Sharing Made Short and AONT-RS.
Benchmark tests show an acceptable impact on overall performance. In con-
trast to similar techniques, the scheme is scalable with the growing number
of fragments and does not require any additional operations apart from data
dispersal.
The Circular all-or-nothing (CAON) algorithm operates on all kinds of en-
crypted data. It creates dependencies between consecutive ciphertext blocks.
Each block is exclusive-ored with its predecessor forming a sort of chain. Such
transformed ciphertext is securely broken into at least two fragments that will
be dispersed over independent storage sites. Inverting the chaining transform
and recovering the initial ciphertext is only possible once all the fragments are
gathered. CAON improves the state-of-the art linear transform by halving
the number of required exclusive-or operations in addition to data encryp-
tion. The performance evaluation, confirming theoretical results, shows that
CAON is the fastest of relevant schemes.
Selective All-or-nothing (SAON) aims at protecting encrypted data that
will be outsourced to only a single storage provider. A ciphertext is trans-
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formed into two fragments: a large public fragment and a small private frag-
ment. Both fragments are necessary for the decryption of the ciphertext. A
user keeps the private fragment on an independent device of their choice and
uploads without fear the larger fragment to a public (inexpensive) cloud.
Results show good performance: SAON achieves better performance than
simply applying the fastest of the known all-or-nothing transforms over the
whole ciphertext. Moreover, a user may vary the size of the private fragment
in order to balance memory occupation and performance overhead.
In conclusion, the schemes presented in this chapter efficiently address
the problem of encrypted data protection against key exposure. Each of
these schemes corresponds to a different storage context. The reinforcing of
confidentiality comes at a price of an almost negligible performance overhead.
They are the fastest of the existing family of all-or-nothing algorithms.
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Chapter 4
Accelerating fragmentation by
combining partial encryption
with an all-or-nothing
transform
4.1 Introduction and Motivations
In the previous chapter, it was demonstrated that the protection of encrypted
data against key exposure will always require some additional pre- [Riv97]
or post-processing [KSLC18, KM18a, KM18b, KM18c]. Therefore, such
data confidentiality reinforcement inevitably leads to a performance overhead
(that for some algorithms can be reduced to the point of being negligible).
For some users, even a small overhead may not be acceptable as they are
looking for the quickest solutions. Indeed, the choice of the right fragmenta-
149
150 CHAPTER 4. ACCELERATING FRAGMENTATION
tion technique is often a compromise between the desired performance, data
protection level, and storage overhead [WBP+01].
This short chapter introduces a solution for accelerating the fragmenta-
tion process, making it faster than symmetric data encryption: the Partial
Encryption and All-Or-Nothing (PE-AON) scheme. It transforms data into a
set of fragments, all of which are required for data reconstruction. In contrast
to previously presented schemes, the PE-AON does not fully encrypt data.
Instead, it encrypts only a part of the plaintext and then fragments it into
k fragments. Plaintext and ciphertext blocks inside the fragments are then
blended using an all-or-nothing linear transform applying only exclusive-ors
operations. Data protection is provided by dispersal as a complete recon-
struction of the initial plaintext and ciphertext blocks is only possible once
the fragments are gathered.
Partially avoiding encryption ameliorates the performance as a part of
the block cipher operations is replaced by exclusive-ors. Therefore, PE-AON
is faster than symmetric encryption combined with straightforward fragmen-
tation (where data are just divided into large chunks of consecutive bits).
When the ratio between the number of encrypted and non-encrypted frag-
ments is wisely chosen, data inside the fragments are protected against the
exposure of the encryption key. Intuitively, better performance comes at the
cost of weaker protection than the one provided by full encryption combined
with an all-or-nothing transformation. In previously presented schemes, an
attacker is presumed to be able to compromise all but one storage location.
By contrast, PE-AON is efficient only against an attacker presumed to be,
depending on the configuration, at all but three storage sites or just at a
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single location. Thus, PE-AON should be treated as a fast fragmentation
method for lightweight data protection, allowing for a gain in performance.
It is especially useful in a situation where the user can combine PE-AON
with a significant dispersal obstacle, for instance they can separate data over
multiple non-colluding clouds.
4.1.1 Data Concepts, Notation, and Prerequisites
The proposed approach identifies the following basic data structures that
mostly correspond to the classical concepts concerning a symmetric block
cipher [Dwo01]:
• Block (P or C or B): a sequence of bits of size |B| corresponding to
the classical concept of block. When referring to a plaintext block, the
block is denoted as P , and when referring to a ciphertext the block is
denoted as C. When a block can be a ciphertext or a plaintext, it is
referred to as simply B.
• Transformed block (B′): a block B (P or C) transformed using the
all-or-nothing transform.
• Plaintext (PLAIN): initial data composed of p plaintext blocks (al-
ready padded if needed).
• Partially encrypted plaintext (PCIPH): partially encrypted plain-
text composed of p+ 1 blocks in total. It is one block longer than the
plaintext as an initialization vector is added during the block cipher
encryption. It contains ef ciphertext blocks and (k − e)f plaintext
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blocks. e is the value defining the number of encrypted blocks inside
the ciphertext. f denotes the number of blocks inside a fragment.
• Fragment (F ): result of data fragmentation. Each fragment is com-
posed of f = p+1
k
blocks.
Notations
Plaintext PLAIN is composed of p input blocks P1, . . . , Pp. It is partially
encrypted into PCIPH composed of p + 1 blocks B0, . . . , Bp+1 (one block
is appended at the beginning of the PCIPH and corresponds to the initial
vector). ef first blocks of PCIPH are ciphertext blocks and the remaining
blocks are plaintext. PCIPH is fragmented into k fragments F0, . . . , Fk−1
of size f = p+1
k
blocks each. A block B inside the fragments is transformed
using an all-or-nothing processing into B′.
Prerequisites
It is assumed that the number of fragments k is a divisor of the number of
blocks p+1 inside PCIPH, so the produced fragments will be of equal sizes.
This prerequisite can be easily satisfied using a padding solution.
The recommended value of e should be close to k. Intuitively, the lower it
is, the lower is the data protection level. The minimum possible value of e is
3; this ensures that each plaintext block will be exclusive-ored with at least
two ciphertext blocks and thus protected against key exposure. Exclusive-
oring a plaintext block with only one ciphertext block would be a weaker
solution, somehow similar to a one-time pad.
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4.2 Description of the Scheme
PE-AON is composed of two steps. The first step comprises partial encryp-
tion of the plaintext and its fragmentation. The second step blends encrypted
and non-encrypted data inside the fragments. Both steps are described in
detail in following subsections.
1: function PartiallyEncryptAndFragment(PLAIN, e, k)
2: Transform PLAIN into PCIPH:
3: for each plaintext block Pi, where i = 1, . . . , ef − 1 do
4: Encrypt block Pi
5: Fragment PCIPH composed of B0, . . . , Bp blocks into k fragments
composed of f consecutive blocks each:
6: for j = 0, . . . , k − 1 do
7: Disperse blocks from Bj×f to Bj×f+f to fragment Fj
Figure 4.1: Pseudo-code of the first step. Plaintext is partially encrypted
(only the first ef blocks are encrypted) and then fragmented into k fragments.
4.2.1 Step 1: Partial Encryption and Fragmentation
Pseudo-code of the first step - PartiallyEncryptAndFragment- is pre-
sented in Figure 4.1. Initial data PLAIN composed of p plaintext blocks
are partially encrypted into PCIPH. Only the first ef blocks are encrypted
using a symmetric block cipher. PCIPH is composed of one block more
than PLAIN as, during the encryption process, an initial vector is gener-
ated and appended as the first block. PCIPH is then fragmented into k
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Figure 4.2: Example for a plaintext composed of p = 7 blocks, k = 4 frag-
ments, and the number of encrypted fragments e = 3. First step of PE-AON
partially encrypts a plaintext PLAIN composed of p blocks into PCIPH
composed of p + 1 blocks. First block of PCIPH, C0, corresponds to the
ciphertext block containing the initial vector. Later, PE-AON fragments
PCIPH into k fragments of size f = 2 blocks each.
fragments F0, . . . , Fk−1: e of the fragments contain ciphertext blocks and
k − e of the fragments contain plaintext blocks. An example illustrating the
whole process is shown in Figure 4.2.
4.2.2 Step 2: Blending Plaintext and Ciphertext Blocks
Pseudo-code of the second step - the all-or-nothing transform AON - is pre-
sented in Figure 4.3. Blocks inside of the k fragments formed during the first
step are processed in a "row by row" fashion. Sets composed of k blocks are
formed, where each of the k blocks belongs to a different fragment. Each set is
composed of e ciphertext blocks and of k−e plaintext blocks. Blocks inside a
set are transformed using Bastion’s all-or-nothing linear transform [KSLC18]
(this transform could be replaced in the future by a different method apply-
ing the same all-or-nothing principle). As a result, each block inside the
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1: function AON(F0, . . . , Fk−1)
2: Proceed in a ’row’ by ’row’ fashion:
3: for i = 0, . . . , f − 1 do
4: Compute the exclusive-or of all blocks in a ’row’:
5: SUM = ⊕j=k−10 Bf×j+i
6: for j = 0, . . . , k − 1 do
7: Exclusive-ors it with each value inside the current ’row’:
8: B′f×j+i = Bf×j+i ⊕ SUM
Figure 4.3: Pseudo-code of the second step of the PE-AON. An all-or-nothing
transform is applied over the k fragments exclusive-oring plaintext and ci-
phertext blocks. Blocks are processed by ’rows’ of k blocks (each block in a
row comes from a different fragment). For each ’row’ of k blocks a SUM
value containing the exclusive-or of the k blocks is first computed. The SUM
value is then exclusive-ored with each value in the row. As a result, a block
inside the ’row’ is exclusive-ored with all k − 1 other blocks from the same
’row’.
set is exclusive-ored with all other blocks. Therefore, plaintext blocks are
exclusive-ored with pseudo-random ciphertext blocks that will protect them.
When the minimum possible value of e is 3 (as suggested in the prereq-
uisites), each of the plaintext blocks will be exclusive-ored with at least 2
ciphertext blocks. An example illustrating the result of the all-or-nothing
process applied on the fragments is presented in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4: Fragments after applying the all-or-nothing transform, example
for k = 4 and e = 3. Each of the plaintext blocks is exclusive-ored with two
ciphertext blocks. All fragments have to be gathered in order to reconstruct
the initial data. However, some information is leaked when k − 1 fragments
are gathered. Therefore, it is important to ensure a secure separation of the
fragments.
4.2.3 Step 3: Dispersing Fragments
In a final step, transformed fragments are dispersed over independent storage
sites. The dispersal technique depends on the values of e and k. Two cases
may be distinguished.
• For e = k− 1: Fragments should be dispersed in a way that no more than
k−2 of the fragments are stored at a single storage site. This requirement
comes from the property of the chosen all-or-nothing transform [KSLC18],
which applied on a set of blocks protects them unless all but two blocks are
gathered. When exactly k − 1 fragments are gathered, some information
about the data is being leaked (it is possible to reconstruct some of the
ciphertext or plaintext blocks). An alternative solution to the problem
would perform the all-or-nothing exclusive-ors at the level of sub-blocks
and not blocks.
• For e < k−1: all fragments have to be dispersed over independent storage
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sites. As the number of plaintext fragments increases, it is possible that
same combinations of ciphertext blocks will be used to protect different
plaintext blocks. Therefore, the data protection level is lower in such a
configuration and fragments are only secure when the attacker is assumed
to be present only within a single storage site. This is the price that must
be payed for acceleration of the fragmentation processing.
Table 4.1: Comparison with relevant works in terms of the number of block
cipher operations (block op.), number of exclusive-ors, the number of storage
sites that an attacker is assumed to be able to compromise, and the ability to
provide a key exposure protection (K.E.P). All the operations are presented
in function of the number of plaintext blocks p.
Algorithm Block op. Exclusive-ors Compromised Sites K.E.P.
Encryption p b.c. p - No
Bastion p b.c. 3p+ 1 k − 1 Yes
CAON p b.c. 2p+ k − 1 k − 1 Yes
SFD p b.c. p k − 1 Yes
PE-AON ef b.c. ef + 2(p+ 1) k − 2 if e = k − 1 Yes
1 if e < k − 1 Yes
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4.3 Comparison with RelevantWorks and Per-
formance Evaluation
PE-AON was compared with relevant works in terms of complexity and data
protection levels. A performance benchmark confirmed the complexity eval-
uation.
4.3.1 Theoretical Comparison with Relevant Works
The PE-AON scheme was compared with relevant works in terms of the
amount of computations, the number of storage sites where the attacker is
assumed to be present, and the ability to protect against key exposure. Re-
sults are shown in Table 4.1. Symmetric encryption is used as a baseline; it
requires p block cipher operations and p exclusive-or operations when applied
on a plaintext composed of p blocks. Bastion’s scheme applies only a linear
transform over the encrypted data without increasing the number of block
cipher operations. Its transform uses 2(p+1) exclusive-or operations. Count-
ing with the encryption step, the Bastion scheme requires 3p+1 exclusive-ors.
Similarly to Bastion, CAON requires some additional exclusive-ors in addi-
tion to encrypting data. Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD) does
not require additional operations to data encryption since it just disperses
data over fragments.
PE-AON requires only ef block cipher operations as it does not encrypt
the totality of the data contained inside the fragments. It performs cf +
2(p+1) exclusive-or operations: ef during the encryption of part of the data
and 2(p+ 1) during the all-or-nothing transform applied in the second step.
4.3. COMPARISON WITH RELEVANT WORKS 159
Encryption and straightforward fragmentation does not protect against
key exposure; an attacker possessing the key is able to decrypt the trans-
formed data. Bastion, CAON, and SFD protects fragments unless all of the
storage sites are being compromised. The level of data protection in PE-
AON is lower since data protection level was traded for better performance.
Indeed, it is assumed that the attacker is only present in a single storage site.
The only exception is when e = k−1, then the attacker may be present in up
to k−2 storage sites. This could easily be reinforced by making the fragments
resistant to an attacker present in up to k − 1 locations. The only change
that would have to be done would be to make the all-or-nothing transform
preform exclusive-ors at the sub-block and not the block level. This will be
a part of the future work.
4.3.2 Performance Benchmark
Implementation details Relevant algorithms were implemented using the
same programming style in JAVA with JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540,
X64-based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with
8 GB RAM, under Windows 7. Standard javax.crypto library was used.
A random data sample was used for each measurement and each presented
result is an average of 30 measurements. AES-NI with 128 bits key was used
for encryption.
Performance comparisons between relevant algorithms are presented in
Figure 4.5. The performance of PE-AON is shown in 4 configurations. In all
configurations, PE-AON outperforms encryption and straightforward frag-
mentation. Therefore, it is also faster than all schemes presented in Chapter 3
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Figure 4.5: Performance benchmark. PE-AON was measured in different
configurations of (k, e). In all of them, it is faster than encryption and
straightforward fragmentation. It is also faster than two other fragmentation
schemes selected for the comparison: Secure Fragmentation and Dispersal
(SFD) and the Bastion’s scheme. The protection level of PE-AON is lower
but still may be sufficient in some situations. For instance, for PE-AON(6,5)
fragments are protected (even against key exposure) unless the attacker is
present in 4 or more storage sites, which seems a reasonable attack model.
(as they all perform full data encryption).
4.4 Summary
This short chapter presented the Partial Encryption and All-Or-Nothing (PE-
AON) scheme; a novel algorithm for fast and secure data fragmentation.
Initial data are partially encrypted and fragmented. Further, fragments are
transformed using an all-or-nothing transform that blends encrypted and
non-encrypted fragments. Each plaintext block is protected by at least two
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ciphertext blocks. In PE-AON, the desired performance and protection level
can be adjusted by varying the number of encrypted blocks. However, the
speed up of the fragmentation process comes at the cost of a decrease in data
protection levels. Fragments are protected, even against key exposure, but
only when the presumed attacker is present in one of the storage sites at most.
For a particular configuration, this dispersal requirement is relaxed and the
attacker may be present in up to all but two fragments storage locations (in
the future, this could easily be changed to all but one by slightly modifying
the all-or-nothing transform).
Bibliography
[Dwo01] Morris J. Dworkin. Nist sp 800-38a, recommendation for block
cipher modes of operation: Methods and techniques. Technical
report, United States, 2001.
[KM18a] Katarzyna Kapusta and Gérard Memmi. Enhancing data pro-
tection in a distributed storage environment using structure-
wise fragmentation and dispersal of encrypted data. In 17th
IEEE International Conference On Trust, Security And Pri-
vacy In Computing And Communications / 12th IEEE Interna-
tional Conference On Big Data Science And Engineering, Trust-
Com/BigDataSE 2018, New York, NY, USA, August 1-3, 2018,
pages 385–390, 2018.
[KM18b] Katarzyna Kapusta and Gerard Memmi. Poster: Circular aon:
A very fast scheme to protect encrypted data against key expo-
162 BIBLIOGRAPHY
sure. In Proceedings of the 2018 ACM SIGSAC Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, CCS ’18. ACM, 2018.
[KM18c] Katarzyna Kapusta and Gerard Memmi. Selective all-or-nothing
transform: Protecting outsourced data against key exposure. In
Proceedings of the 10th International Symposium on Cyberspace
Safety and Security, CSS ’18. Springer, 2018.
[KSLC18] G. O. Karame, C. Soriente, K. Lichota, and S. Capkun. Securing
cloud data under key exposure. IEEE Transactions on Cloud
Computing, pages 1–1, 2018.
[Riv97] Ronald L. Rivest. All-or-nothing encryption and the package
transform. In In Fast Software Encryption, LNCS, pages 210–
218. Springer-Verlag, 1997.
[WBP+01] Jay J Wylie, Mehmet Bakkaloglu, Vijay Pandurangan,
Michael W Bigrigg, Semih Oguz, Ken Tew, Cory Williams, Gre-
gory R Ganger, and Pradeep K Khosla. Selecting the right data
distribution scheme for a survivable storage system (cmu-cs-01-
120). 2001.
Chapter 5
A fast and scalable
fragmentation algorithm for
lightweight data protection
5.1 Introduction and Motivations
The usual solution to ensuring outsourced data confidentiality is to encrypt
data before sending it to the storage provider. Using a good symmetric en-
cryption algorithm ensures strong confidentiality guarantees. At the same
time, encryption comes at a performance price. Thanks to recent advance-
ments in the hardware development like the integration of the AES instruc-
tion set (AES-NI) in many processors, the speed of encryption is being im-
proved. Nevertheless, the overhead is still too important for some users (one
reason could be that not all possess powerful devices) and, consequently, a
non-negligible amount of data is stored insecurely in the cloud. Data frag-
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mentation and dispersal enables a different type of protection mechanism that
does not necessarily require classical cryptographic techniques [CBHK15].
Indeed, data shredding and dispersal over different storage sites intuitively
provides some data protection as an attacker on a single storage site is un-
able to obtain the totality of the information. Combined with data permuting
and encoding, it can be considered a lightweight method for providing data
confidentiality.
This chapter introduces the Fast and Scalable Fragmentation Algorithm
(FSFA), a novel approach for data protection in an environment (composed
of several independent storage sites) that takes full advantage of the possi-
bilities that lie within data fragmentation and dispersal. It transforms user’s
data into multiple interdependent fragments. Recovery of even the smallest
part of a single fragment depends on an equivalent size of content inside one
or more different fragments. In addition, data are shredded before and per-
muted after the encoding to increase the difficulty of data recovery from an
incomplete set of data fragments. FSFA achieves better performance than
relevant techniques (including data encryption and straightforward fragmen-
tation) and does not make use of a key. It addresses the needs of a user fearing
the disclosure of their outsourced data but desiring the storage solution to
be as fast, scalable, and inexpensive as possible.
In the considered threat model, a single cloud provider is honest-but-
curious - they will try to look at the data they were entrusted with but will
not make the effort to contact other cloud providers (who are supposed to
be unknown) in an attempt to recover the data. A cloud site may also be
vulnerable to external attacks leading to data leakage. In such a situation,
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the goal of the algorithm is to fragment the data between the clouds in a way
that the fragments received by a single cloud are practically useless.
Another assumption is that in a situation where the choice of an appro-
priate fragmentation method is a compromise between performance, memory
overhead, and data protection, the user favors the performance. Indeed, if
the data are very sensitive or even critical, additional protection methods
could be applied like perfect secret sharing or symmetric encryption (obvi-
ously this would decrease the performance of the solution). In such a case,
some fragments could be stored in a private and trusted site, leading to an
increased storage cost.
5.2 Data Concepts, Prerequisites, and Nota-
tion
The following key data components are introduced with their size in number
of bits and their dimensions in terms of the number of elements of which they
are directly composed (i.e., a structure S is |S| bits long and composed of s
elements):
• Sub-block (SB): a sequence of size |SB| bits.
• (Input or Encoded) Block (B): a sequence of bits of size |B| composed
of b = |B||SB| sub-blocks; an input block belongs to the original input data;
an encoded block is a result of encoding of an input block.
• Data (D): an input data of size |D| bits composed of d = |D||B| data blocks
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• Permutation array (PA): an array of size |PA| bits containing b values:
all natural numbers in range [0, ..., b− 1] appearing in a random order.
• Initial Pseudo-Random Block (IPB): pseudo-random block used as
a first block of a fragment. It comes from the xor-split of a permutation
array.
• Fragment (F ): a fragment composed of f = |F ||B| =
d
k
input blocks at
the beginning of the algorithm; then composed of the same number f of
encoded blocks plus one IPB at the end of the algorithm.
5.2.1 Prerequisites and Index Notations
Size of data: The number of blocks inside the data d should be a multiple
of the number of fragments k. This can be achieved using padding.
Number of sub-block inside a block: When the number of sub-blocks
inside a block is greater than the maximum value that can be encoded on
|SB| bits, the size of permutation arrays is greater than the block size. To
keep the size of permutation arras equal to the size of a block, the maximum
size of the block should not be greater than the maximum value that can be
represented on |SB| bits, max(#b) = 2|sb|.
Parameters k and c: In order to facilitate computation, the number of
fragments k should be chosen as a multiple of c.
Notation
A fragment is denoted by Fj where j is an integer in [0, . . . , k − 1]. A block
inside a fragment Fj is denoted by Bji , where i is an integer in [0, . . . , f ]. A
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sub-block at the position v inside a block Bji is denoted by B
j
i (v), where v
is an integer in [0, ..., b − 1]. A value at the position t inside a permutation
array PAr is denoted by PAr (t). An initial pseudo-random block is denoted
as IPB and comes from the split of a permutation array. IPBz coming from
the split of a permutation array PAr is denoted by IPBr,z, where z is an
integer in [0, ..., c− 1] such that j (mod c) = z. By convention, an IPBr,z is
also the first block Bj0 of the fragment j = r × c+ z.
5.2.2 Definitions
FSFA creates dependencies between fragments at the level of data blocks and
sub-blocks using a modified version of Shamir’s secret sharing. Dependencies
are not equally strong between all the fragments but each fragment is directly
dependent on c−1 other fragments. To create such dependencies, each block
of a fragment is encoded using c − 1 previously encoded blocks from c − 1
fragments. In order to facilitate the description of the algorithm, the defini-
tions of neighbor fragments and parents blocks are introduced, defining data
structures used during the encoding of a fragment and a block respectively.
Definition 3 Neighbor fragments A fragment Fj from the set of k frag-
ments F0, . . . , Fk−1 possesses c− 1 neighbor fragments used during its encod-
ing:
F(j+1) mod k, .., F(j+c−1) mod k
Definition 4 Parent blocks A block Bji belonging to a fragment Fj such
that i > 0 possesses c− 1 parent blocks inside its neighbor fragments:
B
(j+1) mod k
i−1 , . . . , B
(j+c−1) mod k
i−1
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Dependencies between blocks are created in the form of a chain where
an encoded block is re-used as a parent block during the encoding of the
next block. Input blocks do not possess natural predecessors. Instead, initial
pseudo-random blocks (IPBs) are used as their parent blocks.
(a) (b)
Figure 5.1: Illustration for c = 2 and k = 4. Left: Dispersal of input data.
Each fragment receives 14 of the input data d. Any pair of adjacent blocks is
distributed to different fragments. Right: Splitting k
c
= 2 permutation arrays
into k IPBs (each permutation array is split into c IPBs). As an example,
IPB1,0 will be appended to the fragment F2.
5.3 Forming Fragments
This section details how data are encoded into k fragments and how these k
fragments are dispersed over c independent storage locations. A pseudo-code
summarizing the encoding can be found in Figure 5.2. The defragmentation
process is not described as it is the direct inverse of the fragmentation (it is
also characterized by the same performance).
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1: function FragmentData(D, c, k)
2: F0, . . . , Fk−1=FormFragments(D, k)
3: PA0, . . . , PA k
c
−1 =GeneratePermutations(c, k, b)
4: B00 , . . . , B
k−1
0 =SplitPermutationsIntoIPBs
(
PA0, . . . , PA k
c
−1
)
5: while all f blocks of each fragment are not processed do
6: for each block Bji of a fragment Fj do
7: x=PickEvaluationPoint
8: ParentBlocks =SelectParents
(
Bji
)
9: EncodeAndPermuteBlock
(
ParentBlocks, PAj mod k
c
, x, Bji
)
Figure 5.2: Pseudo-code of the function transforming input data D into a set
of k fragments, that will be dispersed over k separate locations belonging to
at least c independent storage sites.
5.3.1 Data Distribution over Fragments
In a first step , data D = B1, . . . , Bd are distributed over k fragments
F0, . . . , Fk−1 in such a way that Bi is assigned to Fj ⇐⇒ i mod k = j
(FormFragments function). The number of blocks inside the data is a
multiple of k so each fragment receives exactly |D|
k
of the input data (illus-
trated in Figure 5.1). This method of proceeding was chosen as it allows
to start the encoding of first distributed data blocks before the whole data
are distributed over fragments in a pipelined manner. Data distribution over
fragments could also be performed more simply by just dividing data into k
consecutive chunks of size |D|
k
each.
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5.3.2 Generating Permutations
Before beginning to encode data, permutation arrays have to be generated
and split into initial pseudo-random blocks (IPBs). GeneratePermuta-
tions function generates k
c
random permutation arrays PA0, . . . , PA k
c
−1 of
length b containing all natural numbers from the range [0, ..., b−1] appearing
in a pseudo-random order. The role of a permutation array is to mix up
the positions of sub-blocks after block encoding. This is done in order to
slow down the recovery of the relationships between encoded sub-blocks (see
Section 5.4 for more explanation).Multiple permutation arrays are needed as
a fragment has to use a different permutation array than its neighbors.
Function SplitPermutationsIntoIPBs xor-splits each permutation
array into c IPBs (illustrated in Figure 5.1). Obtained k (because k
c
× c = k)
IPBs are distributed over k fragments in a way that IPBrz is assigned to
Fj ⇐⇒ r × c + z = j. IPBr,z becomes the first block Bj0 of a fragment
j, when j = r × c + z. Recovery of each permutation array requires all c
corresponding IPBs. Therefore, the following dispersal recommendation is
formulated:
Recommendation 4 (Dispersing IPBs) Fragments containing IPBs al-
lowing the recovery of a permutation array should be dispersed over indepen-
dent storage locations.
Remark 2 (Generating initial pseudo-random blocks (IPBs)) In or-
der to minimize memory overhead, IPBs are used as shares allowing the
recovery of permutation arrays while, at the same time, being initial pseudo-
random blocks used during the encoding of fragments. A different solution
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would consist in having both permutation shares and IPBs separated.
Figure 5.3: Encoding fragments, example for c = 2 and k = 4. Fragments
are encoded simultaneously, block by block. Input blocks (white) are encoded
into encoded blocks (light grey). A current input block (dark grey) is encoded
using c − 1 parent blocks (red) from its neighbor fragments. A current sub-
block (dark grey, striped) is encoded using c− 1 sub-blocks from parent blocks
(red, striped). After encoding, sub-blocks are permuted according to a given
permutation. When c = 2, each fragment possesses one neighbor (as an
example, F1 is the neighbor of F0).
5.3.3 Encoding Fragments
Encoding processing is sequential and performed on all fragments simulta-
neously, block by block (illustrated in Figure 5.3). It creates dependencies
between a fragment and its neighbors. More precisely, a block Bji inside a
fragment Fj is encoded using c− 1 parent blocks from neighbor fragments of
Fj. The processing is sequential and its philosophy could be roughly com-
pared to the Cipher Block Chaining mode - once a block is encoded it becomes
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a parent block to another input block. The first input block of each of the
fragments does not posses natural parents (a similar problem occurs in CBC
mode, where an initialization vector is introduced as the first block). Thus,
the k first blocks (IPBs) are used as parent blocks. As they are composed of
pseudo-random values, they introduce pseudo-randomness to the fragments’
encoding. In order to increase the ratio of pseudo-randomness inside encoded
data, fresh IPBs could be generated after encoding a portion of input data.
Encoding and Permuting Blocks
Input blocks are encoded and permuted inside the EncodeAndPermute-
Block function (illustrated in Figure 5.3, pseudo-code in Figure 5.4), tak-
ing as input an input block Bji (where j = 0, . . . , k and i = 1, . . . ,#f) to
be encoded, its parent blocks, an evaluation point x, and the permutation
array paj mod c that will be used to permute sub-blocks of the block. Par-
ent blocks are selected from neighbor fragments inside the SelectParent-
Blocks function according to Definition 4. Parent blocks are the last c− 1
encoded (or permutation) blocks from neighboring fragments. The evalua-
tion point x is selected inside the PickEvaluationPoint function. It is
an integer in range of [2, . . . , 2|SB|−1] (2|SB|−1 being the maximum value that
can be encoded on |SB| bits). It is considered as a known value.
An input block is encoded sub-block by sub-block. The encoding proce-
dure is based on a modification of Shamir’s secret sharing. For each sub-block
Bji (v), where v = 0, . . . , b− 1, an encoding polynomial is being constructed.
c − 1 sub-blocks from parent blocks positioned at the same index v to the
currently encoded sub-block are selected as the coefficients of this polyno-
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1: function EncodeAndPermuteBlock(ParentBlocks,PermArray,x,Bji )
2: for v = 0 : b− 1 do
3: a0, . . . , ac−2=SelectCoefficients(ParentBlocks)
4: Bji (v) = b
j
i (v) + xa0 + ...+ xc−1ac−2
PermuteSubBlocks
(
PermArray,Bji
)
Figure 5.4: Pseudo-code of the function EncodeAndPermuteBlock.
mial (function SelectCoefficients). The result of the evaluation of the
polynomial at the evaluation point x is the encoded sub-block. In contrast
to Shamir’s scheme, the encoding polynomial is evaluated at only one point
as just one point in addition to c−1 coefficients is sufficient for the decoding.
Intuitively, an encoded block and its parent blocks should be stored over
separated locations as, reunited together, they allow the decoding of the
input block (in presence of the right permutation array). The following
recommendation on blocks dispersal is formulated:
Recommendation 5 (Dispersing blocks) A block and its c − 1 parent
blocks should be dispersed over c independent storage locations.
Encoded sub-blocks within a block are permuted using one of the permu-
tation arrays. An encoded sub-blockBji (v) goes to position w = PermArray (v).
Permuting sub-blocks mixes up relationships between sub-blocks inside a
block increasing the difficulty of data recovery from an incomplete set of
fragments.
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5.3.4 Dispersing Fragments
Fragmentation produces k final fragments F0, ..., fk−1 of size f + 1 each (f
input blocks and one IPB). Such final fragments should be dispersed over
at least c independent storage sites, e.g. independent cloud providers. The
dispersal procedure is defined by a single rule: a fragment and its neighboring
fragments cannot be stored at a single site. The total number of fragments k
is the choice of the user - a higher value of k reinforces data protection as it
allows for multiple fragments dispersed over a single site. A weaker variation
of the dispersal algorithm where only one storage location is used could be
also considered; instead of misleading a curious provider, a user can upload
the data fragments from c different accounts. In the considered scenario,
it is assumed that the user does not have to care about data availability
or integrity as they are usually guaranteed while signing the Service-Level
Agreement.
5.4 Security Analysis
Each storage site receives k
c
non-neighbor fragments containing uniform and
independent data (resistance to frequency analysis was confirmed by an ex-
tended empirical analysis not presented in this paper). An attacker situated
in less than the totality of the sites can undertake two actions: decode a
portion of data from obtained fragments or verify if data inside received
fragments match some presumed data. To satisfy their curiosity, they have
to overcome a combination of three obstacles: data fragmentation and dis-
persal, permutation, and encoding.
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Data Dispersal The first and simplest obstacle is data dispersal. A single
provider receives k fragments containing only a portion of encoded input
data of size |D|
c
in total. Even decoded, information contained inside the
fragments is sampled (result of FormFragments function) and incomplete.
Moreover, if the cloud does not receive any information about the ordering
of the fragments, there are
(
k
c
)
! possibilities of fragments reassembling.
Data encoding Data encoding creates dependencies between blocks of
fragments and introduces pseudo-randomness to the data transformation
thanks to IPBs. The following lemma is formulated where, by infeasible
decoding, it is understood that for an encoded sub-block of size |SB|, an
attacker must consider 2|SB| possible values of the input sub-block:
Lemma 1 (Sub-block encoding) Decoding of an encoded sub-block Bji (v),j =
0, . . . , k,i = 1, . . . ,#f , without any knowledge about the input data and the
c− 1 values of sub-blocks used during its encoding is infeasible.
Proof 1 The procedure encoding sub-blocks of first input blocks directly ap-
plies Shamir’s secret sharing scheme where c − 1 pseudo-random sub-blocks
from IPBs are used as coefficients of encoding polynomials. Encoding re-
sults are outputs of an information-theoretically secure scheme so they may
be considered pseudo-random since it is supposed that an adversary has no
knowledge about the input data. They can be reused as encoding coefficients.
The value of an encoded sub-block of size |SB| depends on the c− 1 pseudo-
random values of size |SB|. An adversary possessing an incomplete set of
coefficients has 2|SB| possibilities for each of the coefficients to consider. De-
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pending on these coefficients, the input sub-block may take any of the 2|SB|
values.
Data permuting Permutations were introduced in order to protect against
a powerful adversary that possessed a fragment and all but one of its neigh-
boring fragments, as well as acquired partial or total knowledge about the
input data to which the fragments belong. Such an attacker may undertake
two actions: to recover the missing data part or to verify if the fragments
correspond to the data. Without block permutations, they would be able to
recover the first pseudo-random block of the missing fragments by reversing
the encoding procedure. They can then proceed to the verification or to a
partial data recovery. Permuting blocks increases the difficulty of reversing
the encoding procedure. Indeed, to recover values of a missing block, an ad-
versary has to check all the combinations of permutations of the sub-blocks.
The following lemma is formulated:
Lemma 2 (Defragmentation of permuted data) For an adversary pos-
sessing some knowledge about the input data contained inside a fragment, the
difficulty of defragmentation or verification of a fragment without the pres-
ence of all of its neighbors increases with the number of sub-blocks inside a
block and decreases with the knowledge of neighboring fragments.
Proof 2 Let’s first consider a situation where blocks are not permuted, but
just encoded. For each encoded sub-block of a block it is possible to construct
one polynomial equation of degree c− 1, where known or unknown sub-blocks
from parent blocks are used as coefficients. Recursively, these coefficients
may also be represented as polynomial equations so, at the end, all sub-blocks
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may be represented in function of previously encoded sub-blocks as well as of
the first pseudo-random sub-blocks coming from IPBs. For a single block of
b sub-blocks, a system of b equations is obtained. The difficulty of solving
this system of equations depends on the amount of knowledge about input
data and the amount of possessed IPBs. When data are permuted, b! possible
permutations exist, and as do many equally probable systems of equations.
For a permutation array of size b, b! possible permutations exist. If the
blocks are composed of few sub-blocks, a brute-force search over all permu-
tation possibilities is feasible. However, a b = 34 results in 2.95 × 1038 per-
mutation array possibilities, which is comparable to the number of tries that
are required to perform a brute-force attack on a 128-bit symmetric encryp-
tion key (2128 gives 3.4 × 1038 possibilities). An increase of the size of the
block slightly affects the storage space but also improves the performance of
the fragmentation process (performance results presented in Section 5.6).
5.5 Complexity Analysis and Storage Require-
ments
Table 5.1 shows an overview of complexity considerations and storage re-
quirements of concerned fragmentation schemes and of our proposal (FSFA).
Algorithms can be divided into two groups. The first group relies on sym-
metric encryption for data protection and combines it with a key hiding or
dispersal method that prevents the key (and therefore the initial data) re-
covery until k fragments have been gathered. It includes all variations of
the all-or-nothing-transform and Secret Sharing Made Short. The second
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Table 5.1: Runtime and storage requirements of relevant algorithms.
Poly (n, k, d): cost of encoding data d into n fragments using a polynomial of
degree k−1. Matrix (n, k, d): cost of multiplying data d by a dispersal matrix
DM of dimension n × k. Encrypt (d): cost of using symmetric encryption.
Hash: cost of data hashing. RS: cost of applying a Reed-Solomon error
correction codes. FragmentData (d, c, k): cost of data processing in FSFA.
(D - initial data, |D| - size of d, |K| - symmetric key size, |B| - block size in
FSFA, |DM | - dispersal matrix in IDA, k - required number of fragments, n
- total number of fragments)
Scheme Runtime Runtime Storage Storage
Fragmentation Redundancy Without Red. With Red.
SSS Poly(n,k,D) - k|D| n|D|
IDA Matrix(n,k,D) - |D|+ |DM | n
k
|D|+ |DM |
SSMS Enc(D) + Poly(n,k,K) RS(n,k,D) |D|+ k|K| n
(
|D|
k
+ |K|
)
AONT-RS Enc(D) + Hash(D) RS(n,k,D) |D|+ |K| n
k
(d+ |K|)
FSFA FragmentData(d,c,k) RS(n,k,D) |D|+ k|PA| n
k
(|D|+ k|B|)
group, comprising of Shamir’s secret sharing and information dispersal, en-
codes data using a system of equations which is incomplete when less than
k−1 fragments are present. Their big problem is the lack of scalability when
the number of fragment k is growing, as a growing k entails a growing poly-
nomial degree (SSS) or a growing dimension of the dispersal matrix (IDA).
FSFA overcomes the scalability issue by introducing the c parameter. Data
are dispersed over k fragments, but encoded using a polynomial of degree c.
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The following subsections give more detail about the complexity and storage
requirements of analyzed algorithms. A precise evaluation is hard because of
the variety of implementations.
SSS and IDA: SSS computes n values of a polynomial (Poly) for data d of
size |D|. Its performance depends on the values of k, n, and |D|. Evaluating
a polynomial is usually done using the Horner’s scheme, which is a O (k)
operation. The cost of an IDA equals to the cost of multiplying data D by a
k×n dispersal matrix (DM). In both cases, data are usually first divided into
smaller chunks and processed in a chunk by chunk fashion. They strongly
benefit from an implementation in finite field arithmetic of the field GF (28).
SSMS and AONT-RS: Performance of AONT-RS depends on the chosen
encryption (Encrypt) and hash (Hash) algorithms, as well as on the data size
and Reed-Solomon implementation. Wisely implemented, SSMS applies the
same mechanisms as AONT-RS: symmetric encryption (Encrypt) and Reed-
Solomon (RS) codes for redundancy. Instead of hiding the key inside the hash
of the whole data, SSMS disperses it within the fragments using Shamir’s
scheme (Poly) applied only on the key. When SSMS is applied on data
much larger than a symmetric key, the time taken by the key fragmentation
is negligible.
FSFA: FragmentData (d, c, k) is composed of several steps: generating and
splitting permutations, data distribution, data encoding, and data permu-
tation. The most consuming operation is the sub-blocks encoding. It takes
c − 1 additions and c − 1 multiplications to encode a single sub-block, as
the Horner’s scheme for evaluating a polynomial is used. The procedure
is repeated for all the sub-blocks inside the data, so at the end db (c− 1)
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additions and the same number of multiplications are needed to encode all
of the data. Because a GF (28) finite field is used (like for SSS and IDA),
a lookup table is used to replace the multiplications and the additions are
replaced by exclusive-ors. Permuting sub-blocks may be implemented as a
constant time operation. Data dispersal function FormFragments is an
O (k) operation. Being very simple and applied only once, data dispersal
and permutations generation and splitting have a negligible effect on the
algorithm performance. Additional fragments (if needed) are generated in-
side an optional procedure RS, which is exactly the same as the one used
for SSMS and AONT-RS. FSFA produces k|B| bits of storage overhead (k
pseudo-random IPBs). A larger data block increases this overhead, but
at the same time improves data protection and performance, as it allows a
better parallelization of encoding. The defragmentation procedure is fully
parallelizable, as a block may be decoded without waiting for decoding of
predecessors.
5.6 Comparison with Relevant Works
The proposed algorithm was compared with the state-of-the art fragmen-
tation techniques presented in Chapter 2. All schemes were implemented
in JAVA using following resources: JDK 1.8 on DELL Latitude E6540, X64-
based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70 GHz with 8 GB
RAM, under Windows 7. javax.crypto library was used to implement cryp-
tographic mechanisms. Throughput was measured on random data samples
of 100MB.
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Implementation Details Similarly to SSS and IDA, the proposed algo-
rithm can be implemented in any Galois Field GF
(
2Q
)
. Q is usually se-
lected according to the word size of processors and can be 8, 16, 32 or 64-bit.
The presented version was implemented in GF (28) enabling the use of only
logical operations. The same field was used for the implementations of SSS
and IDA. The AES-128 in the CTR mode was used as the symmetric en-
cryption algorithm inside AONT-RS and SSMS. The AES-NI instruction set
was enabled. SHA256 was used as the hash algorithm inside AONT-RS.
The performance of FSFA was measured for four different configurations:
for two different values of c (2 and 3) and two different choices of block
size (34, and 250 bytes: a block size of 34 bytes makes the recovery of a
permutation array similar to performing a brute-force search on a 128-bits
key, a block size of 250 optimizes the performance). Results are shown in
Figure 5.5. FSFA achieves much better performance than the state-of-art
techniques. It is up to 200% (for c = 2) faster than the fastest of the relevant
works (SSMS with AES). As the cost of fragmentation and key splitting is
negligible in SSMS, the performance of SSMS is equivalent to the performance
of the algorithm used to encrypt the data. Thus, FSFA achieves better
performance than data encryption with AES. AONT-RS is slower than SSMS
(as hashing data is more costly than applying Shamir’s scheme to split the
key). In contrast to other algorithms, IDA and SSS do not scale with the
number of fragments k.Presented techniques were integrated within the DepSky multi-cloud envi-
ronment [BCQ+13]. Replacing symmetric encryption with FSFA resulted in
a gain of 2̃0-30% in performance on the client side. The results of an end-to-
end performance comparison depend on multiple factors including the SLA
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(a) (b)
Figure 5.5: Performance benchmark for c = 2 (left) and c = 3 (right).
and the data size.
5.7 Summary
In this chapter, the Fast Scalable Fragmentation Algorithm (FSFA) for data
protection through fragmentation, encoding, and dispersal was introduced
and analyzed. Data transformation into fragments relies on a combination of
secret sharing and data permutation. It produces a small storage overhead
proportional to the number of fragments, which is negligible in relation to
larger data. Defragmentation of dispersed data requires the gathering of
all fragments, which is possible only by acquiring locations and different
access rights of several independent storage sites. Being keyless, the scheme
may be used by a user fearing key exposure. Unlike variations of the all-
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or-nothing transform, the scheme is adapted for data streaming use cases.
Performance benchmarks show that the scheme can be more than 200% faster
than state-of-the art comparable and widely renown techniques. The scheme
is particularly well adapted for data dispersal in a multi-cloud environment
where non-colluding cloud providers ensure the physical separation between
data fragments.
FSFA could be seen as a particular case of a more general method for
data protection combining fragmentation, encryption, and data dispersal
[MKQ15]. Modifications in the way of data dispersal over fragments, data
encoding, or data permuting could be done (i.e., initial encoded blocks could
be generated in a separated step, Shamir’s secret sharing could be replaced
with a different secret sharing scheme). From an implementation point of
view, performance could be improved by fully exploiting various possibilities
of parallelization of the processing.
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Chapter 6
Data protection by means of
fragmentation in unattended
wireless sensor networks
6.1 Introduction and Motivations
In a world of the internet of things, wireless sensor networks are widely
employed to capture all kinds of environmental information. In a classic
approach, they operate in real-time mode where, right after the acquisition,
sensors move data to a network static node named the sink. However, in some
situations, the presence of the sink may not be ensured. For instance, this
may happen when sensors are deployed over huge or hostile areas like national
parks, battlefields, international border zones etc. Therefore, the term Unat-
tended Wireless Sensor Networks (UWSN) was introduced in [DPMS+08]
to define a class of sensor networks where data is stored inside the sensors
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waiting to be collected by a mobile sink (for instance a drone) periodically
visiting the network.
UWSNs raise security challenges as data kept inside the nodes may be
exposed to various types of attackers wanting to read, destroy, or corrupt
the stored information. Several strategies for data protection were already
proposed. For instance, in order to achieve data survivability, data may be
replicated and moved around the network like in [DPMS+09]. A different
approach ensuring, in addition, data confidentiality, consists in making the
sensors encrypt, fragment, and disperse data over their neighbors. Data
reconstruction is then impossible unless a given threshold of k out of n data
fragments is gathered. Data are protected against an attacker unable to
compromise the required amount of sensors between consecutive visits of the
sink.
Several fragmentation schemes adapted to be used inside UWSN were
introduced. They propose a process based on secret sharing ([ROL09a])
or a combination of data encryption and error-correction codes ([KMN17,
RRZ08, WRLZ09]). As energy consumption is an important issue inside
UWSN, some of the proposals use additively homomorphic schemes in or-
der to reduce storage and transmission costs ([ROL09b, ROL09a]). The
Additively Homomorphic Secure Fragmentation Scheme (AHEF) presented
in this chapter revisits the HEHSS scheme by [ROL09a]. In both schemes,
fragmented and encrypted data are aggregated inside the neighbors’ nodes.
However, AHEF significantly improves the HEHSS scheme - instead of using
additively homomorphic secret sharing for data fragmentation, AHEF uses
an additively homomorphic information dispersal algorithm. This change
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has a big impact on the resulting storage overhead and transmission costs.
Indeed, fragments obtained using secret sharing has the same size as the
data itself. Information dispersal produces fragments of optimal size (see
the explanation in [Rab89]). Thus, an increase in the data to be protected
is avoided. In addition, AHEF allows two means of fragment aggregation:
aggregation of fragments from the same sensor and aggregation of fragments
coming from the same cluster of sensors.
6.2 Related Work
This section gives an overview of relevant works from the domain of data
protection and secure aggregation inside UWSN. It especially focuses on
fragmentation schemes used inside UWSN to ensure data confidentiality and
availability. During the descriptions, the following terminology is used: A
sensor sensori, i = 0, . . . , s− 1, captures data during events named rounds,
denoted as round. rmax denotes the number of rounds between consecutive
visits of the mobile sink. Dri denotes the data of size |Dri | bits captured by
a single sensor Si during the round event r. When a fragmentation scheme
is used, data Dri is fragmented into n fragments, k of which are needed for
data reconstruction.
6.2.1 Moving Data around the Network
As presented in [DPMS+08, DPMS+09], attackers come in different flavors.
A curious attacker will try to learn as much as possible about the stored
data. A polluter will try to mislead the sink by introducing fraudulent data.
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A search-and-erase or search-and-replace will destroy or modify certain target
data. Finally, an eraser will erase as much data as possible.
The right defense strategy has to take into account the type of attacker. In
[DPMS+09] three non-cryptographic strategies were introduced and analyzed
in the context of a search-and-erase and eraser attackers: DO-NOTHING
(DN), MOVE-ONCE (MO), and KEEP-MOVING (KM). In DN, captured
data are just waiting inside the sensor for the mobile sink. In MO, a sensor
offloads newly captured data to some other randomly picked sensor right after
capture. In KM, data are moved continuously; each sensor moves each data
item individually to another sensor at each round. Moreover, MO and KM
may be combined with data replication in order to increase the probability
of data survival. For an attacker of type search-and-replace, the choice of
strategy will depend on the frequency of sink visits (MO or KM). MO is
more efficient than KM when rmax < sk−1 . When no replication is applied,
DN is the best strategy against an eraser. However, data migration becomes
better than DN even with a single replica. More works on ensuring data
survivability in UWSN using replication were done in [DPV11, ADPG17].
6.2.2 HybridS
HybridS [RRZ08, WRLZ09] is a scheme for secure and dependable storage in-
side UWSN combining secret sharing with erasure coding. A sensor encrypts
round data using a random key. Then, the Reed-Solomon scheme is used to
encode the encrypted data into n fragments, k of which are needed for data
reconstruction. The secret key is also fragmented into n fragments using a
secret sharing scheme like Shamir’s scheme presented in [Sha79]. Finally,
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the sensor distributes the produced data and key fragments over n randomly
selected neighbors. Such processing achieves lower storage and transmission
costs than simple data replication. Indeed, the only overhead comes from
the key fragments that are the size of the encryption key (typically 128 bits).
When the round data is large, the HybridS achieves lower storage and trans-
mission costs than fragmenting data using secret sharing. However, when the
round data is very small, the overhead coming from key fragments may be
significant. In ([WRLZ09]) a similar scheme (RSSS) combining secret shar-
ing with data encryption was presented. The main difference with HybridS is
that it provides data integrity by including algebraic signatures within data
fragments.
6.2.3 Homomorphic Key-evolution Scheme
The Homomorphic Key-evolution Scheme (HKS) [ROL09b] provides back-
ward and forward secrecy of data stored inside the sensors by combining
dynamic key generation with data aggregation. At each round, a sensor
updates the encryption key Kri by hashing the key used during the previ-
ous round: Kri = h(Kr−1i ). As previous keys cannot be obtained from the
current key, forward secrecy is provided. HKS encrypts data using addi-
tively homomorphic encryption presented in [CMT05] and thus significantly
reduces the volume of data stored inside the sensors. Moreover, to decrypt
the aggregated data, an attacker is obliged to have all the dynamic keys used
to encrypt them. Thus, backward secrecy is provided. The goal of HKS it
to protect the network from curious intruders - those who want to read the
stored data. It is inefficient against attackers who want to erase data as no
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data resilience is provided.
6.2.4 Homomorphic Encryption and Homomorphic Se-
cret Sharing
The Homomorphic Encryption and Homomorphic Secret Sharing (HEHSS) [ROL09a]
scheme improves the HKS scheme by providing data reliability in addi-
tion to forward and backward secrecy. Round data is first fragmented into
a set of fragments n using an additively homomorphic scheme (Shamir’s
scheme [Sha79]). Fragments are then encrypted using additively homomor-
phic encryption. Finally, fragments are distributed over n sensor neighbors
where they can be aggregated with fragments coming from previous rounds.
Thanks to data aggregation, storage overhead, as well as the cost of data
transmission to the mobile sink, it is lower than in RSSS. However, the use
of secret sharing increases the size of the data fragments, as Shamir’s scheme
produces fragments of size |Dri | (leading to an n-fold increase in data volume).
Therefore, the transmission costs during communication with neighbors are
increased.
6.3 Problem Formulation
This section presents assumptions about the considered sensor network ar-
chitecture and the anticipated adversaries.
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6.3.1 Network Model
A scheme of the network architecture is presented in Figure 6.1. In the
considered scenario, the network is composed of s sensor nodes. Each sensor
node has a fixed location and is denoted as sensori, where i = 0, 2, . . . , s−1.
Data captured by the sensors is collected by one or more authorized mobile
sinks visiting the network periodically. To simplify the description of the
proposed approach, it is considered that only one mobile sink is present inside
the network. We assume that a sensor captures data rmax times between
consecutive visits of the sink (this is a simplified approach as sensors could
have different intervals between rounds, i.e. when the data capture would be
triggered by an event). The event of data capture by the sensor is denoted
as a round r, where r = 0, 1, . . . , rmax − 1. At a round r, a sensor sensori
captures data denoted as Dri .
Sensors are limited in terms of computational power and memory. Apart
from capturing and processing data, it is assumed that the sensors are able
to communicate with at least n others sensors that are located in their neigh-
borhood. It is a simplified approach as not all sensors may have n other nodes
in their neighborhood. Two solutions may be adopted in a situation of lack
of neighbors. First, n can be variable and dependent on the sensor location
(an example is shown in Figure 6.1). The same solution could be applied in
a situation of loss of neighbors due to interferences, obstacles, or issues of
sensor mobility. Second, a multi-hop transmission may be used for sensors
without enough neighbours. In the worst case scenario, a sensor could func-
tion without neighbors for some period of time and then re-transmit collected
data with the reappearance of neighbors. In order to save energy, a classic
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sleep and live technique can be applied as sensors are alive only during and
shortly after each round.
The mobile sink is assumed to be a trusted party that cannot be com-
promised. It is also assumed that the collected data is processed in an en-
vironment not limited in terms of computation power, memory constraints,
or energy consumption. For instance, once collected, data could be sent to a
cloud for further processing.
Static configuration is a simplified approach. A more sophisticated scheme
would include a dynamic selection of neighbors. Such a dynamic network
topology would be motivated by two factors. First, the sensors’ nature may
be mobile, leading their neighbors to continuously change. Second, in a static
configuration, attackers who know the topology of the network will first try
to compromise the set of sensors they know are their neighbors. A mobile
network makes the fragment distribution complicated, but increases the level
of data protection. Indeed, moving sensors naturally add randomness to the
fragment distribution, confusing the attacker about the location of the frag-
ments. Some works on data fragmentation using secret sharing inside mobile
UWSN have already been done in [RG13], showing how parameters of the
secret sharing should be chosen in function of the mobility degree of the
network.
During the system’s initialization, each sensor receives information about
the location of its n neighbor’s node (as at each round, the sensor will produce
n data fragments and disperse them over its neighbors). Information about
the network topology should be transmitted securely as it can provide hints
to an attacker about the groups of sensors that will store fragments of the
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data.
Figure 6.1: Simplified scheme of the network architecture. Each sensor com-
municates with its neighbors (during each round, this is shown for just two
sensors) and with the mobile sink (during data collection). Depending on
the network density, some sensors may have less neighbors than the others;
sensor1 has three neighbors but sensor6 only two.
6.3.2 Threat Model
The threat model presumes that a roaming adversary is present inside the
network, and has the ability to compromise most k − 1 sensors during con-
secutive visits of a mobile sink. The setting of k and rmax must be carefully
chosen during the network’s dimensioning whilst also considering an estima-
tion of the system’s vulnerability. Once the attacker compromises a sensor,
they are able to fully control it and consequently obtain the data collected
during their occupation of the sensor. However, unless they manage to com-
promise a set of k sensors storing fragments of the same round data, they
are not able to obtain the data collected before the compromise. There is
no way for a sensor to distinguish if its neighbor is currently under attack or
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not.
An attacker is assumed to not be able to compromise k sensors between
consecutive visits of the sink. However, an additional countermeasure may
be established, reducing this time interval to the time until initial data col-
lection is done. It would consist of encrypting the first round data fragments
stored at the sensor with a temporary key distributed during the system ini-
tialization and known to the end user. This temporary key would be deleted
from the sensor’s memory after the first round. This way, an attacker would
only have time until the first round to compromise k sensors and obtain the
temporary keys.
The attacker is assumed to be curious - they want to read the stored
data. Therefore, the AHEF scheme presented in this chapter focuses mainly
on providing data confidentiality and does not treat the problem of fragments
authentication or integrity verification. However, it could be complemented
with a different scheme treating these two issues, for instance the solution
presented in [BPVW11].
6.4 The Proposed Scheme
The goal of the scheme is to protect the data stored inside the sensors until the
arrival of the mobile sink while minimizing storage overhead, the complexity
of processing, as well as the transmission costs.
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6.4.1 System Initialization
During system initialization, a secure hash function (for instance SHA-512)
denoted as h (.) is chosen and preloaded to the sensors along with a sym-
metric cipher algorithm (for instance AES). In accordance with Kerckhoffs’s
principle, the hash and the cipher function are publicly known. Moreover,
each sensor sensori receives its own initial key denoted as K0i (key distri-
bution protocol may be based on one of the several solutions proposed in
[GC15]). Initial key K0i is refreshed after each visit of the mobile sink by
being exclusive-ored with a nonce produced using a secure cryptographic
Deterministic Pseudo Random Generator (DPRG) ([BK11]). The seed of
the employed DPRG can be constructed by hashing the secret key.
Fragments Distribution and Aggregation
Two configurations of fragment distribution and aggregation are possible. In
the first configuration, only data coming from the same sensor is aggregated.
At each round, a sensor captures round data, fragments it into a set of
n fragments, and disperses the fragments over its neighbors where they are
aggregated with fragments distributed during previous rounds. In the second
configuration, sensors are organized into clusters of n nodes. At each round
each sensor from the cluster sends its data to the neighbors (that are also
belonging to the cluster). Then, the data coming from the different nodes of
the cluster is aggregated.
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Key Evolution
At the beginning of each round, the round index r and the sensor’s round key
Kri are updated. The current round key is obtained by hashing the previous
round key: Kri = h
(
Kr−1i
)
, where r = 0, . . . , rmax − 1 and K0i is the initial
key. Thanks to the one-way property of the hash function, attackers who
compromise a sensor and obtain its current round key will not be able to
derive the previously used round keys. Thus, forward security is provided.
The mobile sink stores the initial key Ki of each sensor, allowing it to derive
the round keys as needed.
6.4.2 Processing Round Data
At each round, data captured by a sensor is processed using the Additively
Homomorphic Encryption and Fragmentation scheme (AHEF) composed of
two steps: data fragmentation and data encryption.
Step 1 - Fragmentation of Round Data into Data Points
In the first step, round data is fragmented into n fragments, k of which are
needed for data reconstruction. Instead of the additively homomorphic secret
sharing that was applied in HEHSS, an additively homomorphic dispersal
algorithm - similar to the one presented in [Kra94] - is used. More precisely,
the first step consists of following operations:
1. Represent collected data Dri as a vector of k integers Dri (j), where
j = 0, . . . , k − 1 and Dri (j) ∈ [0, . . . , dmax − 1]. The size of a each of
the k data values is of |D
r
i |
k
bits.
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2. Choose integer m in function of the predicted number of rounds rmax,
aggregation configuration (only sensor or between cluster), and dmax:
m = 2dlog2(rmaxdmax)e when the aggregation is performed only on data
coming from the same sensor or m = 2dlog2(nrmaxdmax)e when the data
will be aggregated inside a cluster of n sensors.
The proposed scheme uses the additively homomorphic encryption scheme
(AHE) presented in [CMT05]. In AHE, encryption/decryption opera-
tions are modified. Normally, encryption consists of exlusive-oring the
data with a random keystream. In AHE, the exclusive-or operation is
replaced with addition (encryption) or subtraction (decryption) mod-
ulo an integer m. The value of m has to be not only larger than the
size of the data to be encrypted, but also has to take into account the
number of rounds rmax and numbers of fragments that will be aggre-
gated together at each round in order to prevent the overflow coming
from the addition of multiple fragments. Indeed, with each round, the
sum of the round data increases. Therefore, data fragments have to be
large enough to contain the sum of all round data.
3. Construct an encoding polynomial yri (x) =
k−1∑
j=0
Dri (j)xj (mod m). The
k data values are used as the coefficients of this encoding polynomial.
4. Evaluate the polynomial yri (x) at n different evaluation points xl, xl > 0
and l = 0, . . . , n− 1 in order to obtain n different data points P li,r =
(xl, yri (xl)) that are the result of the fragmentation of round data Dri .
The round data can be obtained back by interpolating the polynomial
using any k of the n points.
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Step 2 - Transforming Points into Fragments using Additively Ho-
momorphic Encryption
Fragments from the first step have to be encrypted in order to be protected.
The second step therefore encrypts each fragment using additively homomor-
phic encryption:
1. Generate a set of n pseudo-random keystreams Ti,r using a stream
cipher and the current round key Kri . Each of the n keystream Ti,r(l),
l = 0, . . . , n− 1 is a value from in range [0,m− 1].
2. Transform the point P li,r into the final fragment Fmi,r by encrypting the
y-axis values of the point. The encryption process entails the modu-
lar addition of the y-axis value of the point and of its corresponding
keystream:
F li,r = (xl, AHE(yl, Ti,r(l))) = (xl, yl + Ti,r(l) (mod m))
6.4.3 Fragments Aggregation
AHEF allows the aggregation of fragments not only between different rounds
but also between different sensors. Indeed, any two fragments may be aggre-
gated if they were obtained using the same evaluation points (x-axis values).
This is possible because of the additively homomorphic properties of both
fragmentation and encryption. Additively homomorphic fragmentation al-
lows the addition of multiple points of different polynomials evaluated within
the same set of evaluation points. Furthermore, additively homomorphic en-
cryption allows the addition of multiple encrypted points even if they were
encrypted using different keys.
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In the proposed simplified architecture described in Section 6.3.1, it is pre-
sumed that during the static configuration of the network each sensor receives
information about its n neighbors. The sensor is then constantly transmit-
ting fragments evaluated at the same x-axis value to the same neighbor so
fragments coming from a same sensor but from different rounds can be easily
aggregated.
It is also possible to aggregate fragments coming from different rounds of
the same sensor but also fragments coming from different rounds of different
sensors. In order to enable the aggregation of fragments coming from different
sensors, sensors should be organized in clusters of n sensors. Inside such a
cluster, each sensor will receive fragments obtained using the same x-axis
evaluation point in order to enable a correct data aggregation. Thus, an
information about the evaluation points to be used during fragmentation
along with a map associating sensors with those points should be given during
the initialization phase.
6.4.4 Data Defragmentation
Data reconstruction is performed after the collection of at least k final frag-
ments by the mobile sink. Each fragment is a sum of rmax component frag-
ments ( or nrmax when cluster aggregation is used): F lAggSensor =
∑rmax
1 F
l
i,r
or F lAggCluster =
∑rmax
1
∑n
1 F
l
i,r. First, fragments are individually decrypted
to obtain the aggregated points. Then, the sum of round data is interpolated
from the aggregated points.
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Step 1: Decryption of Fragments
In the additively homomorphic encryption (AHE), data decryption consists
of subtraction modulo m of the keystream from the encrypted data. Thus,
decryption of a final fragment consists in performing rmax (or nrmax when
cluster aggregation is used) subtractions modulom of all the keystreams that
were used during the encryption of single fragments components of the final
sum.
Step 2: Interpolation
After decryption of the k fragments, k points containing aggregation of rmax
(or nrmax) points are obtained. The next step consists in interpolating a
polynomial using those k points and reconstructing the polynomial’s coeffi-
cients. This can be done using one of the standard interpolating methods,
for instance the Lagrange interpolation. The interpolation is a more com-
plex operation than the evaluation used during the fragmentation step (it
has an arithmetic operational complexity of O(k2) that can be reduced to
O(klog2k); the Horner’s scheme can be used to reduce the complexity of
polynomial evaluation to O(k)). However, interpolation is not a problem as
long it is performed outside the sensors and there is no real-time constraint
(which is the case of the presented scenario).
6.5 Comparison with Relevant Works
AHEF was analyzed in terms of storage overhead and transmission costs as
well as in terms of performance of data processing. Results were compared
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Table 6.1: Quantitative analysis of relevant schemes. (*) - A version of
RSSS where the key is fragmented and transmitted among the data. (1) -
Aggregation is performed only on fragments coming from the same sensor. (2)
- Sensors are organized into clusters of n nodes and corresponding fragments
from the n sensors are being aggregated.
Scheme Storage Overhead Transmission Costs Resilience Agg.
Data M.
rmax∑
r=1
|Dri | DN:
rmax∑
r=1
|Dri | No No
[DPMS+08] MO: 2
rmax∑
r=1
|Dri |
[DPMS+09] KM:
rmax∑
j=1
j∑
r=1
|Dri |
RSSS n
k
rmax∑
r=1
|Dri |
(n+k)
k
rmax∑
r=1
|Dri | Yes No
[RRZ08]
[WRLZ09]
RSSS (*) n
k
rmax∑
r=1
(|Dri |+ k|key|)
(n+k)
k
rmax∑
r=1
(|Dri |+ k|K|) Yes No
HKS |Dri |+ log2(rmax) |Dri |+ log2(rmax) No Yes
[ROL09b]
HEHSS (1) n(|Dri |+ log2(rmax)) (n+ k)(|Dri |+ log2(R)) Yes Yes
[ROL09a]
HEHSS (2) (|Dri |+ log2(rmaxn)) (n+ k)(|Dri |+ log2(rmaxn)) Yes Yes
AHEF (1) n( |D
r
i |
k
+ log2(rmax)) n( |D
r
i |
k
+ log2(rmax)) Yes Yes
AHEF (2) 1
k
(|Dri |+ log2(rmaxn)) (n+ k)(
|Dri |
k
+ log2(rmaxn)) Yes Yes
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with relevant works.
6.5.1 Storage Overhead
A comparison of storage overhead (SO) and transmission costs (TC) of rel-
evant schemes was done. Table 6.1 presents a summary of the quantitative
analysis. To better illustrate the difference between algorithms, simulations
of SO and TC are presented in Figures 6.2 and 6.3. During simulations, a
data sample of 1000 bits was created at each round. It was supposed that
the end user is interested by the average value of the captured data as well
as by their variance.
Intuitively, for all schemes, the storage overhead depends on the size
of round data |Dri | and the number of rounds rmax. As presented in Fig-
ure 6.2, data aggregation allows a significant saving of SO. Indeed, for Basic
Scheme and RSSS at each round, the SO increases by the size of round data
|Dri |. HKS, HEHSS, and AHEF allow data aggregation. For each of these
schemes, at each round, the storage overhead increases only by the value
coming from the bits added to avoid overflow during aggregation of data
fragments. HEHSS applies secret sharing in addition to encryption which, in
contrast to encryption, increases the size of the data (the size of each data
fragment is equal to the size of the round data, so it leads to a n-fold increase
of SO during the first round). AHEF deals with this problem by replacing
Shamir’s scheme with Krawczyk’s information dispersal.
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(a) SO - fragmentation techniques. (b) SO - homomorphic techniques.
Figure 6.2: Storage cost per sensor. Data aggregation allows a significant
reduction in storage cost. (a) HKS does not provide data resilience and it
also comes with limited data protection. AHEF achieves a lower storage cost
per sensor (factor ≈ 1
k
) than HEHSS since it replaces secret sharing with
information dispersal (b).
6.5.2 Transmission Costs
Transmission costs are expressed as the sum of bits transmitted from the
sensor to its neighbors (during fragmentation) and of bits of stored data
transmitted to the sink during data collection. As presented in Figure 6.3,
TC for the Basic Scheme in the KEEP-MOVING mode are much higher
than for the rest of the schemes (for which the increase is linear in function
of the number of rounds). When k = n, RSSS and Basic Scheme in the mode
MOVE-ONCE have equal TC. Schemes allowing data aggregation comes with
a significantly lower TC. HKS has the lowest TC; it does not spread data
over the sensor’s node since its only TC is the cost of uploading data to the
204 CHAPTER 6. FRAGMENTATION INSIDE UWSN
(a) TC - fragmentation techniques. (b) TC - homomorphic techniques.
Figure 6.3: Transmission costs (TC) per sensor. Fragmenting data instead of
replicating and applying error correction codes helps limit the transmission
costs while providing data resilience (a). AHEF significantly reduces TC
in comparison to HEHSS as its data fragments are k-times smaller than in
HEHSS. HKS does distribute data to its neighbors (and thus does not provide
data resilience) so the only TC is the transmission to the sink (b).
sink. For AHEF, the cost is twofold: in addition to the sink’s transmission,
at each round, data are diffused over neighbors. Fragment size in HEHSS is
k times larger than in AHEF (due to the use of Shamir’s scheme). Therefore,
at each round, its TC are k times larger than these of AHEF.
6.5.3 Performance Benchmark
Implementation details Relevant algorithms were implemented in JAVA
using the following resources: JAVA 1.8 and Matlab 2011b on DELL Latitude
E6540, X64-based PC running on Intel R© CoreTM i7-4800MQ CPU @ 2.70
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(a) Storage overhead. (b) Transmission costs.
Figure 6.4: Comparison of two aggregation variants: (1) Aggregation of frag-
ments only coming from a single sensor and (2) Aggregation of data coming
from a single sensor and some of its neighbors. This demonstrates that aggre-
gating fragments from multiple sensors leads to an increase in transmission
costs but a decrease of storage costs.
GHz with 8 GB RAM, under Windows 7. AES-CTR with 128-bits key was
used to generate the pseudo-random keystreams and SHA256 as the hash
function.
Benchmark results Execution time for data processing for rmax = 10000
rounds was measured for each algorithm in two configurations: when all
the fragments are required for data recovery (n = k) and when redundant
fragments are generated (n = 1.5k). The time between consecutive rounds
was not taken into account as it is the time when a sensor rests in sleep mode.
Results are shown in Figure 6.5. The proposed scheme (AHEF) achieves
better performance than HEHSS and RSSS. The performance’s gain increases
with the number of fragments. The clear lack of scalability of HEHSS and
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Figure 6.5: Performance benchmark. AHEF achieves a better performance
than HEHSS and RSSS. It comes with a slightly higher performance over-
head than HKS as it adds fragmentation to the encryption. HKS does not
provide data resilience, which is why it was not included in the comparison
for n=1.5k.
RSSS is mainly caused by the use of Shamir’s secret sharing. In contrast to
HKS, AHEF provides resilient data and generates interdependent fragments.
Thus, it comes with a slightly larger performance overhead.
6.6 Summary
This chapter focuses on a different kind of data fragmentation - the one
performed inside Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks. It introduces an
Additively Homomorphic Encryption and Fragmentation (AHEF) scheme.
The scheme allows the preservation of the backward and forward secrecy
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of data collected inside the sensors during multiple collecting rounds. It
combines dynamic key evolution with additively homomorphic encryption
and additively homomorphic fragmentation.
AHEF replaces additively homomorphic secret sharing used in state-of-
the-art techniques with additively homomorphic information dispersal. This
change has a significant impact on the volume of data stored inside the sensors
as well as on the transmission costs. Both are reduced by a factor of at least
2 (the exact gain will depend on the number of fragments and consequently
on the chosen number of neighbors of each of sensors). Two configurations of
data aggregation are presented: aggregating data produced by a single sensor
and aggregating data produced by a cluster of several sensors. The storage
overhead and the transmission costs are compared in both configurations.
AHEF considerably reduces the number of required computations allowing
sensors to limit the use of their energy not only because of the decreased
amount of transmission in comparison to state-of-the-art techniques, but
also because of a less energy consuming data fragmentation procedure.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
This chapter summaries the research contributions presented in this thesis
dissertation. It also gives a detailed insight into future work.
7.1 Summary of contributions
This dissertation addresses the problem of preserving data confidentiality
using a combination of data fragmentation, encryption, and dispersal.
Chapter 2 contains a detailed survey of data fragmentation as a way
of preserving data confidentiality. Two types of fragmentation categories
were introduced: bitwise and structurewise. We observe that fragmentation
techniques can be divided into these two categories. The bitwise fragmen-
tation category includes techniques like secret sharing, information disper-
sal, and various schemes based on symmetric encryption. The structurewise
fragmentation category gathers the historical object-oriented fragmentation-
redundancy-scattering approach together with multiple schemes fragmenting
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relational databases in order to preserve user’s privacy. Described techniques
are compared in terms of performance, storage overhead, and provided data
protection level. Performance benchmarks give an empirical comparison in
order to confirm theoretical evaluations. In addition to data fragmentation
techniques, systems applying data fragmentation are presented. Included
here are not only academic but also commercial systems, demonstrating the
growing interest of industries in fragmentation as a way of providing data
protection. Elements proper to such solutions like the management of frag-
ments’ locations are pointed out and portrayed. Recommendations on the
design of a secure fragmentation architecture are given at the end of the
chapter.
Chapter 3 extends the all-or-nothing family of algorithms with three
schemes that are the fastest among known state-of-the-art schemes: Secure
Fragmentation and Dispersal (SFD), Circular-All-Or-Nothing (CAON), and
Selective All-Or-Nothing (SAON). All of them encrypt then transform and
disperse data over multiple storage locations. The main goal is to protect the
obtained fragments against the exposure of the cryptographic material, espe-
cially the encryption key, without compromising fragmentation performance.
They achieve a very moderate performance overhead (between 6 and 10%)
in comparison to simple data encryption. This is possible as they require
only few operations in addition to data encryption. As SFD does not per-
form any operation apart from data fragmentation and CAON uses only one
exclusive-or per one bit of data, it is actually hard to imagine a fragmentation
algorithm that would achieve the same properties with less operations. The
three schemes share the same main goal but are dedicated to be applied in
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three different contexts. Both SFD and CAON transform data into multiple
fragments of equal size. They could be applied in a data center composed of
a multitude of servers or by users having access to several storage sites. The
difference between the two schemes lies in the fact that they are designed
to be applied on different kinds of encrypted data. SFD operates on data
encrypted using block ciphers with a mode of operation applying chaining
between ciphertext blocks. CAON can be employed on any kind of encrypted
data and thus may be applied on data encrypted using streamciphers. SAON
differs from SFD and CAON, in that it fragments the transformed data into
only two fragments: a small fragment designated to be stored on a trusted
device and a large fragment meant to be outsourced. SAON suits the needs
of users having access to only a single storage site, i.e. a public cloud.
Schemes presented in Chapter 3 are fast but cannot be faster than their
key component - symmetric data encryption applied over the whole input
data. Consequently, accelerating the fragmentation process even more re-
quires limiting the number of block cipher operations. This is the main
idea behind the Partial Encryption and All-Or-Nothing (PE-AON) scheme
presented in Chapter 4. In a first step, PE-AON encrypts only a part of
the plaintext. In a second step, it blends the encrypted and non-encrypted
data using an all-or-nothing transform based solely on exclusive-ors opera-
tions. The speed up of the processing comes at the cost of tightened dispersal
requirements; fragments are protected (even against key exposure) but only
when an attacker is assumed to have access to at most one of the storage sites.
The only exception from this rule is when the amount of non-encrypted data
is equal to a size of a single fragment. In such configurations, the attacker
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has to compromise the totality of the storage sites in order to reconstruct
the initial data and is able to recover some information about the data when
accessing all but two storage locations. It is an especially interesting config-
uration as it allows a fragmentation processing faster than encryption while
protecting the fragments against key exposure.
Chapter 5 introduces the Secure and Scalable Fragmentation (FSFA)
scheme - a lightweight fragmentation method that, instead of symmetric en-
cryption uses a combination of data encoding, permutation, and dispersal. It
produces a small storage overhead proportional to the number of fragments,
which is negligible in relation to larger data. Performance benchmarks show
that the scheme can be more than two times faster than symmetric encryp-
tion. The scheme is particularly well adapted for data dispersal in a multi-
cloud environment, where non-colluding cloud providers ensure the physical
separation between data fragments. It could be seen as a particular case of
a more general method of lightweight data protection combining fragmenta-
tion, data encoding, and data dispersal.
Nowadays, the internet-of-things enables data fragmentation and distri-
bution within a different type of architecture - the one composed of a multi-
tude of sensors nodes with tight energy and memory constraints. Chapter 6
treats the problem of providing data confidentiality by means of fragmen-
tation inside Unattended Wireless Sensor Networks. It introduces the Ad-
ditively Homomorphic Encryption and Fragmentation Scheme (AHEF) that
can be used to fragment data inside a sensor before dispersing them over a
number of the sensor’s neighbours. By replacing additively homomorphic se-
cret sharing used in state-of-the-art techniques with additively homomorphic
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information dispersal, AHEF considerably reduces the volume of data stored
inside the sensors (more at least 50%), as well as the transmission costs. In
addition, it decreases the number of required computations allowing sensors
to save the energy of the sensors.
7.2 Future Work
Six schemes were proposed improving the state-of-the-art techniques for data
protection by means of fragmentation in two kinds of distributed environ-
ments. They open the door to several research tracks and raise a few open
questions which need to be addressed in future work.
Fine-grained implementation of the algorithms
The presented schemes were evaluated not only in terms of theoretical com-
plexity but also in terms of execution time. The implementation was realized
in a coarse-grained manner as the libraries containing basic algorithms (like
the block cipher AES) were not modified. Integrating the proposed schemes
within standard mechanisms would improve their performance. For instance,
the block dispersal performed by the SFD could be directly implemented in-
side the function encrypting data using a block cipher and not in a second
step after the data encryption (the way it is currently implemented). More-
over, performance could be improved by fully exploiting various possibilities
for parallelization of the processing.
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Transforming FSFA into a methodology
The Fast and Scalable Fragmentation Algorithm (FSFA) presented in Chap-
ter 5 could be transformed into a more general methodology combining sev-
eral lightweight mechanisms in order to protect the fragmented data. Indeed,
various modifications for methods of data dispersal over fragments, data en-
coding, or data permutation could be done. First, instead of Shamir’s se-
cret sharing, another secret sharing scheme could be applied. Second, the
amount of employed pseudo-random data (in FSFA, presented as the Initial
Pseudo-random Blocks) could be adjusted to the desired level of data pro-
tection. Third, a more sophisticated means of data permutation could be
imagined. Although some preliminary cryptanalysis work was performed, a
more detailed security analysis comparing it with the state-of-the-art should
be performed before its deployment in a industrial context.
The dispersal obstacle
During the descriptions of the dispersal of the fragments, it was assumed
that the user has the access to a sufficient number of physically separated or
independent storage locations, i.e. different data centers of the same storage
provider or different storage providers. However, the question of how to en-
sure the separation of the fragments is not trivial. First, fragments should
not be distributed using a single channel in order to make the man-in-the-
middle attack inefficient. Ideally, a separate encrypted communication chan-
nel should be established between the trusted user’s device and each of the
storage locations. Second, the dispersal obstacle is enabled by the difficulty
to access the selected number of storage location. Therefore, even a coarse-
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grained dispersal over different storage providers may be not challenging for
the attacker, for instance if the user uses the same credentials to access each
of storage sites. The same situation will occur if the data are dispersed over
virtually separated but physically identical storage servers. Therefore, future
work will focus on ensuring a secure distribution of the data fragments from
the trusted area where the fragmentation occurs to their final destinations.
Processing of fragmented data
The question of a secure processing is unavoidable in the case of outsourced
data. A theoretical way of addressing this issue could be seen in the use
of homomorphic encryption [Gen09]. However, Fully Homomorphic Encryp-
tion is currently impractical and Somewhat Homomorphic Encryption has
limited applications areas. Multi-party computation and searchable encryp-
tion seems a much more promising direction for following years [ABB+15]. A
research track would adapt existing multi-party computation and searchable
encryption techniques to the fragmented nature of the data.
Designing a complete bitwise fragmentation storage systems
In the future, presented fragmentation algorithms could be integrated inside
existing systems in order to enrich them with an additional data protection
mechanism or with a fast and lightweight fragmentation alternative. For
instance, they could be integrated within the HAIL system providing high-
availability and integrity for cloud storage [BJO09] or the DepSky multi-
cloud project [BCQ+13]. Moreover, the all-or-nothing schemes presented in
Chapter 3 could be used as a way of creating dependencies between data in
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fast access management systems, like the Mix&Slice [BDCdVF+16].
Fragments Distribution and Energy Cost Evaluation of Fragmen-
tation in UWSN
The schemes presented in Chapter 6 were evaluated in terms of storage over-
head, transmission costs, as well as performance. In the future, an analysis of
the energy consumption should be performed. Indeed, energy optimization
plays a crucial role inside UWSN as sensors are powered by batteries. Thus,
theoretical results showing that the AHEF scheme requires less computa-
tions than other techniques should be confirmed by an empirical measure-
ment of the sensors’ energy consumption. Such measurements should take
into account not only the energy required for the data fragmentation, but
also the energy required to disperse the fragments. The first works on this
subject, addressing the optimal distribution of data fragments, are already
in progress [CKL18].
A static configuration of the UWSN where the sensor sends data only to
its closest neighbors facilitates the description and evaluation of the AHEF
scheme. However, this network model could be extended in several aspects.
First, the proposed fragmentation scheme could be adapted to a dynamic
network model where the nodes are mobile and thus neighbors of a node
are constantly changing. Second, a multi-hop data dispersal protocol could
be established that would wisely balance between the dispersal scope of the
data fragments and the energy consumption of the sensors. A work on this
subject is already in progress [LKMJ19].
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Appendix A
Empirical Analysis of FSFA
This appendix presents an empirical security evaluation of the Fast and Scal-
able Fragmentation Algorithm (FSFA) introduced in Chapter 5. Results
show that data inside fragments produced by FSFA achieve a good level of
uniformity and independence. Contrary to an information dispersal algo-
rithm, this scheme does not preserve patterns inside data fragments.
All tests were performed using Matlab environment on textual data sam-
ples provided by the French post office LaPoste1. An example of one of
such data sample is shown in Figure A.1a. Its corresponding fragment is
presented in Figure A.1c and compared to the one obtained using an IDA
(Figure A.1b).
Probability Density Function. Frequency counts close to a uniform dis-
tribution testify data have a good level of mixing. This means that each
byte value inside a fragment should have an occurrence probability close to
1
v
= 0.0039, where v is the number of possible values (256 for a byte). In
1http://www.laposte.fr/
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Original data IDA Proposed scheme
Figure A.1: Byte value distribution of a textual data sample (a) and distri-
bution of one of its fragment after applying an IDA (b) and after applying
the proposed approach (c), k=2. Data patterns are preserved after the use of
an IDA. Fragment (c) contains all possible byte values and does not contain
visible data patterns. The x-axis shows the byte position inside the sample,
the y-axis shows the byte value at position x.
Figure A.2a, the probability density function (PDF) of a data sample and
two of its fragments are shown. Results for the fragments are spread over
the space and have a distribution close to uniform. It demonstrates that the
occurrence probability of byte values is close to 0.0039.
Entropy. Information entropy is a measure of unpredictability of informa-
tion content [Cac97]. In a good fragmentation scheme the entropy of the
fragments should be close to ideal. Figure A.2b shows the entropy value
for three different fragmented data samples for different fragmentation al-
gorithm. The entropy value of the fragments generated using FSFA was
comparable with the entropy of fragments generated using SSMS and much
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Figure A.2: Left: Probability density function comparison for data and their
two different fragments. The x-axis shows possible byte values in the sample,
the y-axis shows the probability of occurrence of a value. For fragmented
data, the occurrence probability is close to the one of a uniform distribution
(0.039). Right: Entropy comparison for three data samples (text, image).
The maximum entropy value is equal to 8. Entropy of fragments obtained
using IDA depends strongly on the entropy of the input data.
higher than the one obtained using an IDA.
Chi-squared test. The uniformity of byte values of data inside fragments
was validated by applying a chi-squared test [Coc52]. For a significance
level of 0.05, the null hypothesis is not rejected and the distribution of the
fragment data is uniform if χ2test ≤ χ2theory(255, 0.05) ≈ 293. The test was
applied on fragmentation results of 15 different data samples for a fragment
size of 1000 bytes. For all samples, the tests was successful.
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(a) Original data (b) IDA (c) Proposed scheme
Figure A.3: Recurrence plots for data from Figure A.1. The x-axis shows
data values, the y-axis shows data values with a delay t = 1.
Recurrence. A recurrence plot serves to estimate correlation inside data
[RN88]. Considering data vector x = x1, x2, ..., xm a vector with delay t ≥ 1 is
constructed x(t) = x1+t, x2+t, ..., xm+t. A recurrence plot shows the variation
between x and x(t). In Figure A.3, such plots for a data sample and its
fragments obtained by applying an IDA and the proposed scheme are shown.
Using the proposed scheme, data inside the fragments are more uniformly
distributed.
Correlation. Correlation coefficients between fragments were measured
and were close to 0. This demonstrates that even neighboring fragments are
not correlated with each other and thus confirms the independence property
of the scheme.
Difference. Each fragment should be significantly different from the initial
data and from other fragments of the same fragmentation result. Bit differ-
ence between a data sample and each of its fragments was measured and
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(a) (b)
Figure A.4: Correlation between fragments. Measured for c = 2 (a) and c = 3
(b). Block size was equal to 34 bytes. Correlation coefficients are close to 0,
even between neighbor fragments.
was close to 50%. The same result was obtained for the difference between
fragments themselves.
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